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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the repopulation of Leningrad following the blockade of the city 
during the Second World War. In the years after the lifting of the siege blockade 
survivors remaining in Leningrad were joined annually by hundreds of thousands of 
incomers. However, while the siege has recently been the subject of a number of 
scholarly and literary treatments, much less attention has been paid to what happened 
next in terms of the mass resettlement of the city. Accounts of the consequences of the 
blockade that touch upon the postwar population have deployed the term ‘Leningraders’ 
as shorthand for a cohesive community of blockade survivors, embedded in the culture 
and landscape of the city. Even pieces of work that have portrayed post-siege Leningrad 
as a ‘city of migrants’ have concentrated on the impact of the loss of the prewar 
population rather than on the multifarious experiences of its itinerant populations.  
 
The thesis addresses the role of widespread experiences of displacement and resettlement 
in structuring relationships among individuals and between citizens and the authorities in 
the post-siege civic environment. It examines the repopulation in the context of evolving 
Soviet practices of population management after the war and in terms of the intersection 
of population movements with the re-affirmation of a civic community in a city which 
had lost a vast proportion of its population, just as it gained the basis for a powerful new 
narrative of belonging. It demonstrates how competing visions of the desired postwar 
order on a national and local scale were constructed and contested in relation to displaced 
people who were often targeted as a potentially transgressive presence in the postwar 
landscape.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
  
1.1 “Quickly-quickly they settled all our empty space.” 
  
This thesis is a study of the repopulation of Leningrad in the wake of the devastating 
blockade of the city in the Second World War. On 27th January 1944, Soviet troops on 
the Leningrad front had the German army in retreat, and the freedom of the city from its 
almost nine hundred day encirclement was announced. The American journalist and war 
correspondent Harrison Salisbury described the moment thus: 
  
On January 27 at 8 p.m., over the sword point of the Admiralty, over the great 
dome of St. Isaac’s, over the broad expanse of Palace Square, over the broken 
buildings of Pulkovo, the dilapidated machine shops of the Kirov works, the 
battered battleships still standing in the Neva, roared a shower of golden arrows, 
a flaming stream of red, white and blue rockets. It was a salute from 324 cannon 
marking the liberation of Leningrad, the end of the blockade, the victory of the 
armies of Generals Govorov and Meretskov. After 880 days the siege of 
Leningrad, the longest ever endured by a modern city, had come to an end.1 
  
The shower of golden arrows and red, white and blue rockets roared over a city, as this 
passage suggests, much of which was still standing, but which was scarred by the 
preceding years of bombardment and blockade, of military mobilisation and mass 
starvation. The poet Vera Inber, who only came from Moscow to stay in the city in the 
wake of the German invasion but lived there through the whole of the siege, recalled 
jumping on a crowded tram to travel to watch the dazzling light show from the Kirov 
                                                  
1
 H. Salisbury, The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad (London: Pan Books, 2000), p.566; Salisbury points 
out in a footnote that the exact length of the siege is variously calculated at 880, 882 or 872 days depending 
on the start date used. The fall of Shlisselburg on 8th September 1941 is commonly accepted today as 
marking the start of the blockade, which then continued for 872 days, although the encirclement was 
breached in January 1943.  
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Bridge, which was completely filled with people.2 According to some estimates, 
however, less than a fifth of the pre-war population of Leningrad remained in the battered 
city at the end of the siege to witness the victory salute.3 The other four fifths had 
mobilised to the army at the front, evacuated to the east or starved to death in an urban 
famine of unprecedented scale.4 In the most severe period of the blockade, the winter of 
1941-2, rations fell to as low as 125g of bread a day and inhabitants remaining in the city 
endured bitter cold and hunger without fuel, running water, or means of transport. 
Thousands of people died every day and bodies piled up on streets and courtyards.5 The 
diary of a schoolgirl, Tania Savicha, who died in spring 1942, recorded the deaths of her 
family members one by one as the winter progressed. After the death of her mother she 
wrote “The Saviches are dead, they all died”.6 In these conditions, the number of people 
inhabiting the city dropped from over 3,000,000 at the start of the war to under 600,000 
by the time the siege ended.7 Leningrad, in the words of John Barber, “suffered the 
                                                  
2
 V. Inber, Leningrad Diary, trans. S. M. Wolff and R. Grieve (London: Hutchinson & Co Ltd, 1971), 
pp.182-3. 
3
 For use of this statistic see L. A. Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad, 1941-1995. Myth, 
Memories and Monuments (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.73 or N. Iu. Cherepenina, 
‘Demograficheskaia katastrofa blokirovannogo Leningrada’, in Zhizn’ i smert’ v osazhdennom Leningrade: 
istoriko-meditsinskii aspect. Materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii, 26-27 aprelia 2001g (St 
Petersburg: Petropolis, 2001), p.7; establishing precise figures for population losses from the city during the 
siege is complicated and will be examined in detail in chapter two.   
4
 The unprecedented scale of the famine is highlighted in J. Barber, ‘Introduction: Leningrad’s Place in the 
History of Famine’, in J. Barber and A. Dzeniskevich (eds.), Life and Death in Besieged Leningrad, 1941-
44 (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p.1; Bubis and Ruble have also discussed the 
blockade as the longest and most devastating siege of a major urban centre in the history of mankind: E. 
Bubis and B. A Ruble, ‘The Impact of World War II on Leningrad’, in S. J. Linz (ed.), The Impact of World 
War II on the Soviet Union (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985), p.189. 
5
 For this type of description of the severe period of the siege see L. Gouré, The Siege of Leningrad 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp.218-223 or Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege, pp.1-2; 
Goure, for example, quotes from the diary of one former city resident who wrote in 1942 that “Leningrad is 
dying. Slowly and painfully….The city is perishing”: Goure, The Siege of Leningrad, p.220. 
6
 As cited in Goure, The Siege of Leningrad, p.219; the diary was cited as evidence in the Nuremberg Trials 
and was widely known in Russia and abroad after the war as a symbol of the city’s suffering. 
7
 Poliakov and Zhiromskaia have established a figure in the order of 3,300,000 inhabitants on the eve of the 
war: Iu. A. Poliakov and V. B. Zhiromskaia (eds.), Naselenie Rossii v XX veke: Istoricheskie ocherki. Tom 
2. 1940 – 1959gg (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001), p.42. Several recent works on the blockade give a figure of 
about 575,000 for the population at the start of 1944: Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege, p.73 and R. 
Bidlack, ‘Foreword: Historical background to the siege of Leningrad’, in C. Simmons and N. Perlina (eds.), 
Writing the Siege of Leningrad: Women’s Diaries, Memoirs and Documentary Prose (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002), p.xxiv. A senior St Petersburg archivist puts the figure at even lower, 
just 557,760 people: N. Cherepenina, ‘Assessing the Scale of Famine and Death in the Besieged City’, in 
Barber and Dzeniskevich (eds.), Life and Death in Besieged Leningrad, p.62. A figure of 546,000 residents 
for the start of January 1944 can be found in the records of the Statistical Administration of the City of 
Leningrad from 1967, where it appears as part of a set of data collated for an anthology to be published that 
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greatest demographic catastrophe ever experienced by one city in the history of 
mankind”. 8 
  
As the majority of the city’s residents left or perished, apartments and districts became 
cold, dark, silent and empty.9 Whole areas of the city were burnt to the ground by 
German bombing or knocked down to provide remaining residents with firewood. One 
woman who lived through the blockade noted in her recollections of the first winter that 
“whole families, whole apartments with collectives of families disappeared. Houses, 
streets, blocks disappeared”.10 By 27th January 1944, the ‘second capital’ had become an 
emptied space.11 
  
Harrison Salisbury evokes the eerie emptiness of the blockaded city and its reversion 
almost to the sparsely populated city of the pre-industrial era. He describes how, in 1943: 
  
The city now bore little resemblance to the majestic capital of prewar 1941. It 
was more like that Petersburg of which Turgenev wrote: “… these empty, wide, 
gray streets, these gray-white, yellow-gray, gray-pink peeling plaster houses 
with their deep-set windows – that is our Northern Palmyra. Everything visible 
from all sides, everything clear, frighteningly sharp and clear, and all sadly 
sleeping.” The city [in 1943] did not sleep, but it was empty. There were not 
many more people walking the streets of Leningrad than walked the streets of 
Turgenev’s Petersburg in 1860 or 1870.12 
  
                                                                                                                                                  
year: Statisticheskoe upravlenie goroda Leningrada, Tsentral’nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sankt 
Peterburga, henceforth TsGASPb, f.4965, op.8, d.738, l.4. Again, difficulties assessing population figures 
for the city will be discussed further in chapter two. 
8
 Barber, ‘Introduction: Leningrad’s Place in the History of Famine’, p.1. 
9
 A section in Lisa Kirschenbaum’s study of the legacy of the siege is entitled ‘Cold, Hunger, Darkness: 
The Winter of 1941-1942’: Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege, p.56. 
10
 From the reminiscences of the classicist Ol’ga Freidenberg, written in spring 1942 and published in the 
almanac Minuvshee in 1987, as cited in Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege, p.123. 
11
 The city (called St Petersburg from its founding in 1703, then renamed Petrograd in 1914 and Leningrad 
in 1924, reverting to its original name after the collapse of the Soviet Union) had been the capital from the 
early eighteenth century until 1918, when the Bolsheviks moved the capital back to Moscow. On the 
continuing symbolic power of Leningrad as a second capital see Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege, 
p.31. 
12
 Salisbury, The 900 Days, p.552. 
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Indeed, a poem composed in April 1945 about life in the blockaded city by Ol’ga 
Berggol’ts, a Leningrad poet who lived through siege, echoes Turgenev’s portrait of the 
empty streets of mid-nineteenth century Petersburg. Berggol’ts, too, depicts derelict and 
uninhabited expanses of the city, clearly apparent to the spectator: 
  
“We lived high up – on the seventh floor. 
From there the city was visible for a long way. 
It was scorched, quiet and proud, 
It was deserted 
And all (of it), up to the ashes, – (was) ours”.13 
  
For survivors of the blockade, as a recent investigation by Lisa Kirschenbaum indicates, 
it seemed like the prophecy made by Peter the Great’s first wife that “the city will be 
empty” had been on the verge of fulfilment.14 In fact, the population recorded in the city 
took until early 1961 to recover to prewar levels.15 From the moment the city was 
liberated and the rockets of the victory salute flew over its battered expanses, however, a 
frenetic growth of the population did take place. In the three years from the start of 1944 
to the end of 1946 over 1,500,000 people came to live in Leningrad, according to the 
official registration of incomers.16 An interviewee in a recent oral history project on the 
blockade, conducted by the European University, St Petersburg, recalled how “our city 
                                                  
13
 O. Berggol’ts, ‘Tvoi Put’’, in Sobranie sochinenii v trekh tomakh. Tom vtoroi (Leningrad: 
Khudozhestvennaia Literatura, 1973), pp.107-121, here p.114; translations are mine unless otherwise 
stated. 
14
 Eudoxia was the first wife of Peter the Great, the tsar who decreed the founding of St Petersburg in 1703. 
Peter had forced Eudoxia to become a nun in 1698 after she objected to his rejection of Muscovy traditions. 
See Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege, p.21-22 and p.28; see also E. Hellberg-Hirn, Imperial 
Imprints: Post-Soviet St Petersburg (SKS Finnish Literature Society, 2003), p.118 for the point that this 
widely known ‘prophetic curse’ has been variously attributed to Eudoxia or to an old-believer severely 
punished by Peter.  
15
 Statisticheskoe upravlenie goroda Leningrada, TsGASPb, f.4965, op.8, d.738, ll.4-4(ob); this assertion is 
based on figures for the city of Leningrad, without the inclusion of the suburban settlements which also 
came under the jurisdiction of the Leningrad City Soviet – the distinction will be explained further in 
chapter two.  
16
 Calculation based on figures assembled at the time by the city’s Statistical Administration: TsGASPb, 
f.4965, op.8, d.738, ll.5-5(ob). 
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very quickly filled up, our house filled with people….quickly-quickly they settled all our 
empty space”.17 
  
There has been some very valuable scholarly, and literary, work produced in Russia and 
the west in the last decade on daily life in besieged Leningrad, on the lasting effects of 
the widespread starvation and the memorialisation of the blockade by survivors.18 Much 
less attention has been paid to what happened next in terms of the rapid resettlement of 
the cityscape, despite the scale of this event in numerical terms alone. Social histories that 
do feature the post-siege city tend to focus either on the life stories of blockade survivors 
or on the population lost to the city forever during the war and the repercussions of their 
absence.19 This is understandable, given the scale of suffering in wartime Leningrad. This 
work argues, however, that the aftermath of the siege can only be properly understood by 
considering the way the city ‘filled up’ again, the diverse experiences of displacement 
and resettlement undergone by many of its population and the way that central and local 
authorities treated incomers to the city – both returnees and new migrants - from 1944 
onwards. 
  
The thesis picks up the story of everyday life in the city once the blockade was lifted and 
the victory salute was over. Specifically, it tells the neglected tale of how the city’s 
expanses, its ‘broken buildings and machine shops’, were quickly repopulated by 
hundreds of thousands of in-migrants and how this migration was experienced, shaped 
                                                  
17
 Interview with V.Kh.V., Arkhiv Tsentra Ustnoi Istorii Evropeiskogo Universiteta St. Peterburga, 
henceforth ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-006, p.23. 
18
 This thesis draws in particular on Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege;  Simmons and Perlina (eds.), 
Writing the Siege of Leningrad; Barber and Dzeniskevich (eds.), Life and Death in Besieged Leningrad; 
and M. Loskutova (ed.), Pamiat’ o blockade: Svidetel’stva ochevidtsev i istoricheskoe soznanie 
obshchestva: Materialy i issledovaniia (Moscow: Novoe izdatel’stvo, 2005). David Glantz has also written 
two recent books focussing on the defence of the city: D. M. Glantz, The Siege of Leningrad 1941-1944: 
900 Days of Terror (London: Brown Partworks Limited, 2001) and The Battle for Leningrad: 1941-1944 
(Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002).  Anna Reid is currently working on a book about the blockade 
which is due to be published shortly, with the provisional title Blockade: the Siege of Leningrad 1941-
1944. The siege was the setting for a 2001 novel by British author Helen Dunmore: H. Dunmore, The Siege 
(London: Penguin Books, 2001) and also for a novel by the screenwriter David Benioff published in 2008: 
D. Benioff, City of Thieves (New York: Viking Books, 2008). 
19
 These works will be discussed in more detail later on in this chapter. Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the 
Siege, is a good example of work that conflates postwar Leningraders with blockade survivors. For one 
example of a study that concentrates on implications of the lost population see B. A. Ruble, ‘The Leningrad 
Affair and the Provincialization of Leningrad’, Russian Review, Vol.42, No.3 (July 1983), pp.301-320. 
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and represented. It addresses questions such as who were the people who repopulated the 
scorched and deserted city? Where did they come from? How did they figure in the 
practices and discourses of central and local authorities at the end of the war? How did 
they experience and shape their own displacement and resettlement? What was the nature 
of their encounters with the city, with its government, its physical spaces, its rich 
mythology and its other inhabitants? What role did they play in both the physical and 
discursive reconstruction of the cityscape at the end of the war? 
  
In conceiving the post-blockade history of the city in a framework of displacement and 
resettlement, the thesis does not disregard the local dimensions of Leningrad’s postwar 
history, the background of the extraordinary suffering of the siege and the distinct 
position of St Petersburg-Leningrad in Russian culture. Instead, it seeks to combine these 
with both the history of Soviet population management and the global history of 
migration. It examines, above all, how the powerful civic narrative of belonging, 
constructed by officials and survivors during and after the siege, intersected with the 
massive sweep of population movements at the end of the Second World War. This 
approach, it argues, allows for a re-examination and enrichment of existing portraits of 
‘Leningraders’ after the war and illuminates ways in which membership in the civic 
community was actually constructed and contested. The investigation has significance as 
a case study in practices of population politics and polity building and contributes to our 
understanding of relationships between state and society and between central and local 
authorities in the postwar Soviet Union.20 
  
This introduction will outline the main arguments of the thesis and their relation to bodies 
of work on St Petersburg-Petrograd-Leningrad and on population movement in the Soviet 
                                                  
20
 The research for this work has been carried out within the framework of a collaborative AHRC funded 
project, ‘Population, state practice and social experience in the USSR and Easter Europe, 1930-1956’. The 
project addressed issues such as the relationship between ‘space’ and ‘place’, between ‘sedentarism’ and 
‘itinerancy’, and between state practice, the everyday experience of displaced persons and individual 
identity. Some of the findings of this thesis have been published in the edited volume Warlands, which was 
one outcome of the project, alongside discussions of population resettlements in other parts of the Soviet 
Union, the Baltic countries and Poland at the end of the war: in P. Gatrell and N. Baron (eds.), Warlands: 
Population Resettlement and State Reconstruction in the Soviet-East European Borderlands, 1945-1950 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
 7
Union and beyond. It will set out the theoretical and methodological approaches that have 
been employed in the study and will also address the impact of this type of work on our 
understanding of the postwar period of Soviet history as a whole. First, however, why is 
there a need to reassess scholarly depictions of ‘ordinary Leningraders’ after the war? 
  
1.2 A motley crowd: questions of identity in postwar Leningrad 
  
Chapter two of the thesis is devoted to discussion of the diversity of people who 
constituted the post-blockade public. It begins with the description of a throng of people 
at a fair in Leningrad in 1946, taken from the recollections of Anatolii Petrov, a city 
resident who was nine years old at the time. Petrov recalls how, as a lad, he walked 
among the “motley crowd” (pestrota) at the fair and, as he relays his encounters with a 
variety of postwar characters, he wonders about the identity of the public as a whole, 
repeating to himself “who are you? Who are you?”21 This chapter and the following one 
attempt to reconstruct the population of the city of the immediate post-blockade years, in 
a way that reflects Petrov’s articulation of heterogeneity and uncertainty. 
  
This approach is intended to serve as a corrective to existing scholarly accounts of the 
city in the postwar years, which tend to deploy the term ‘Leningrader’ as straightforward 
shorthand for particular types of inhabitants of this period. The current work is, on this 
level, an engagement with previous publications that have provided limited, one-sided, or 
seemingly contradictory portraits of the postwar population. 
  
Until the late 1990s, postwar Leningrad tended to feature in western historiography 
principally as the backdrop to high political wrangling and cultural and political 
repressions. Scholarship concentrated in particular on the city as the location of the first 
targets of the cultural crackdown orchestrated by Andrei Zhdanov from 1946, which 
began with an attack on Leningrad-based writers Akhmatova and Zoshchenko and local 
journals Zvezda and Leningrad, and as the site of the purge of Zhdanov’s protégés and 
                                                  
21
 A. Petrov, ‘Ver zind zi? Ver?..’, Neva, No.5 (1995), pp.220-223, here p.220. 
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other local officials following his death in 1948, in what became known as the Leningrad 
Affair.22 Some accounts of the origins of what David Brandenberger has more recently 
called “this enigmatic purge” have made links between the ‘high politics’ of the struggle 
for influence between blocs centred on Zhdanov, former first party secretary in 
Leningrad, and Georgii Malenkov, and the self-assertiveness of local Leningrad officials 
based on an understanding of the city’s wartime experience as a uniquely heroic 
episode.23  
  
Recent accounts of the legacy of the siege by Lisa Kirschenbaum, among others, have 
focussed on postwar Leningrad as the site of attempts by survivors to endow the painful 
experience of the blockade with meaning. The postwar city is understood by 
Kirschenbaum as the site of memorialisation of the extraordinary and unique experiences 
of the blockade by a ‘community of Leningraders’ and the local authorities. She 
maintains that city dwellers and officials in Leningrad during and after the war, like 
Londoners in the Blitz, created a small-scale ‘we’, a community of people who had 
stayed and struggled, “that was in many ways defined by and identified with well-known 
urban spaces”.24 Residents’ longstanding practices of imagining the city, in conjunction 
with the state’s efforts to impose meanings on the cityscape, facilitated the production of 
local myths which meaningfully plotted the chaos and affliction of life in the blockaded 
                                                  
22
 On the details of the Leningrad Affair see, for example, Ruble, ‘The Leningrad Affair’; Ruble does 
incorporate the Leningrad Affair into a social history of the city and his work will be revisited later in this 
chapter. For the Leningrad Affair as part of the historiography of high postwar Soviet politics see, for 
example, W. G. Hahn, Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946-
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city. These myths shaped a civic cultural identity that for some transcended the horrors of 
war and persisted into the post-Soviet era.25  
  
In this context, Kirschenbaum writes, for example, that “the individual memories that 
Leningraders brought to Soviet sites of memory…complicated, without necessarily 
rejecting, the closure and cant of official myths…Leningraders used official narratives to 
validate loss and to fill in the gaps that they (adaptively) allowed to form in their own 
recall”.26 ‘Ordinary Leningraders’ of the postwar years in this treatment, therefore, are 
equated to blockade survivors, the blokadniki, understood as long-term residents who 
identified closely with well-known urban spaces and narratives and who had suffered 
with the city during the siege.  
  
This thesis makes use of, and corroborates, many of Kirschenbaum’s findings on the 
mythology of the siege. However, it argues that her frequent reduction of ‘postwar 
Leningraders’ to a fairly cohesive community of blockade survivors, embedded in the 
culture and landscape of the city, disregards a major significance of the ‘demographic 
catastrophe’ that had befallen the city. The drastic fall in the population in the course of 
the siege, to which Kirschenbaum herself, of course, makes reference, points to the small 
proportion of the prewar population who remained the city at the end of the blockade and 
to another possible history of the wartime and postwar city: one of displacement and 
resettlement.  
  
In fact, Blair Ruble, in his 1990 survey of the social, economic and political forces which 
shaped the historical development of Leningrad, had already characterised the postwar 
city as “a city of migrants”.27 He has argued in several publications that by September 
1945 the population of the city had already doubled in comparison with March 1943, on 
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account of in-migration.28 According to Ruble, the initial rapid replacement of the 
population could not have occurred on account of the return of prewar Leningraders who 
had been evacuated from the besieged city and were “spread halfway to Vladivostok”, as 
it is unlikely that they could have made the hundred and thousand mile treks across the 
war-torn Soviet Union back to their native city in significant numbers at this time.29 The 
incomers were, on the whole, therefore, made up of demobilised soldiers and in-migrants 
from rural regions. As a result, he writes, by as early as 1945, “a large number, perhaps 
even a majority of the city’s residents had not lived in the city before the outbreak of 
hostilities, had limited personal or familial ties to the city and, as a rule, had fewer work 
skills…than did the city’s prior inhabitants”.30 This “reliance on migration” he concludes 
“magnified the demographic chasm created by the horrific losses of the blockade”.31  
  
Elsewhere, Ruble elucidates the significance of the losses of the siege and subsequent in-
migration in terms of the erosion of Leningrad’s links with its own past and its 
irrevocable provincialisation. According to Ruble, the 1940s represented a historic break 
in the history of Leningrad, and its decline in status from capital city to ordinary 
provincial centre was cemented, as the population of the city of Peter and Lenin was 
quickly reconstituted “by new residents with few historic ties to either founding father”. 
These new inhabitants, he asserts, threatened the city’s unique way of life with oblivion.32 
  
Migration and social transformation in the wake of the blockade and the threat these 
posed to a unique civic culture have been, more recently, the focus of local Russian 
historian A. Z. Vakser. In his book on postwar Leningrad published in 2005, Vakser does 
provide a broad picture of the city’s population in the first few years following the 
blockade. His discussion encompasses the blokadniki and also demobilised soldiers, re-
evacuees and new city-dwellers directed into the workforce by official organisations, 
including adolescents sent into Leningrad’s trade schools. He also refers to an “invisible 
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population” of prisoners of war, other types of prisoners and people arriving illegally, 
without government sanction, who do not show up in official statistics.33  
  
Vakser’s emphasis, though, is also on the city’s repopulation on the basis of the in-
migration of newcomers. He argues, in a similar vein to Ruble, that up to forty percent of 
the prewar population had been lost for good, perishing in the blockade, at the front or in 
evacuation or resettling permanently elsewhere and concludes that, “together with 
them…the city irretrievably lost a whole human layer…bearers of a mentality, of a 
culture that was specific to Petersburg-Petrograd-Leningrad”.34  Elsewhere, he elaborates 
vividly on the implications of the post-blockade replacement of the population, writing 
that the as a result of the cataclysm much of the population had “disappeared into 
oblivion”, disrupting the “normal course of the reproduction of a unique way of life, 
(and) material and spiritual culture”. He adds: “it is possible to restore the numerical size 
of the population. But you don’t resurrect the dead”.35 
  
In contrast to Kirschenbaum’s reconstruction of an enduring civic and cultural 
community, therefore, the research of these authors suggests a tale of social discontinuity. 
The latter viewpoint has been summed up by another local historian, Alexander 
Panchenko, in an interview that appeared in May 2000 in the St Petersburg edition of the 
newspaper Argumenty i Fakty. In the words of Panchenko, a large part of the population 
died in the blockade, “then…the village by fair means or foul exploded into the city. 
And…Piter stopped being Piter – …in the sense of the composition of the population”.36  
  
A third narrative of events has been touched upon, however, by Elizabeth White, whose 
recent work focuses on the successful return by prewar inhabitants who had been 
transported out of the blockaded city. White has argued that the tropes of unprecedented 
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loss and discontinuity in the “narrative of the non-return of ‘native’ Leningraders” have 
to be interrogated, as not only did many evacuees resettle back in Leningrad at the end of 
the war but massive population gains and losses were, in any case, nothing new for the 
city, which had not long before experienced civil war and rapid industrialisation.37 The 
story of the unprecedented and permanent loss of native city-dwellers as a result of the 
siege, while not entirely untrue, according to White, is itself an element of the rich 
mythology of the ‘Northern Capital’ and its cultural memory and she calls for the 
positing of a “more dynamic relationship between the city and its residents, new and 
old”.38 
  
White’s argument that the demographic transformation of the 1940s, while great, was not 
entirely unprecedented, finds support in the earlier work of Vakser and Ruble. Vakser, for 
example, while arguing that the blockade interrupted the normal, or regular, reproduction 
of Leningrad’s way of life, also notes that this was the second time in fifty years that 
various groups of people were faced with the task of the renewal of the city.39 Blair Ruble 
also refers, alongside his characterisation of 1940s as a historic break in the history of the 
city, to the plummeting of the city’s population in the wake of the revolutions of 1917 
and the civil war and to the subsequent rapid repopulation. He describes how many 
Petrograd residents fled their city after the Bolsheviks seized power, the seat of 
government moved to Moscow and food supplies were disrupted by fighting in the 
surrounding countryside. The gentry and middle classes sought refuge abroad in 
numbers, while other inhabitants, in particular those who had joined the ranks of the 
city’s workers in preceding decades, disappeared to the villages to seek food as hunger 
and cholera took hold. In this way, the number of people living in the city fell from about 
2,500,000 in February 1917 to less than 750,000 by August 1920. 40  
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A rapid influx of people into the city, now called Leningrad, Ruble continues, occurred 
from 1928, as Stalin’s campaign to force peasants into collective farms and deport rich 
peasants or ‘kulaks’, together with his industrialisation drive, launched a “torrent of 
peasants fleeing the countryside”. 41 The city’s population increased by almost 1,500,000 
between 1929 and the census of 1939, which documented a record population of over 
3,000,000 and another 300,000 living in the suburbs.42 
  
A sense of some of the similarities between the 1940s and the previous periods of civil 
war and industrialisation is reinforced by other accounts that evoke the emptying and 
filling up of the cityscape in the earlier years. Mary McAuley has termed the civil war 
period the first “emptying of the city” of the twentieth century.43 It was accompanied, she 
states, by the common appearance of empty apartments, boarded-up buildings and 
ghostly districts. Victor Serge, in 1919, recorded his impressions of an “abandoned city”, 
in which a square where Lenin gave a speech “was no more than a white desert 
surrounded by dead houses”.44 Slump gave way to furious growth in the 1930s, Marina 
Vitukhnovskaia attests, as some people were forced out of the city, and exiled and 
arrested in the terror, but many more arrived. The city now expelled, now absorbed 
streams of people many-thousand strong, she writes, summarising that the fate of the city 
in the early twentieth century was “extremely dynamic and dramatic”.45 
  
Vitukhnovskaia’s work, in places, applies a narrative of a fracture in the city’s history, 
and the threat posed by newcomers to its unique culture, to the earlier Stalinist period. 
She also acknowledges, however, that the rapid influx of people into the city was not an 
exclusively Soviet or twentieth century phenomenon.46 The work of James Bater shows 
that the population of the city had begun growing frenetically from the mid-nineteenth 
century, as an influx of new inhabitants was catalysed by the stirrings of industrialisation. 
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Between 1850 and 1890 the population doubled from just over 500,000 to over 1,000,000 
and by 1914 it had doubled again.47 Blair Ruble, interestingly, contends at one point in 
his survey that from the moment of the city’s foundation its population had been mobile, 
changing and transient. In a chapter on ‘the Petersburg tradition’ he too highlights the 
rapidly changing society of late nineteenth century St Petersburg in particular. He 
describes, for example, how over 1,000,000 new residents moved to the city between 
1870 and 1914, many “fresh off the farm”, and how “prince and peasant alike regarded 
their residence in the capital as only transitory”.48  
  
Once one considers the significance of the history of comings and goings in the city, then 
notions of a longstanding community of city-dwellers, either cemented or destroyed by 
the experiences of the blockade and repopulation, become problematic. This is not to 
ignore the existence of a strong local mythology that shapes the meanings attached to 
experiences and identities within the city or to deny that this local narrative of belonging 
was reinforced during and after the experience of the terrible catastrophe of the blockade. 
It is important, however, to recognise that these civic narratives of belonging have been 
formulated and reformulated in conjunction with a mobile and changing population. It is 
also important to recognise when these narratives are shaping the work of historians 
themselves.  
  
The tropes of destruction and oblivion that have informed the work of those historians 
who foreground the lost population of the blockade and the threat posed by migrants to a 
unique culture, also run throughout the city’s mythology. The apparent transience of life 
in the city is perhaps one reason why loss, death and even apocalyptic destruction have 
had continued resonance as dominant themes in the mythology of the city, alongside 
others such as the triumph of culture over nature and barbarism. 
  
From the nineteenth century, in particular, both the myth of a “city of culture”, formed 
out of a desolate and boggy wilderness by the will of one man, Peter the Great, and the 
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“antimyth” of a city founded on the “tears and bones” of those who died building it and 
subject to periodic catastrophes in which it is reclaimed and almost destroyed by 
elemental forces, have coexisted in oral lore and literature.49 Both are crystallised in what 
Katerina Clark calls the ‘locus classicus’ of the Petersburg myth, Pushkin’s long poem 
The Bronze Horseman, in which the city, Peter the Great’s resplendent creation, is 
engulfed by flood waters, drowning the fiancée of a lowly clerk and driving him insane. 
The poem concludes with the clerk running “through the deserted squares of Petersburg”, 
believing he is being chased by the statue of Peter on a horse, and dying of hunger and 
exhaustion.50 V. N. Toporov has encapsulated the productive tension between the 
antithetical images of the city in the “Petersburg text”, writing that “P[etersburg]. – is the 
abyss, the “other” realm, death, but P. is also the place where national self-
awareness…reached that limit, beyond which new horizons of life open up, where 
Russian culture celebrated the greatest of its triumphs”.51      
  
The ‘city of death’ and the ‘city of culture’ both became common themes in written and 
oral reminiscences on the horrors and deprivations of the blockade. Kirschenbaum writes 
how “the ghosts of the blockade inhabited an already haunted landscape” of a city 
steeped in myth.52 The images and themes characterising the older Petersburg myth – 
those of destruction as well as redemption, of apocalypse as well as spiritual purification 
and the triumph of civilisation – provided a frame for giving meaning to the suffering of 
the blockade.53 A compiler of the city’s legends has also noted how oral folklore that 
arose after the war reflected the real tragic losses and destruction of the siege, and 
conveyed the sense of an emptied city and a threatened culture. These included popular 
stories manifesting anxiety about the disappearance of local artistic and architectural 
treasures, despite the fact that almost all of these had been preserved or were quickly 
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reconstructed. One such story told how one of 29 lions supporting a fence on the banks of 
the river Neva had suddenly disappeared in the siege and would be found one day in one 
of the southern Soviet republics.54  
  
The terms of the myth of Petersburg, Katerina Clark has argued, have proved tenacious as 
frames for interpreting changing reality in both Soviet Leningrad and post-Soviet 
Petersburg. The great illusion contained in the Petersburg myth, she adds, is that of its 
uniqueness.55 Certainly, even when recent scholarship has portrayed postwar Leningrad 
as a ‘city of migrants’, conclusions about its history have attended more to local myths of 
place than to the multifarious experiences of its itinerant populations.  
  
This thesis builds on Elizabeth White’s call for a more dynamic understanding of the 
relationship between the city and its varied residents after the blockade. It does so by 
examining the role of widespread experiences of displacement and resettlement in 
structuring relationships among individuals and between citizens and the authorities in 
the post-siege civic environment. Life in the city at the end of the war was heavily 
marked by the imprints of the extraordinary suffering of the blockade, while at the same 
time the city was being reconstituted once more through diverse migrations. The thesis 
explores how these aspects of civic life interlocked, in particular – and insofar as the 
sources permit - from the perspective of the population on the move that has been largely 
lacking so far. It examines the way that more general Soviet practices and experiences of 
displacement were given form, perpetuated and transformed in the local context of the 
post-siege city.56 In particular, it examines the ways in which these wider trajectories and 
practices of displacement intersected with the re-affirmation of a civic community in a 
city that had lost a vast proportion of its population, just as it gained the basis for a 
powerful new narrative of belonging. 
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Understanding the post-blockade period in these terms it is possible to avoid replicating 
the self-image of the city as entirely unique, and rather to interrogate the (re-)generation 
of these types of civic myths after the war in the context of broad and complex practices 
of population movement.57 The next section will outline further how this research 
engages with a mobile, itinerant, perspective and the implications of integrating this 
approach into an historical survey of Soviet migration.  
  
1.3  “What is lacking is a nomadology”: integrating an historical study 
with theories of space, place and displacement  
  
The observation that histories of post-siege Leningrad tell us more about local myths than 
about its repopulation, even when it is characterised as a ‘city of migrants’, echoes the 
claim made by the philosophers Deleuze and Guattari in the 1980s that “history is always 
written from the sedentary point of view…even when the topic is nomads. What is 
lacking is a Nomadology”.58  
  
In the past twenty years, scholars from a wide range of disciplines have addressed the 
importance of mobility across space in shaping social life. In the words of Tim Cresswell:  
  
Everyone is travelling in the field of ‘theory’ today. Metaphors of movement 
parade across the pages of cultural theorists, social theorists, geographers, artists, 
literary critics. Mobility is the order of the day.59 
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Three years after Cresswell wrote this John Urry elaborated a ‘mobile sociology’. This 
sociology, he stated, should be one that registers the “geographical intersections of 
region, city and place, with the social categories of class, gender and ethnicity”, but that 
also registers that “there are crucial flows of people within, but especially beyond, the 
territory of each society”.60  
  
Often the ‘travelling theories’ that have been developed, however, have emerged from 
scholars interested in contemporary communities. These theories have even been 
explicitly counterposed to the study of supposedly more settled societies of the recent 
past. Urry, for example, claims that flows of people and things are a property of “the new 
global order”, in which “diverse mobilities are transforming61 the ‘social as society’ into 
the ‘social as mobility’”.62  Another sociologist, Rob Shields, refers to the “contemporary 
paradoxes of everyday life” when discussing the intersection of culture, space and flows 
of people.63 Lisa Malkki notes that throughout recent scholarship “what [Edward] 
Said…calls a “generalised condition of homelessness” is seen to characterise 
contemporary life everywhere”.64 In this way, Creswell concludes, the nomad has 
become the “geographic metaphor par excellence of postmodernity”.65 
  
In the theoretical literature the prominence of flows – of people, information and objects 
– is, moreover, frequently associated with the flourishing of capitalism and in this way 
would seem doubly unsuited to a history of the Soviet Union. John Urry explicitly 
juxtaposes his vision of modern, horizontally mobile societies to former East European 
socialist societies and the USSR. The latter cases are, he explains, exemplars of Zygmunt 
Bauman’s ‘gardening’ states, in which people and information are bounded and frozen 
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and subject to the state’s concerns with ordering, regulating and weeding humanity or, to 
mix a metaphor, “with the detailed cultivation of each animal in each particular place”.66 
This is in contrast to the return of the ‘gamekeeper’ state in the West and in post-socialist 
Eastern Europe, which is concerned only with regulating the mobilities of its roaming 
stock, especially across national borders.  
  
The ‘ordering’ and ‘gardening’ intentions of the Soviet state are acknowledged in this 
thesis. The Soviet ‘gardening’ enterprise was an attempt at the transformation and 
purification of society, the remaking of the citizenry, with the aim of creating a 
harmonious and loyal socialist community, within a secure Soviet territory.67 This social 
engineering was to be accomplished through the refashioning of identities and the brutal 
removal of the ‘weeds’ that did not have a place in the new socio-economic order. It 
entailed policies for reconstructing and then fixing the geographic, social and ethnic 
boundaries of the country and the identities and locations of its population.68 These 
attempts at ordering Soviet citizens and territory were encapsulated in the application of 
the internal passport system, which was introduced in 1932, in conditions of rural famine 
and industrialising frenzy that had prompted the flight of desperate peasantry from the 
villages and high labour turnover between factories and towns. 
  
The passport system delineated places of strategic importance to the state, which within a 
year or two encompassed most urban areas and the country’s border-zones. It required 
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people over sixteen living within these areas to take out and register a passport, record in 
it details of their identity such as class background, ethnicity and occupation, and on the 
basis of this obtain a permit for residency that was registered to a particular address. 
Peasants who had been rounded up into collective farms were not issued passports, and 
hence were denied the right to resettle into ‘regime zones’ without further government 
involvement. The regime also refused passports to certain categories of people already 
living in these areas, including those without state employment (other than the disabled 
and pensioners); suspected former ‘kulaks’; those who had arrived without a formal 
invitation of work from an enterprise or who were ‘obvious flitters’; people deprived of 
the right to vote, who were often former gentry; people with a criminal record; and 
refugees from abroad.69  
  
In the course of passportisation the political police formalised the practice of regularly 
‘cleansing’ cities and borderlands of these undesirable elements, who were evicted to live 
in non-strategic areas or, in the case of some labelled as kulaks or criminals, exiled to 
labour camps or special settlements in remote parts of the country.70 The priority of the 
passport system, as David Shearer has suggested, was to ““fix” the urban population” in 
place and to purge and protect core Soviet spaces, and secondly to control further 
movement into these areas.71 In the words of Tova Höjdestrand, the aim was “keeping 
‘matter out of place’ out of places that matter”.72 
  
A number of scholars, including Shearer, however, have drawn attention to the fact that 
these ‘gardening’ aims and practices to fix the population did not eliminate ‘crucial 
flows’ of people across the Soviet Union, in particular from the countryside into urban 
areas. In 1948, Eugene Kulischer, an American sociologist of Russian origin and 
commentator on wartime and postwar refugee movements, conceived the repopulation of 
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Leningrad after the siege as part of numerous interrelated migrations that stretched across 
Soviet, Russian, European and world history. These migrations were made up of the 
organised, government-sponsored movement of peoples and also the desperate flight of 
people from zones of conflict, the cumulative decisions of individuals to move, often 
from village to city, and the wide-ranging travels of adventurers. 73  
  
In the Soviet Union, the regime intended the mass movements of people to be effected 
through organised government transfers following the introduction of the passport 
system. Population shifts continued up to the eve of the war in part on the basis of these 
organised movements. These included the mobilisation of labour to cities and industrial 
settlements across the Soviet Union in a national scheme of organised recruitment 
(orgnabor).74 In 1940 the government supplemented this planned transfer of people into 
the workforce with a decree making teenagers, especially in rural areas, liable to 
compulsory relocation to train and work in industries across the Soviet state.75 The 
introduction of the passport regime, moreover, facilitated the ongoing deportation of 
different groups of people away from certain areas of the country. These included people 
in urban areas who were marked as socially marginal, harmful or criminal by their lack of 
a residence permit for the city in which they were living, and also other groups of people 
who came under suspicion and could be identified by the social, ethnic or other entries in 
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their passports.76 Between 1935 and 1938, for example, the Stalinist regime forcibly 
resettled thousands of members of particular diaspora ethnic groups from the country’s 
eastern and western borderlands, to special settlements in Siberia and Central Asia, where 
they added to the population of peasants exiled from the countryside as ‘kulaks’ in earlier 
years.77 Thirty percent of the Finnish population of the Leningrad region was deported in 
these years.78  
  
Displacement and resettlement, however, occurred not just as part of the state’s strategies 
for developing the economy, mobilising, controlling and engineering the population, and 
reordering Soviet space. People also repeatedly chose to relocate in contravention of the 
new restrictions fixing them in place, which in turn prompted renewed efforts from the 
authorities to settle them.79 
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Kulischer and others have estimated that the urban population more than doubled 
between 1926 and 1939, largely on account of continuing in-migration, which fell off 
briefly in 1933 following the introduction of the passport system but resumed again in 
1934.80 This in-migration remained out of the complete control of the central authorities, 
who expressed concern at the people continuing to throng railway stations across the 
country. A station in Leningrad region in the mid-1930s, for example, was described as 
“more like a flophouse than a decent station”.81  In the new Soviet city of Magnitogorsk 
the “bacchanalian fluidity” of the population, in the words of Stephen Kotkin, may have 
slowed down after 1932 but this was probably due more to improved living conditions 
than to the passport system, and migration both organised and haphazard persisted.82 The 
high geographic, as well as social, mobility of workers persisted throughout the chaos of 
the second five year plan and the years of the terror, and in 1932-1935 and again in 1937, 
the number of workers recorded as leaving jobs exceeded total manpower.83  
  
As the Soviet workforce continued to be characterised by fluidity the regime issued 
decrees stipulating increasingly severe penalties for unauthorised departures from the 
workplace. In 1940 the regime made unauthorised changing of place of work a criminal 
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offence, that could be punished with two to four years imprisonment.84 These decrees 
aimed not just at fixing a stable workforce for the economy but also intertwined with a 
number of measures intended to discipline new arrivals to form a settled and ‘civilised’ 
socialist urban population and to ‘cultivate’ proper conduct in them, as part of the 
regime’s mission to mould a country of “backward, individualist peasants” into 
“efficient, cultured, and responsible workers and collective farmers”.85 Throughout the 
Soviet period, though, as Cynthia Buckley has demonstrated, citizens found methods for 
circumventing restrictions on movement between workplaces and residences.86  
  
The inability of the regime to constantly monitor the population, inefficiencies in the 
residency registration system, the high labour demand for low prestige jobs and the 
prevalence of a second, unofficial economy and personal networks of assistance and 
exchange all encouraged people to risk migration without an official passport or permit.87 
Corruption and fraud further facilitated migration to cities by those who could obtain 
permits through semi-legal and illegal means. People who could not obtain the 
documents needed to move utilised bribes, false documents and bogus marriages, or in 
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some cases just hid from the authorities during document checks.88 Scientifically 
managed migration in the Soviet Union, Buckley concludes, was a myth and total control 
over the placement of the population an illusion.89 Despite, as well as because of, the 
efforts of the authorities to manage and ‘cultivate’ the population, in order to ensure the 
stable functioning of the economy and the harmonious order of the Soviet state, it seems 
that the ‘quicksand society’ of the early 1930s never fully solidified.90 
  
This is not to say, though, that the restrictions did not matter.91 Buckley points out that 
managed migration may have been a ‘myth’, but that the system, as both a symbolic and 
administrative mechanism, shaped individual decisions. She argues that, in a way, the 
operation of the system was quite similar to market-based signals, in terms of individual 
perceptions of costs and benefits, although the nature of the costs and benefits were 
different from those of market economies. The system was selective, in that migrants 
weighed up the benefits of moving against the difficulties of obtaining a residence permit 
through unofficial channels, or resettling illegally, which meant living outside of the 
official distribution of resources, including housing. The system, Sheila Fitzpatrick avers, 
while not preventing movement altogether, “complicated life enormously for many 
people”.92 
  
David Shearer maintains that the system under Stalin functioned not only as a tool to 
enforce the physical removal of stigmatised people from certain areas of the state’s 
territory, but also to compel the Soviet population to think in terms of certain social and 
geographical categories, which occupied different places in a hierarchy of privileges, 
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restrictions and exclusions. These classifications cut along class and ethnic lines but also 
fostered clear divisions between good, organised populations and bad, unorganised 
ones.93 In this way the regime imposed a framework of stratified identities, while also 
creating conditions for individuals to reconstruct and manipulate these identities “through 
illegal migration, falsification of passport information, multiple moves…or other 
means”.
94
 The movements of people in this context can be seen as contributing to the 
formation and also the transformation of models of ‘homo sovieticus’.95 
  
The Second World War and the Nazi invasion of Soviet territory had a dramatic impact 
on the regime’s ongoing efforts to order its population and space and on the movements 
of millions of Soviet citizens. Eugene Kulischer describes the massive displacement, and 
the shattering of borders and population controls that the war brought across Europe, in 
the following terms: 
  
Frontiers where each immigrant had once been carefully filtered were crossed by 
millions whose passports were guns and whose visas were bullets. They set in 
motion millions of others who marched unarmed between streams of blood and 
tears.96 
  
Soviet society was convulsed not only by the violation of its external borders, across 
which moved armies, prisoners and forced labourers in both directions, but also by 
evacuation and mobilisation on the home front. Barber and Harrison depict how millions 
of Soviet citizens moved from west to east into evacuation, and millions of others moved 
in the opposite direction as part of the Red Army. As they note, the “boundaries between 
urban and rural society were endlessly crossed” in these years, by town dwellers in search 
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of food; peasants mobilised to wartime industries; prisoners and former exiles sent to 
farms, work benches or the front.97  
  
The Soviet authorities enacted policies once more to assert power over the placement of 
the population and to enforce a certain vision of society. Workers from all but very 
peripheral industries were declared to have been mobilised for the war effort and were to 
be directed into whatever factory, in whatever location, the regime chose. Penalties for 
‘desertion’ from the workplace became even harsher. New laws introduced in 1940, 
which were only gradually repealed from 1948, stipulated that industrial workers who left 
their places of employment without authorisation should be sentenced to five to eight 
years in a labour camp, workers on transport to three to ten years and teenage trainees to 
one year.98  
  
The regime also conceived the evacuation as a form of managed migration, to be 
administrated in a similar manner to previous population resettlements, such as the 
organised redistribution of labour and the prewar deportations.99 Officials established 
criteria for evacuation which reflected the resources, human and material, that were 
conceived as necessary for the war effort. The plan also reflected and imposed the 
operative categories of the Soviet system and its social and geographic stratification. It 
envisaged the evacuation as taking place largely from the threatened cities, rather than the 
countryside, and did not cover the whole population of these urban areas. Civilians were 
to be evacuated not as an endangered population but as workers of a particular enterprise, 
as privileged members of the state apparatus or the new Soviet intelligentsia and their 
wives, and as mothers with young children.100  
  
Wartime policies to manage the population did not simply act to reinforce prewar images 
of the polity, however. The authorities organised coercive population relocations in these 
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years to assert their control over newly acquired Soviet borderlands. On the eve of the 
war and at the end, for example, the Soviet political police deported hundreds of 
thousands of people from western Ukraine and Belarus and the Baltic states, in addition 
to arresting and executing many of their number. The deportations targeted social groups 
such as ‘former people’, the privileged classes and officials of the old regimes in these 
places, and ‘kulaks’ who resisted collectivisation. These groups were removed in a 
campaign of Sovietisation that was, however, also understood by the people affected as 
an attack on their nationality.101  
  
Ethnic categories were further to the fore in the deportations carried out in the state’s 
prewar territory. These deportations reflected shifts in categories for inclusion and 
exclusion, status and stigma in the Soviet polity and an adjusted framework for 
conceiving state-society relations in the light of wartime experience. The war reinforced 
the purification drive of the regime, Amir Weiner has argued, confirming the gardening 
ethos within which it sought to create a more harmonious, unified and pure community 
through its welfare and punitive policies.102 It also increased the importance of ethnic 
identities, along with service to the state, in the regime’s definitions of belonging and 
added criteria of wartime behaviour to these. These categories were manifested in the 
resettlements of whole peoples at this time.103 In 1941, the Soviet authorities deported 
hundreds of thousands of Volga Germans as a pre-emptive measure against suspect 
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loyalties. Finns and Germans were also sent into ‘special evacuation’ from Leningrad and 
its surrounding region at the start of the war. Later, as the Red Army pushed back the 
German forces, the political police organised the forcible resettlement of entire 
nationalities labelled as collaborators, removing Crimean Tartars, Kalmyks, Balkars and 
the Ingush-Chechen and Karachai nationalities from the northern Caucasus and Crimea 
into Central Asia.104  
  
Many people, though, were crossing the country under their own steam. Official priorities 
may have shaped the evacuation from some areas of the Soviet Union, for example, but 
so too did mass flight in the face of the German advance and the personal decisions of 
individual Soviet citizens.105 Even the organised evacuation from Moscow broke down 
and on 16th October 1941 Georgii Efron noted in his diary that an “enormous number of 
people depart n’importe ou [any which where], overloaded with bags and trunks….It 
seems that 50 percent of Moscow is evacuating itself”.106 Later in the war, a front page 
article in Pravda simultaneously underlined the harsh penalties for ‘deserting’ one’s 
place of employment and hinted that high turnover was still widespread due to the 
desperation of employers for labour and the desires of people to leave their places of 
evacuation. It gave the example of one boss at an aluminium factory who had been 
sentenced to ten years imprisonment for sheltering labour ‘deserters’ from other 
enterprises.107 The war also swelled the numbers of orphaned, homeless and unattended 
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children who were a perennial feature on the Soviet streets in the first half of the 
twentieth century.108 
  
The exigencies of the war propelled many people into movement. For some this was a 
desperate and miserable dislocation, that could potentially mark them as ‘deserters’.109 
For others it was an opportunity to change their location and refashion their identity. 
Some peasants, exiled kulaks and prisoners volunteered to join the army or move into 
industry in order to eradicate old stigmas.110 Other members of the population changed 
their places in the polity by flouting identification laws, in a situation where even the 
‘illusion’ of effective barriers to movement at times ceased to operate. In his memoir, 
Alexander Wat recalled a scene at Saratov train station during the Second World War, 
reflecting that: 
  
all of Russia was on the move, everyone, peasants, collective farmers, and 
especially people whose passports had been taken from them and who had only 
identification cards. An enormous percentage of the population. They had not 
been able to leave their district without an NKVD pass. But suddenly all that 
was overturned; the wave of war had destroyed all those barriers, and Russia was 
on the move.111 
  
This thesis takes up the story at the end of the war, as the Soviet regime sought to 
mobilise the population for feats of socio-economic reconstruction in a landscape that 
historian J. Duskin has described as “cities strewn with smoldering rubble and roads 
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clogged with destitute migrants”.112 It examines the repopulation of Leningrad in relation 
to evolving Soviet practices of population management after the war, as well as the 
individual trajectories of millions of Soviet citizens. It seeks to uncover the diverse 
experiences of people journeying to the city. It also aims to give greater analytic visibility 
to the conjuncture of the ‘gardening’ and ‘ordering’ aims of the state, the socio-economic 
reconstruction of the polity, the rebuilding of its physical infrastructure and the ongoing 
movements of the Soviet population at the end of the war. 
  
The anthropologist Liisa Malkki in her ‘ethnography of displacement’ has elucidated the 
way in which an itinerant perspective or ‘nomadology’ can shed light on practices and 
discourses constructed around human mobility in the past and the present, and in Europe 
and beyond. She invokes Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘nomadology’ as a “clarifying exercise”: 
an exercise which should not suppose that territorial displacements are exclusively 
contemporary, postmodern phenomena or that they have not been written about before. 
Instead, she argues, the exercise provides a new scholarly lens for understanding how the 
displaced become an object of knowledge, and also a category in the socio-political 
construction of space, and for understanding the complexity of ways in which people 
construct and lay claim to places as ‘homelands’.113  
  
Putting displacement at the centre of an analytical framework, Malkki argues, not only 
helps us to understand the lived experience of many people on the move but also allows 
us to interrogate the widespread assumptions about the links between people and places 
that are made by scholars, as well as by governments and their populations. These 
assumptions, she points out, tend to naturalise attachments between people and place and 
to pathologise those ‘out of place’. They entail powerful and common metaphoric 
practices which conceive the connections of people to a particular territory in botanical or 
kinship terms. Governmental, scholarly and commonsense languages and practices take 
for granted that people are naturally ‘rooted’ in a ‘native soil’ or attached to a 
‘motherland’. People who are ‘uprooted’ or ‘rootless’ represent, in this sedentarist 
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thinking, a violation of cultural and territorial roots and, as such, an aberration of the 
natural order of things. This aberration is associated with lost moral bearings and 
potential contamination of stable, territorialized existence in discrete homelands.  
  
These assumptions, she argues, underpin many articulations of community, nation and 
homeland. They also provide the context to technologies that have been adopted by states 
to control the movement and settlement of ‘peoples out of place’. The refugee camps 
which stretched across Europe after the Second World War are, in this view, instances of 
practices directed at the “care and control” of people who are seen to be dangerously 
“torn loose” from their soil and culture.114  
  
In developing her itinerant perspective, Malkki builds on the work of another 
anthropologist, Mary Douglas. Douglas argued that the process of organising the external 
environment and imposing orders and meanings on society is accompanied by a 
confrontation with matter which is deemed ‘out of place’ in that order. This 
confrontation, according to Douglas, can frequently generate rhetoric of pollution and 
contagion and practices of purification.115 Persons who are in a marginal state, ‘who are 
placeless’, transgress against the stable order and classifications of society. As elements 
deemed anomalous, they are reacted to as a symbolic danger, deviant and polluting.116 
Malkki argues, however, that there is a difference between the classification of non-
human objects as ‘matter out of place’ and the classification when people are in question: 
“people categorize back”.117 Displaced people may live at some level within categories 
not of their making but they also forge their own visions of exile and refugee-ness, and of 
belonging and home.  
  
Malkki’s observations that displacement gives rise to discourses and practices which are 
both creative and, sometimes brutally, constraining, also draw on comments by 
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anthropologist James Clifford. In Clifford’s analysis of the routes and crossings made by 
people, communities from nations to cities to neighbourhoods and villages become 
cultural centres “constituted relationally…through historical processes of displacement”, 
as much as through stasis.118 Clifford contends that human location and cultural meanings 
attached to different sites are produced through encounters between people in transit and 
those who dwell in a certain place, who themselves may have a complex personal history 
of displacement and travel. Community boundaries and their ‘insides’ and ‘outsides’, are 
also maintained through practices of power aimed at “disciplining the restless movement 
of people”.119 Borders are policed against transgression by unauthorised outsiders and the 
“stasis and purity” of locales are “asserted – creatively and violently – against historical 
forces of movement and contamination”.120 A view that gives visibility to both travelling 
and dwelling, therefore, can reveal how homelands are defined as community insides and 
outsides are “sustained, policed, subverted [and] crossed” by various historical 
subjects.121  
  
Both Clifford and Malkki utilise ideas developed by Michel Foucault about space and 
power in their conceptions of how experiences of displacement are linked with the 
exercise of power in the process of community construction. Foucault observed that 
“space is fundamental in any form of communal life; space is fundamental in any 
exercise of power”.122 He explored how mechanisms of power have been exercised in the 
classification and labelling of social groups in conjunction with the partitioning of space. 
Power is asserted in the regulating of contacts across the boundaries of the regions 
formed by partitioning, as well as in controlling and promoting certain modes of 
behaviour within them.123 One of the primary objects of these disciplining and governing 
techniques, he noted in the 1970s, is to fix floating populations; discipline “is an anti-
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nomadic technique”.124 He also examined how deviance was constructed as part of this 
exercise of power.125 Malkki and Clifford combine a similar focus on disciplining 
practices with their awareness of the possibilities for self-definition produced by human 
movement. They explore how identities are lost, made and remade as people are 
variously compelled into movement or empowered by it, as they move in and out of 
territories and traverse regions, or have their movements constrained.126 
  
This thesis applies the theoretical approach of these anthropologists who, in the words of 
Mike Crang and Nigel Thrift, “do space” by “questioning how communities are 
constituted”, to the study of community building and structuring in Leningrad at the end 
of the war.127 It employs this approach to highlight the intersection of diverse 
articulations of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, ‘native’ and ‘uprooted’, by the civic as well as 
central authorities and by various groups of the post-blockade population themselves, 
including migrants to the city.  
  
The investigation is informed by Malkki’s emphasis on the language which scholars 
themselves use to write about and categorise displaced populations. It draws, for 
example, on the research of Katerina Gerasimova and Sofia Chuikina and Marina 
Vitukhnovskaia, who have teased out the diverse and nuanced everyday interactions, or 
dialogue, that took place in the 1920s and 1930s among groups of city-dwellers who had 
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been resident in Leningrad-St Petersburg for various lengths of time and between these 
residents and the changing physical environment of the city. It transfers their analysis to 
the post-blockade context, but also attempts to move beyond their delineation of ‘rooted’ 
and other populations, and in particular Vitukhnovskaia’s  concern with the extent to 
which newcomers succeeded in ‘sinking their roots’ (vrastaniia) into the city. 128 Instead 
the thesis concentrates on the mechanisms by which degrees of alien-ness and belonging 
were established, enforced and negotiated in the urban environment at the end of the war. 
  
Malkki’s insistence on the commonality of botanical metaphors in ‘fixing’ populations 
also suggests that efforts to regulate the repopulation of post-blockade Leningrad can be 
understood in a broader context than Soviet attempts at population management.129 The 
work of scholars such as Amir Weiner and Peter Holquist has productively discussed 
how the drive of the Soviet state to monitor, reshape and purge society pursued 
particularistic Marxist goals but also operated according to a modernist ethos of social 
engineering that was widespread in states across Europe and European colonies from the 
end of the First World War, at work in the creation of welfare systems as well as in ethnic 
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cleansing campaigns.130 Malkki’s ‘itinerant perspective’ suggests how the modernist 
goals and disciplining technologies adopted by the Soviet state also interlaced with 
attitudes to people ‘out of place’ that have been manifested in the ordering of 
communities at international and local, as well as state, level and that have predated and 
outlasted the height of the ‘modern project’ in Europe in the first half of the twentieth 
century.131 
  
Refugee camps, for example, have been and remain a feature of attempts to organise, 
contain and isolate flows of people. Peter Gatrell has written of displaced persons camps 
across Europe after the Second World War as chief among the institutions that governed 
the experiences of refugees.132 Malkki’s work is based on an investigation of the 
experience of exile in shaping the construction of national identity in the setting of a 
camp in western Tanzania for Hutu refugees who fled the genocidal massacres of 1972. 
Recently, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre has drawn attention to the Sri 
Lankan government’s internment of people fleeing conflict in the country in closed 
military-run camps. The government have argued that this is necessary in order to screen 
the displaced for their affiliation and to de-mine their areas of origin, even though, 
according to the Monitoring Centre, many could have been released to live with families 
in areas free of mines.133  
  
The intersection of the state’s desire to ‘fix’ people in certain spatial and social orders 
with ongoing processes of displacement is clearly not just a feature of former east 
European socialist regimes. Not only can historical works on the region productively 
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employ certain theories linking space, place and displacement but such investigations can 
serve as useful case studies of how these linkages have operated. In other words, not only 
does history need concepts of space and displacement, but conceptualisations of 
contemporary societies based on the prevalence of human movement, and some recent 
theories accentuating a migratory sensibility, can benefit from history.   
  
This becomes apparent in a critique by Rafael Perez-Torres of the ‘nomadic’ philosophy 
of Deleuze and Guattari. According to Perez-Torres, the conception of current societies 
by Deleuze and Guattari as systems caught between regimes of stratified order and 
unfettered flows entails inscribing the fluid movement as a positive, empowering and 
joyful chaos. Perez-Torres points out that the lack of historical grounding in this work 
results in the neglect of the re-territorialising processes which haunt migration. He insists 
that “rather than allow the term “migration” to remain metaphorical…an astute critic 
would insist upon the fact of deterritorialisation as a historically grounded, painful, and 
often coerced dislocation”.134 James Clifford has also raised concerns about a 
‘nomadology’ that celebrates movement as a universal imperative. He calls instead for 
explorations which track “the worldly, historical routes which both constrain and 
empower movements across borders and between cultures”.135  
  
This thesis forms part of a body of work, led by Nick Baron and Peter Gatrell, that has 
recently sought to bring an historical approach to the literature on practices and 
experiences of displacement, an approach “that establishes the larger geopolitical, 
political, legal and economic framework to which displaced persons were subject”.136 
Following their 2003 article which set out their use of a theoretical framework which 
privileged an ‘itinerant perspective’, Baron and Gatrell edited a volume, Homelands, that 
brought together essays which applied this perspective to events in eastern Europe 
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following World War One.137 The volume discerns how, as the old empires fragmented, 
the “exigencies of new state-building…lent added urgency to the strivings of political 
leaders and government officials to ‘fix’ their populations and define their new 
‘homelands’” across the region.138  
  
The present work is one of a number of investigations that shift the focus of this analysis 
to population resettlements in the region in the wake of World War Two, a period of 
boundary redrawing, population transfers and massive dislocation and relocation not only 
across Europe but beyond. It seeks to apply the ‘itinerant’ approach to an exploration of 
the constitution of a ‘homeland’ within a ‘homeland’ at this time: the attempt to 
reorganise the territory of the city of Leningrad and to define its social composition in 
relation to a migrant population, at the same time as the frontiers of the Soviet state as a 
whole were being reaffirmed through the attempted distribution and fixing of 
populations.  
  
The next section of the introduction will set out how this endeavour to capture the 
intentions of the central and local authorities, and the responses of people within the city 
and on the move at the end of the war, has informed, and been informed by, the 
methodology of the research.    
  
1.4 Notes on methodology  
  
The thesis draws on a variety of sources, including central and local archival documents, 
interviews, literary works, memoirs, contemporary newspaper accounts, and published 
letters to the editor. The basic methodological approach is implicit in the ‘itinerant 
perspective’ outlined above but will be elucidated further here. In relation to official 
documents found in the central archives in Moscow and in several local St Petersburg 
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archives, the analysis follows the observations of Peter Holquist that the true significance 
of materials generated by the Soviet regime, as by other regimes, is not so much as a 
repository of information to be strip-mined for details about society, but rather as an 
indication of the desires, intentions and practices of the regime itself.139 Population 
statistics, for example, often “did not correspond neatly with the reality [they] purported 
to describe”.140 Instead, they interacted with reality in a kind of feedback loop. Concerns 
about social issues led the state to employ statistics to create a representation of the social 
field. These statistics in turn constituted different categories of the population as elements 
that could be manipulated by the state and fixed the attention of the authorities on 
particular social problems. David Shearer has argued that the passport system in the 
Soviet Union can be understood in just such a way, as one of many schemes “that tell us 
more about the categorisers…than about the population it was supposed to categorise”.141 
This approach resonates with Malkki’s focus on the language used by governments and 
individuals to categorise the displaced. In his seminal work on the ‘quicksand society’ of 
the early Soviet years Moshe Lewin notes the “morally charged vocabulary of Soviet 
sources” on labour turnover, but states himself a few lines below that as ‘floods’ of 
people moved around the country “morality dissolved”.142 This thesis tries to keep the 
focus on what lies behind such morally charged vocabulary and its effects on the 
population.  
  
The thesis combines this approach to official documents with an examination of other 
types of sources, in order to try to obtain a sense of how official categories structured the 
experiences and views of individuals, and to what extent they were adapted or challenged 
in the actions and interpretations of people themselves.  
  
The thesis uncovers an intersection between official rhetoric and popular concerns in 
articles and readers’ letters published in the daily local party newspaper, Leningradskaia 
Pravda, in the years 1944 to 1947. It approaches the newspaper articles in some respects 
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in a similar way to Jeffrey Brooks in his survey of the official press from the Revolution 
until Stalin’s death.143 That is, it explores the way the press contextualised the Soviet 
experience, framed a picture of society and imposed a structure for thinking about issues, 
even among those who were non-believers. Unlike the work of Brooks, however, who 
analyses samples of various newspapers to compare the space devoted to different themes 
throughout the Stalin period, this study is based on readings of every issue of one local 
newspaper within a short time frame. As a local, rather than national, party newspaper it 
reveals the cracks and tensions between the images of postwar society being projected in 
editorials controlled by the central authorities and those which reflected and constructed a 
more particularistic, local discourse. This was especially noticeable in the Leningrad 
press from the start of the war until the onset of the Leningrad Affair in 1949, which was 
targeted, at least in part, against pretensions to local independence. Before 1949, 
replications of articles from the central Pravda newspaper and reports of speeches by 
state officials in Moscow reaffirming the centrality of the Party and Stalin in Soviet life 
appeared slightly uneasily alongside pieces which read like a “hymn to the city”.144  
  
The study also tentatively suggests that letters to the editor published in the paper reveal 
something about the way some citizens engaged with and informed these projections of 
society, as well as much about the regime’s vision of the citizenry. Alex Inkeles and Kent 
Geiger, in 1952, analysed critical letters to the editor published in a number of Soviet 
newspapers in 1947 which complained about defects in Soviet institutions and problems 
of everyday life.145 They concluded that the language of the letters suggested that the 
average letter was written by someone other than an assigned official or professional and 
was not substantially re-written by an editor. The criticism, nevertheless, was expressed 
within narrowly defined limits and the letters published in order to fulfil certain functions 
in the system. Soviet citizens wrote letters on topics permitted and encouraged by the 
official press and any that touched on other themes were screened out by editors. 
Convention also dictated the short business-like style of the letters published. The regime 
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encouraged letters which held lower level administrators responsible for everyday 
difficulties encountered by citizens, which fostered an image of a community-conscious 
citizenry and acted as a safety valve for the everyday tensions of Soviet life.  
  
Despite the heavily structured nature of the correspondence, though, as Jim Riordan and 
Sue Bridger discuss, even letters published under Stalin reveal some ways that people 
thought about their grievances and their society and made demands on it.146 This thesis 
argues, furthermore, that through their letters some citizens were writing themselves into 
an image of society and perhaps even shaping and adjusting it in the process.   
  
The thesis also examines sources produced by Soviet citizens in perhaps a less heavily 
structured context, in particular recent memoirs and interviews. The interviews used were 
carried out by the Oral History Centre at the European University, St Petersburg between 
2001 and 2003 as part of two projects on the blockade. Six of these interviews have been 
published in full in the book Pamiat’ o blokade but the archive at the Oral History Centre 
contains transcripts of a much larger collection of interviews.147 While the focus of the 
projects was the experience of the blockade, the interviewees included people who were 
evacuated from the city during the siege and then returned. The interviews, moreover, 
were largely unstructured, beginning with the request for the interviewees to talk about 
their lives, and in some interviews the post-siege period and the repopulation process 
loomed quite large.  
  
There are obvious drawbacks to drawing extensively on transcripts of interviews 
conducted by other researchers, not least the difficulties in grasping the nuances, 
emphases and emotion imparted in the telling. One of the aims of the projects, however, 
was to provide scholars from a range of disciplines access to people’s life histories, and 
the subjects, symbols and references, both to official discourse and personal experience, 
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that they employ in their recollections.148 This is the spirit in which the interviews are 
discussed in the thesis. The argument that is constructed in the thesis on the basis of this 
research will be outlined in the following section of the introduction. 
  
1.5 A complex story of travelling and dwelling in the post-siege city: 
an outline of the thesis     
  
The work of the anthropologist James Clifford proceeds from the assertion that field-sites 
should not be treated as “ancient and settled” but as opening onto “complex histories of 
dwelling and travelling”.149 This thesis aims to tell just such a complicated story of 
travelling and dwelling in relation to Leningrad after the siege.  
  
The story begins with the attempt to produce a portrait of the population living in and 
travelling to the city after the siege. Chapters two and three examine statistics quantifying 
the heterogeneous mix of residents who constituted the growing population in the first 
few years after 1943. Chapter two discusses the number of people living in the city after 
the war who had survived the blockade, while chapter three turns the attention to 
returnees from evacuation and the front, and new in-migrants to Leningrad. As they 
progress the chapters note the impossibility of a precise statistical recreation due to the 
unreliability of Soviet population statistics and also the ‘statistical invisibility’ of certain 
groups, especially those travelling to the city outside of official channels. It discusses 
how flows of people by their nature complicate the efforts of states to count their 
populations, to make society “legible”, in the words of James Scott, which is one reason 
that states seem to be “the enemy of “people who move around””.150  
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The chapters also argue that the reconstruction of groups making up the postwar 
population is complicated by the tangled experiences of location and displacement that 
marked most of the post-siege population in different ways, which defy straightforward 
classification by scholars as well as the state. What of the blokadniki, for example, who 
were not long term residents but recent migrants to the city when war broke out, or even 
refugees from the Leningrad suburbs at the start of the war? Or evacuees who had 
actually lived in the city for the worst of the blockade? Conclusions about the extent to 
which the post-siege city was a city of blokadniki or a city of migrants, and assessments 
of the numbers of ‘Leningraders’ who perished in the siege, the numbers who returned 
from elsewhere and the quantity of new arrivals, are dependent on classifications 
imposed by the researcher, as much as by the authorities.  
  
Chapter three concludes that, while identifying the presence of a range of populations in 
the city is a useful corrective to earlier one-sided accounts, an examination of life in the 
post-siege city should not just seek to replicate official attempts to count the number of 
people in particular categories. Rather, it should uncover how notions of a ‘native’ 
community and categories of outsiders were constituted and contested at the time, in 
reference to widespread processes of displacement and resettlement, as well as myths of 
‘home’.  
  
Chapter four of the thesis explores the criteria according to which both the physical 
repopulation of the city and the discursive construction of a ‘family of Leningraders’ took 
place at the end of the war. It highlights how criteria for inclusion in the core civic 
community were articulated and, to an extent, enforced, and civic identities remade, in 
relation to the phenomenon of massive population movement.  
  
To begin with, the chapter examines how migration to the city was the object of stringent 
regulations by the central Soviet authorities, as they sought to reconsolidate power over 
the territory of the state as a whole and to reinforce a vision of the desired spatial and 
social order within it. This vision was one in which everyone had a ‘place’, both social 
and geographic, according to their contribution to the state economy, their level of 
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culture, ethnicity, gender and wartime behaviour. Some of these markers were introduced 
and forged during the war years, others were prewar ones that had been consolidated or 
adapted as a result of wartime developments.  
  
The chapter explores how these state aims initially, in some ways, came into conflict with 
those of the Leningrad authorities, who sought to regulate settlement in the city according 
to different criteria, based on an understanding of ‘Leningraders’ informed by the distinct 
local experience of the blockade. As the authorities set about reintegrating central 
priorities into local practices, the chapter continues, the visions of both were subverted 
and the repopulation shaped, just as evacuation from it had been, by “the countless 
individual decisions made by individual Soviet citizens”.151 Individuals both inside and 
outside the city displayed a range of understandings about who should make up the post-
siege population and these became manifested in practice, as citizens utilised a variety of 
contacts to enter the city regardless of official obstacles.  
  
As the city began filling with people, the lack of available housing, much of which had 
been destroyed during the siege, meant that many experienced continued displacement 
within the city. Competing conceptions of belonging crystallised around claims made 
upon the limited housing that remained intact. Against this background, organs of the city 
government attempted to impose an image of a ‘family of Leningraders’ that excluded 
some of the new arrivals while offering a model for integration for others. The chapter 
concludes that this model reinforced local wartime narratives, while treating groups of 
incomers and itinerants as ambivalent elements in the post-siege cityscape.  
  
The next chapter of the thesis uncovers in further detail how the ambivalent position of 
those arriving to repopulate and reconstruct Leningrad translated into discourses and 
practices that marked them out as transgressive bearers of disease, disorder and 
criminality. This chapter highlights how those crossing the city’s boundaries became the 
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focus for urban anxieties and their movements the subject of a dialogue about desirable 
civic populations and behaviours.152  
  
It details how enforced sanitary checks and treatments punctuated the journeys of many 
of those travelling to Leningrad. Government regulations obliged all incomers to the city 
to undergo inspections for lice and to have their bodies and belongings disinfected upon 
arrival. Upon entry to the city they, like other residents, had to contend with an urban 
environment blighted by a breakdown in sanitation. Rhetoric in the local press, however, 
related the dirtiness of the cityscape to the disorderly nature of the new arrivals, a 
disorderliness that shaded into hooligan and criminal behaviour. When incidents of 
typhus rose in 1947, rather than focusing on improvements to the public health 
infrastructure the authorities linked up sanitary checks with the raids conducted by police 
within the city to round up people perceived as leading a ‘vagrant form of life’ and 
remove them from the city.   
 
The chapter argues that this reflected the tendency of states to link the regulation of 
populations in a spatial order with the implementation of sanitary controls and the 
‘filtering’ of criminal or subversive individuals, as displayed across Europe in the 
treatment of refugees and other displaced or ‘surplus’ groups.153 It also discusses how this 
tendency intertwined with a specifically Soviet purification drive and Soviet norms of 
cultured-ness (kul’turnost’) in behaviour.154 It adds, however, that in post-siege 
Leningrad these practices and discourses acquired a distinctive inflection as they became 
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part of the definition of a postwar homeland and the ‘moral and cultured’ community that 
belonged to it on both a national and local level.  
 
After the siege officials aimed to impose authority over the spatial order, not only in 
terms of controlling the way the emptied city filled with people, but also, concomitantly, 
the way its social spaces were ordered and the city was filled with significance as a 
place.155 This accorded with the aim of the central authorities to ‘remake the streets’ in 
order to manifest in public space an understanding of the war as a triumphant victory for 
the Soviet order, for Russian traditions, and for the might of the state.156 It also suited the 
distinct desires of local officials to commemorate the triumph and renewal of the ‘eternal 
city’, and to give meaning to the blockade in terms of the defence of every stone of its 
famous architecture by Leningraders whose blood had thickly watered the soil of the city 
during the siege.157 The representations and treatment of certain groups of newcomers 
and itinerants as bearers of crime, dirt and disease were not just bound up with regulating 
movement into the city, but also with articulating requirements for membership of the 
Soviet and civic communities and formulating desirable relationships to the postwar 
cityscape and its appearance. The disorderly, hooligan or criminal behaviour of incomers 
were discussed in terms of offences against the socio-economic and spatial fixing of the 
population and the fashioning of a moral and cultured postwar family, as much as in 
terms of the violation of legal norms.  
 
This chapter concludes that this interpretation of crime in the post-blockade city suggests 
a way of understanding accounts of the growth of crime in cities and industrial centres 
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across the Soviet Union in the postwar years. In Leningrad, as in other towns and cities, 
there was a brief increase in levels of recorded crime between 1945 and 1947, but this 
took place within a overall significant fall in registered crime that occurred from 1940. 
Jeffrey Burds and Elena Zubkova have both noted how letters, newspapers and other 
documents from many places in the Soviet Union ar the time nevertheless convey a sense 
among the population that it was increasingly unsafe to walk the streets, or travel on 
trains, as bands of criminals were terrorising peaceful citizens. Burds explains this 
disjuncture between popular impressions and the modest increase in overall crime as the 
result of the fact that the increase in crime occurred disproportionately on account of rises 
in particularly violent and public crimes, such as ‘social banditry’, in these years.158 He 
directly opposes his argument to that of Zubkova, who attributes the disjuncture to the 
heightened public fear of falling victim to crime in the difficult living conditions after the 
war.159  
    
This work proposes that anxiety about social disorder, actual confrontations between 
police and social criminals, as well as the regime’s continued criminalisation of many of 
the population in its legislation and rhetoric, all overlapped in the attempts of the state to 
establish a particular socio-geographical order at the end of the war and the subversion 
of, and at times resistance to, these efforts.160 Public assertions of moral panic and 
increased police vigilance, as well as some of the rise in recorded crimes and arrests, can 
therefore be understood in the context of the re-ordering of society and the remaking of a 
‘civilised’ peacetime Soviet population. The war had reinforced many elements of the 
Soviet system at the same time as it created permanent shifts in social groups, 
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expectations and the touchstones of personal experience.161 The reconsolidation of the 
social and geographical boundaries of the state, as well as local communities, and the 
reconstruction of the Soviet order in the light of wartime experience did not prompt the 
scale of arrests that had been carried out in the late 1930s. In these earlier years a mass 
repression of socially ‘deviant’ elements in the form of former kulaks, former convicts, 
petty criminals, refugees, unruly peasants, déclassé social groups, beggars and the 
homeless had been carried out.162 Nevertheless ‘itinerants’ and others who were out of 
place in the postwar polity were targeted in ruthless policing practices and given 
prominence in public discourse as contaminants of the order under reconstruction.  
  
The thesis concludes that its findings have relevance for how we conceive postwar Soviet 
state and society more generally. The research, it suggests, complicates and enhances the 
portrait of “collective invention and survival” in Leningrad after the siege and brings into 
focus the experience of people on the move in the postwar Soviet Union, but also has 
ramifications for interpretations of the late Stalinist period as a whole.163 Ongoing 
displacements and resettlements, arrivals and departures that it has discussed in relation 
to Leningrad suggest an alternative to recent scholarly work which characterises the 
period in terms of a ‘normalisation’ of Soviet life, understood as the unmaking of the 
consequences and upheavals of the war and a return to stability. The thesis contends that 
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the postwar period can be characterised instead as one of continuing unsettlement, as 
much as of resettlement, and as one in which society was being remade, often in coercive 
ways. The next section will briefly outline developments in the historiography of the 
period and the way in which the current work supplements, and challenges, the available 
scholarship.   
  
1.6 Postwar enigmas 
  
In her book on Russia after the Second World War, published in 1998, Elena Zubkova 
observed that in the historiography of a country which for many remains a ‘mysterious 
sphinx’, few eras “have been as obscure and enigmatic as the high-water mark of 
Stalinism, the period between the victory of 1945 and Krushchev’s famous denunciation 
of the tyrant in 1956”.164 The book’s editor and translator noted that attention paid to the 
postwar period so far had been largely limited to foreign affairs or infamous political 
events, such as the concocted Jewish Doctors’ Plot to murder Stalin in early 1953. He 
reiterated the reflection of Alexander Werth, a correspondent for the British press in 
Russia during and after the war, that it “is the most unexplored period in the whole 
history of the Soviet Union”.165  
  
The introduction to Zubkova’s book called for the development of this partial research on 
the postwar period, by means of an amplification of the approach taken by Vera Dunham 
in her notable earlier work on middle class values in postwar Soviet literature. In this 
study, Dunham had not adopted a purely political focus but had explored the spectrum of 
values and dynamics of behaviour of the Soviet middle class and the interaction of this 
group with the Stalinist regime in the wake of the war. Further work, Zubkova contended, 
should address the relationship between state and society at every level and seek to reflect 
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the public attitudes, interests and strategies for survival of various social constituencies 
and categories of the postwar population.166  
  
In the decade since the appearance of Zubkova’s book historians have, indeed, 
increasingly turned to the study of the late 1940s and beyond. A mass of new scholarship 
has augmented Zubkova’s history of everyday life and public opinion in postwar Russia 
and, on the basis of access to rich archival sources, has illuminated much more vividly 
the formerly opaque and enigmatic postwar Soviet society.167 The recent accounts of the 
memorialisation of the blockade, with which this work engages, can be numbered among 
these illuminating publications. While shedding light on socio-cultural developments 
after the war, however, some of the scholarship on the period frames these developments 
in a rubric of a postwar ‘normalisation’, or ‘return to normalcy’, which is employed in 
inconsistent and contradictory ways,  
  
Mark Edele, for example, in his study of the social integration of war veterans, points to 
the years 1947-8 as a major turning point in the period of ‘high Stalinism’: the beginning 
of the ‘return to normalcy’ in terms of the unmaking of the consequences of the Second 
World War. He suggests that this framework makes sense of the winding up of the 
demobilisation of the army in 1948; the dismantling of privileged welfare provision for 
soldiers and their families after 1947; and the decision to make Victory Day into a regular 
workday at the end of 1947. It also integrates Elena Zubkova’s discussion of a renewed 
wave of state repression after 1948 and Donald Filtzer’s narrative of progress from 
immense poverty to a slight improvement in living standards from this year.168 Julie 
Hessler has also argued in her examination of Soviet trade patterns that “the late Stalin 
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period brought a measure of normalisation in the economic and social spheres” and has 
identified the watershed as occurring around 1948, when the postwar famine weakened 
its grip.169 Hessler, however, defines Soviet normalisation not as a return to prewar 
‘Stalinist normalcy’, as Edele does, but as an end to the provisioning crises which had 
been a recurrent feature of Soviet life ever since the Revolution. In this view the 
watershed in high Stalinism marked the beginning of a new period of mundane shortage, 
which would last until the end of the Soviet Union.170  
  
The work of Sheila Fitzpatrick equates postwar normalisation with a release from 
wartime obligations, relaxation in social tensions, loosening of state control and the 
lessening of demands for extraordinary sacrifice. She concludes that, due to economic 
problems and the policies of the regime, the wartime atmosphere persisted and a ‘return 
to normalcy’, as imagined and hoped for by most of the population, did not occur until 
after Stalin’s death in 1953.171 For her, the immediate postwar years were ones marked by 
the delay of the return to normalcy. 
  
These authors provide rich accounts of postwar events and processes, however it is not 
clear why they should all fit into a discourse of normalisation. Fitzpatrick herself 
indicates problems with ascertaining a return to normalcy in the Soviet context, pointing 
out that the turmoil of the prewar Soviet Union “did not provide a very satisfactory or 
complete model for normalcy” and that the regime and the population often had very 
different ideas of what constituted ‘normal life’.172 It cannot be assumed, moreover, that 
the population themselves held homogenous notions about what a return to normalcy 
entailed. The use of the term raises questions of whether people themselves experienced 
and conceived of events in relation to a ‘normalisation’, and how and when they felt that 
a return to normalcy had occurred. If, for the millions of Soviet individuals, as for the 
scholars who have written about them, a sense of when, how and if normalisation took 
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place varied from person to person, then this casts further doubt on the usefulness of an 
exercise to identify the nature and timing of a return to normalcy.  
  
The findings of this thesis reinforce the inadequacy of conceiving the period in terms of 
these types of normalisation, either effected or delayed. Fitzpatrick details that her use of 
the concept of the ‘return to normalcy’ also implies “going home, and settling down”.173 
The thesis, as a study of the rapid repopulation of the city of Leningrad that lasted from 
1944 until 1947, after which time it slowed down, might seem at first to corroborate the 
accounts which hold that the late 1940s witnessed the settling down of Soviet life. In fact, 
however, it uncovers diverse stories of settlement and displacement, which did not 
necessarily start with the war and end with arrival into post-siege Leningrad.  
  
For some individuals an odyssey of wartime wanderings did come to an end in the late 
1940s, with their arrival in the city and obtainment of somewhere to live. For others, 
however, migration into the city heralded further displacement, as they were not allocated 
housing or were moved from one unsuitable or occupied dwelling to another. For some, a 
sense of return to ‘normal life’ was delayed, or made incomplete, by the non-return of 
their prewar housing and belongings, as well as the wartime loss of family, friends and 
neighbours. Others understood their postwar displacement or resettlement in relation to 
pre-war lives that had already entailed a great deal of geographic, as well as social, 
mobility. For many, including a large number of adolescents, their organised settlement 
in the city at the end of the war was experienced as a forced dislocation, and some of 
these individuals took opportunities later to run away from the places of work and 
accommodation to which they had been attached.  
  
The situation in Leningrad illustrates how the war, moreover, had transformed the 
physical boundaries and appearance of many parts of the country and had generated shifts 
in conceptions of home and criteria for belonging, with which officials and members of 
the population were grappling at the end of the war. This was the case not only on the 
local level, but also on the level of the state, as wartime behaviour and movements, as 
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well as ethnic identities, overlaid and often superseded earlier criteria for membership in 
the ‘Soviet family’.174 In this context, ‘settling down’ or even ‘going home’, whenever it 
occurred, was not simply a ‘return to normalcy’.  
  
The diverse resettlements and unsettlements undergone by Soviet individuals after the 
war, this thesis argues, should be understood in the context of the remaking of Soviet 
society, rather than just the unmaking of the consequences of the war. The experience of 
resettlement could be, but was not necessarily, understood as a return to normalcy by 
Soviet citizens. It was, however, often marked by the attempts of the Soviet authorities at 
various levels to impose a particular set of norms and a vision of society on its postwar 
territory by moving and fixing, and isolating and punishing, different populations, a 
process which was challenged and subverted by the behaviours and movements of some 
of the people themselves. This understanding incorporates Zubkova’s analysis that, while 
repression was increased after the war against political and cultural elites from 1949, the 
peak period in terms of numbers of political and criminal convictions was 1945-1946, 
when the victims were “returning POWs, repatriates, former soldiers of the Vlasov army, 
Ukrainian national separatists…and other elements of the population classified as 
“socially dangerous persons””.175 
  
The term ‘normalisation’ has been used by scholars drawing on the work of Foucault in 
other contexts to denote not a general settling down of life but the active, often coercive, 
structuring of communities, classifying and ordering of populations, defining of decency 
and abnormality and the ‘regularisation’ of the status of groups in relation to this 
community.176 It is ‘normalisation’ in this very specific, often coercive, as well as 
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constitutive sense, that is shown in this thesis as pertinent to an understanding of the 
repopulation of Leningrad after the siege and the experience of displacement in the 
postwar period of Soviet history.  
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 Chapter 2. “Who are you?” Reconstructing the 
population of the post-siege city (part one) 
  
2.1 The spring fair crowd 
  
The question “Who are you? Who are you?” is a recurrent refrain in the reminiscences of  
St. Petersburg resident Anatolii Petrov, published in the literary journal Neva in 1995, 
about the public at a spring fair organised in Leningrad in 1946.177 The fair took place for 
a month from 19th April in the centre of the city, on a public square on the bank of the 
river Neva overlooking the Peter and Paul fortress, and was announced with much fanfare 
in the local Party newspaper, Leningradskaia Pravda.178 By this time the population 
registered with the authorities at addresses in the city had grown from well under 600,000 
at the start of 1944 to over 1,700,000.179 The front page of Leningradskaia Pravda on 
24th April proclaimed that over one and a half million people had visited the spring fair in 
the five days since it opened, including half a million inhabitants on the Sunday alone.180  
  
The newspaper’s editors made clear the impressions that Leningrad residents should take 
away from their visit. The “eye is gladdened”, wrote the author of an article celebrating 
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the opening of the fair on 19th April, by the variety of goods on offer: the huge window 
display of a snack bar, stuffed with every possible kind of refreshments, sandwiches and 
buns, sweets and biscuits; on other stalls the teapots, aluminium dishes, children’s 
bicycles, table lamps, milk cans; overcoats, suits, tablecloths and napkins, suitcases, 
briefcases, handbags, every possible kind of finery, perfumes, musical instruments; 
preserves made from plums, apricots, cherries and strawberries, apple jellies, halva, 
juices and tomatoes; an abundance of sprats and caviar; and the beauty of the plentiful 
fresh collective farm produce, including vegetables, potatoes, meat and dairy products.181  
  
This was at a time when bread was still distributed to over half the Soviet population 
through the centralised rationing system.182 Deficits of many goods and constantly rising 
prices meant that workers earning the average of 500 roubles a month struggled to buy 
even the rationed foodstuffs and manufactured goods in state stores to which they were 
entitled.183 By autumn 1946 problems of food supply, exacerbated by a poor harvest and 
government policies of forcible grain procurement, raising prices and curtailing the issue 
of ration cards, would precipitate a country-wide famine.184 While briefly touching on the 
trade done at the spring fair, newspaper accounts made clear that its significance was as a 
spectacle.185 The head of the department of trade of the Leningrad City Soviet stressed 
the festive “external form” of the 180 brightly coloured pavilions and their array of 
goods.186 The article of 19th April listing the produce on display featured a description of 
the fair as a “fairytale” city of fantastical installations, reminiscent of the colourful 
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illustrations accompanying popular folk tales.187 The fantastical sights included a brightly 
painted carousel springing into life and a kiosk with a roof in the shape of a saucepan 
overflowing with milk and a cat twice human height catching it in his paw, as well as the 
consumer goods themselves.188 
  
From the mid-1930s the utopian promises of the Soviet project encapsulated in the 
popular song that proclaimed “we were born to make fairy tales come true” increasingly 
took the form of images of coming plenty.189 Celebrations of consumer goods served to 
justify the sacrifices required in the present, to educate the population in a ‘cultured’ 
lifestyle which they should strive to achieve and to demonstrate that life was becoming 
more joyful.190 In the wake of the war the regime added ‘rising from the ashes’ to the 
repertory of Soviet fairytales.191 The images of the spring fair in the post-siege Leningrad 
press superimposed the theme of recovery from the war onto earlier tropes: the fair was 
to exemplify the healing of the city’s wounds and the restoration of the links between 
Leningrad and the rest of the country, as well as the pinnacles of current Soviet culture 
and industry, the abundance of the future and the gaiety of old Rus’.192  
  
Petrov recalls being stunned as a nine year old boy by the fair which suddenly appeared 
before his eyes in all its splendour. He was so struck by the brightly decorated beer stalls 
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in the shapes of a bear with a can in its paws and three giant cans of beer that, despite his 
age, his dislike of beer, and his lack of money, he mentally approached the waitress in 
white and made the imaginary purchase which the fair was encouraging thousands of 
citizens to make. The splendour of the physical appearance of the fair, however, forms 
only a small part of his impressions and becomes just the backdrop to an attempt to make 
sense of the diverse and incongruous post-blockade population encountered milling 
around its stalls. Petrov depicts himself moving through the postwar crowd, observing the 
rest of the public at the fair and hearing the question ‘who are you’ echoing in German in 
the sounds of the cries of birds flying above the brightly coloured pavilions: “Sind sie 
wer? Sind sie wer?[sic] (“Who are you? Who are you?”)”.193 In an abortive attempt to 
answer the nagging issue of the collective identity of the crowd gathered at the bazaar, he 
characterises it in the following way:   
  
We, that is the public at the fair, for the main part were paupers, impecunious 
and starving. Beggars sat and stood on the pavements, pickpockets darted among 
the crowd. In this motley collection (pestrota) of people, the soldiers looked 
fine, especially those who were decorated with military awards. Over the heads 
of very well dressed women (fox fur collars, high quality coats, jackets, suits, 
hats) it looked liked something shone, as if these ladies radiated something, just 
like their companions, (who) in their appearance were reminiscent of a far away, 
perhaps non-existent time - Soviet aristocrats, dandies in white scarves, leather 
gloves and boots, polished to an unbearable shine…But the recent war 
constantly reminded of itself – in the stripes on the shirts of demobilised 
soldiers, in the scars and traces of burns on their faces, in the crutches and 
prostheses in the form of wooden legs, in the empty sleeves, neatly tucked into 
the soldiers’ belts…Stop!194 
  
The persistent uncertainty of the query ‘who are you?’ punctuates Petrov’s encounters 
with a variety of characters in particular. These include a grey-haired and wrinkled old 
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woman, in a tattered overcoat missing its right sleeve, who holds out her shaking bare 
arm in the hope of alms; a handsome war invalid without both legs who moves around 
with the help of a cart on ball bearings and sings along to an accordion, getting ‘dead 
drunk’ together with other invalids in the crowded taverns and on the streets; a grey, 
faceless mass of German prisoners of war who ‘swarm about’ in the nearby ruins, 
clearing up the wreckage of houses; and a peasant man, a former kulak, whose family had 
previously violently clashed with Petrov’s father during his participation in the campaign 
to collectivise the countryside. Now, following the death of his three sons at the front, the 
peasant with a ‘Pugachev’ beard sits drinking together with Petrov’s father, who himself 
has been recently demobilised from a penal battalion, where he ended up after his 
incarceration in the course of the mass arrests of the late 1930s.  
  
For Petrov, therefore, the collective entity of his family and neighbours and the wider 
Leningrad crowd, brought together in shared social spaces around the fair, is remembered 
as a diverse and disorientating assortment of figures. His public incorporates a ravaged, 
female countenance, betokening the lasting legacy of the wartime siege of the city, which 
was a predominantly female experience of starvation and survival, and also embodiments 
of the ‘war come home’, in the form of both decorated soldiers and destitute war 
invalids.195 His portrait is a confusing mixture of well-dressed regime elites and ragged 
beggars, waifs and petty thieves, of ambiguous former ‘class enemies’ and pitiful 
prisoners of war and of the markedly peasant and rural in the centre of the city. Together 
these various elements of the crowd provoke questions of social identity and trajectory 
that Petrov cannot resolve. At the end of his reminiscences the puzzle ‘who are you?’ still 
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hangs in the air and is coupled with the secondary question “where (are we heading) 
to?”196 
  
While Anatolii Petrov depicts a disparate post-blockade population, destabilising his 
notions of civic identity, scholarly discussions of the city in the wake of the siege have 
tended to produce narrowly bounded characterisations of its social composition, defining 
it as a city of blockade survivors (blokadniki), a city of migrants, or a city of re-evacuees. 
This chapter and the next challenge these simplifications, assert the limitations of 
attempts to classify the population in these ways and affirm instead the fluidity of the 
composition of city inhabitants, the permeability of the dividing lines between the various 
categories used to describe them and the cross-cutting self-identifications of residents.197  
  
The chapters are structured around an appraisal of demographic data compiled by the 
Leningrad authorities. The details contained in statistical records on the composition of 
the population during and after the siege reveal something of the variety of inhabitants in 
the post-blockade city. At the same time the gaps and inconsistencies that can be 
identified in these records hint at further complexities in the make up of the population 
obscured by the aggregate figures. The chapters reveal how definitions of who counts as 
a ‘Leningrader’ imposed by officials or adopted by researchers themselves affect the 
visibility of people in statistical representations and how the range of comings and goings 
shaping the structure of the populace defied these efforts at quantification and 
classification. Rather than arriving at a precise numerical answer to the puzzle ‘who are 
you?’ this analysis of demographic figures prompts further reflection on how criteria for 
belonging to the civic community have been established, articulated, enforced and 
undermined by scholars, officials, the various inhabitants of the city and people on the 
move themselves. The rest of this chapter is dedicated to the question of the extent to 
which the postwar city was a ‘city of blockade survivors’. 
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2.2 The blokadniki 
  
In her book The Legacy of the Siege Lisa Kirschenbaum uses the terms Leningraders and 
blockade survivors, blokadniki, fairly interchangeably, even when her topic is the post-
blockade population. She writes of the post-siege reconstruction of the city and Stalin’s 
increasing suppression of local commemorations of Leningrad’s unique fate that: 
  
In Leningrad, the “restored” city was not always a forgetful city. The survivors’ 
ability, or perhaps propensity, to see the city simultaneously as it is and as it was 
constitutes a vital point of reference in the examination of how Leningraders 
rebuilt their city after the war. After 1949, Leningraders lacked a public 
repository of artefacts and stories about the blockade. They lacked places to 
mourn the dead. But because memories were so closely associated with spaces 
that they continued to interact with and “see” – even if they had changed 
substantially – the erasure of memory was never complete.198 
  
Kirschenbaum’s postwar Leningraders are in the main, therefore, prewar inhabitants who 
had lived and worked in besieged Leningrad and survived through the terrible hunger and 
cold of the winter of 1941-2 to participate in the city’s reconstruction. She addresses the 
relationship to the city of the largely female population who had made enormous efforts 
to maintain daily life in the city under the extreme conditions of the blockade.199 These 
are the inhabitants whom Ol’ga Berggol’ts described, gave voice to and united in the 
poetry that she read out over the local radio throughout the siege, for example in these 
lines composed in the winter of 1941 addressed to a Leningrad housewife: 
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And to you – yes to you they will erect 
A monument on a large square. 
In immortal stainless steel 
They will engrave your simple appearance. 
  
In such a way: emaciated, brave, 
In a hastily tied headscarf, 
Just like, when under fire 
You go out with your purse in hand.200 
  
Berggol’ts later recognised, Kirschenbaum points out, that in the immediate postwar 
years, the central authorities were not likely to sanction the commemoration in steel of 
people who “didn’t blow up any tanks”.201 As soon as the war was over, Stalin called for 
the country to curtail talk of the war and move on to tasks of reconstruction. While 
monuments were hastily erected to fallen Red Army soldiers in the newly acquired Soviet 
territories and on the foreign soil of Germany and Eastern Europe, within the pre-1939 
borders of the Soviet Union monuments were slow in coming and modest, taking forms 
such as grim stone obelisks.202 Stalin certainly had no interest in commemorating 
catastrophic, local and domestic wartime episodes, above all ones that promoted pride in 
the autonomy of Leningrad.203 Even before the attack on Leningrad’s independence of 
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1949, during which the Museum of the Heroic Defence of Leningrad was shut down, 
there was no attempt to build a monument to the ‘ordinary’ women of the blockade. 
  
Instead the authorities set about removing traces of the war from the cityscape through 
the reconstruction effort. Local officials and architects in the initial post-blockade years, 
however, did not necessarily envisage the repairs to the city’s bomb damaged edifices in 
terms of forgetting the recent past but rather regarded them as a way of commemorating 
survival and renewal in the city at the same time as “recovering what was lost”.204 The 
‘ordinary Leningraders’ living in the city who now applied themselves to rebuilding the 
postwar cityscape, Kirschenbaum argues, similarly felt a desire to remember the 
sacrifices of the blockade, while also marking the return to life that had begun by the end 
of the siege. Their efforts in reconstructing the city’s buildings and their everyday 
interactions with urban spaces allowed them “to preserve the familiar places in which 
they had led their prewar lives and survived the blockade”.205  
  
But how many of the individuals who could be met in Leningrad’s domestic and public 
spaces in the years after January 1944 were prewar residents who had survived the siege? 
To what extent were those carrying out its reconstruction the emaciated women in 
headscarves from 1941 who had survived to rebuild their city and their prewar lives?  
  
Kirschenbaum states that only about 640,000 people remained in the city at the end of 
1942, a total that had fallen to 575,000 people by 27th January 1944, when the blockade 
was lifted.206 Within two years, according to the residence records of the local police, the 
number of people recorded as living in the city had grown by over a million. The number 
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of inhabitants at the end of January 1946, states an NKVD report from this month, was 
1,675,332.207 During the two years after the lifting of the siege, moreover, people left the 
city as well as arrived there. The poet Vera Inber, having lived through the entire 
blockade and witnessed the fireworks of the victory display, wrote “farewell Leningrad” 
in her diary entry of 7th June 1944 and made her way to Moscow a few days later.208 
Inber may have been unusual in that she had only travelled to Leningrad from Moscow 
two weeks before the start of the siege to be together with her husband, a Leningrad 
doctor, during the war.209 She was not, though, it would seem, the only siege survivor to 
move away at the end of the war. The City Soviet’s Statistical Administration made note 
of the departure of over 50,000 people from the city in 1944 and over 80,000 in 1945.210 
These figures indicate that Leningrad residents who had been in the city when the siege 
was lifted declined in number in absolute terms in the ensuing years, while also forming a 
smaller and smaller proportion of the growing population. Just two years after the end of 
the blockade those who had lived the whole way through it appear to have made up only 
about a third of the city’s recorded inhabitants.211  
  
Some of those arriving, however, in the immediate post-siege years were themselves 
former residents of the city who had left for the front or into evacuation during the war. 
Evacuation from the city had continued, after a brief interruption at the beginning of the 
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siege, for the entire of its duration and some of those arriving in the post-blockade years 
had lived through its most severe days and considered themselves ‘blockade survivors’. 
Before discussing the composition of the incoming population who made up the rest of 
the city’s residents after the war, though, there is more that can be said about how closely 
the figures for those living in the city at the end of the blockade approximate to the 
situation at the time. A closer analysis of the demographic records and the manner of 
their production demonstrates various reasons to treat the statistics with caution.  
  
Kirschenbaum’s figure of 575,000 people living in the city in January 1944 is based on a 
reference made by Richard Bidlack in 2002 to a statistic originally published in the 
journal Voprosy Istorii in 1967.212 The author of the journal article, N. A. Manakov, 
obtained his demographic figures from documents generated by the Main Trade 
Administration of the City Soviet.213 Alternative data for the number of residents, 
however, emerge from reports filed by other branches of the local state and party 
administration. Recent archival investigations by several scholars, for example, have 
uncovered documents held by the city’s Party Committee and by the Health and 
Statistical Administrations of the City Soviet, among other organs, recording in the 
region of 556,000-558,000 inhabitants at the start of 1944.214 The Statistical 
Administration also compiled a collection of data in 1967 on the development of 
Leningrad that includes a table of population figures in which the number of people left 
in the city at the start of 1944 is put as low as 546,000.215  
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The variations in the figures can partly be accounted for by differing bureaucratic 
delineations of the city of Leningrad. By 1939 the four suburban towns of Kolpino, 
Kronstatdt, Pushkin and Peterhof had been added to the territory administered by the City 
Soviet.216 Henceforth the civic authorities regularly recorded two sets of statistics for the 
population, one for the inner city of Leningrad, made up of 15 districts, and another for 
the wider city comprising 19 central and suburban sectors. For the duration of the siege, 
though, the towns of Peterhof and Pushkin were occupied by German forces and until 
their liberation in February 1944 the figures for the greater city referred to 17 rather than 
19 districts.217 As regards the population data for January 1944, the Statistical 
Administration’s total of 546,000 inhabitants refers to people living in the 15 central city 
districts, while the higher figures include the suburbs remaining in the purview of the 
City Soviet.218   
  
Differing definitions of the city’s territorial limits cannot account for all the variations in 
the demographic statistics reported, however. The decisions and intentions of the 
compilers and their classifications of the population affected the methodology they used 
to calculate the number of residents, and the figures at which they arrived, in other ways 
as well. The city’s Trade Administration, for example, gathered data on residents as part 
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of the process of ascertaining the number of people in the wider city, including suburban 
towns, who qualified for ration cards in a given month.219 During the war local 
government organs administering the distribution of ration cards were prominent among 
institutions involved in regular efforts to count the population.220 The local police and the 
city’s Health and Statistical Administrations at the same time continued to work out 
demographic data for both the central city and the suburbs on the basis of the numbers of 
people registered at addresses in these localities in accordance with the internal passport 
and residence permit system.221  
  
People living in the city who were incorporated into assessments about the allocation of 
ration cards overlapped, but were not coterminous, with those registered as permanent 
Leningrad inhabitants, as the possession of a residence permit was not the sole condition 
for receiving a ration card. Data calculated by both methods excluded people housed and 
fed in state institutions, from prisons to hospitals and invalid homes, but figures based on 
the issue of ration cards also left out residents who were fed in special canteens or had 
been sent to work at that time in rural areas outside the city to lay in peat and firewood 
for the city.222 The number of people worked out on the basis of residence permits 
generally included these groups but, on the other hand, did not incorporate individuals 
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who were working inside the city but had not yet been granted the right to stay 
permanently.223  
  
A memorandum produced for the Leningrad City Party Committee towards the end of 
1943 by the head of the City Bureau for Ration Cards illustrates well how the very 
attempts of state officials to map, categorise, stratify and isolate groups within the 
population for various purposes, including provisioning, welfare, punishment, and 
assigning privilege, determine the data available and create divergences and blank spots 
in statistical representations of society.224 In this report, the head of the Leningrad bureau 
set out to reconstruct the age and gender make up of the population of Leningrad, 
together with the suburban towns of Kronstadt and Kolpino, on 1st June 1943, on the 
basis of documents presented by individuals to receive ration cards for that month. He 
cites in the course of the analysis two different figures for the aggregate population of 
these territories. At first, the document states that the total population at the start of June 
1943, worked out on the basis of assessments about the issuing of ration cards, was about 
621,000 people.225 In the table outlining the age and gender composition of the 
population later in the report, however, the figure for the total number of inhabitants is 
fixed at 569,397.226  
  
What happened to over 50,000 of the population? The author of the memorandum 
explained that the data used to calculate the structure of the population did not include 
45,600 people who were not ultimately issued ration cards as part of the central system: 
about 16,000 who were ascertained as being treated in hospitals in the city; an assortment 
of people in other institutions including invalid homes and prisons; people confined to 
corrective labour colonies; and workers in particularly vital industries, including over 
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11,000 engaged in military-reconstruction work..227 In his elaboration of the structure of 
the population, therefore, the author rendered invisible the city residents removed from 
the general supply system due to their segregation in state institutions or to their status as 
either indentured or particularly valued workers. The report demonstrates how statistics 
produced by the authorities created partial reflections of the population, reflections that 
shaped aspects of people’s everyday lives, such as access to food, but which represent 
only a slice of reality.228  
  
The second set of data on the population composition also excluded, according to the 
report, about 6,000 people who had initially been counted as civilian, urban residents but 
were discovered to be working for military organisations and units of the Administration 
of Defence Construction and living on the territory of the surrounding Leningrad 
region.229 This inconsistency points to the fact that discrepancies between the various 
figures available and gaps between these figures and the situation in reality arose both 
from deliberate decisions about who should be counted and also from the frustration of 
neat delineations of the civic population in practice.  
  
The blurring and crossings of boundaries between frontline and rear and the inside and 
outside of the city confounded the structures used by the authorities to describe, count 
and act on the population during the war, through the end of the siege. The contours of 
the German encirclement around Leningrad complicated distinctions between military 
and civilian populations and between the city and its outskirts. In places the frontline ran 
right through the city suburbs, coming close to some of the inner city districts. As we 
have seen, the German army occupied the suburban towns and imperials palaces of 
Pushkin and Petrodvorets, and fierce fighting in the Kolpino suburb established the front 
just south of the area’s Izhorsk metal-working factory.230 At some points the front ran 
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within ten miles of Palace Square in the centre of Leningrad and within just two and a 
half miles, eight tram stops, of the Kirov plant, formerly the Putilov works, known for the 
activities of its striking workers in the revolutions of 1905 and 1917.231  
  
It was possible to travel to and from the front on Leningrad’s trams and trolleybuses 
when public transport was functioning in the city. Harrison Salisbury describes the 
journey of the war correspondent Alexander Rozen from his newspaper offices to the 
front at the start of the blockade in a streetcar with a machine gun mounted on front: 
  
As Rozen waited at the Kirov Gates for his pass to be checked, a 60-ton KV tank 
emerged from the passageway, wheeled majestically into Stachek Prospekt and 
headed for the city limits. Just behind, racing to catch up, went the streetcar. The 
trolleycars ran as far as the Kotlyarov streetcar barns. There they halted and the 
conductor shouted, “All off. This is the front. End of the line.” Beyond that you 
went by foot, picking your way through the military trucks, the barricades, the 
tank traps, the dugouts, the machine-gun nests, past the Krasnensk Cemetery and 
Forel Hospital to Sheremetyev Park. The trenches began there.232  
  
The city came under the administrative jurisdiction of a Military Soviet as well as the 
civilian City Soviet and was divided into six defence sectors, corresponding to six of the 
inner city districts, where barricades were maintained by local NKVD officers, regular 
police and factory workers.233 Military organisations, including military hospitals, were 
located within the inner city, employing civilian as well as military personnel and treating 
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civilian and military casualties.234 To the west of the city, on the other hand, German 
forces had halted over twenty miles outside of the established city limits, cutting off some 
territories within the ring of the blockade which formally belonged to the surrounding 
Leningrad region.235 Many of the city’s remaining inhabitants spent time building 
fortifications both in and around the city erecting pillboxes, camouflaging factories and 
turning workshops into machinegun nests.236 In this situation ‘civilian’ and ‘municipal’ 
records could not correspond to discrete populations caught within the siege. 
  
This is not to say that distinctions between the city, surrounding areas and the frontline 
were completely effaced during the siege.237 The point is that the relationship between 
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‘rear’ and ‘front’ and the city and its limits was complex and movements between them 
thwarted simplifications, not that the attempt to make such distinctions was abandoned or 
did not matter to the authorities or people themselves.238 
  
The archivist Nadezhda Cherepenina has suggested that statistics on demographic 
processes in the city during the siege period should be treated with caution as local 
administrative organs were not always concerned with the identity of people coming in 
and out of the city, neglecting to record whether they were residents of the city or of the 
region, or people from elsewhere who had been evacuated as far as Leningrad or were on 
assignments in the city.239 This thesis contends, in contrast, that the local civilian and 
military authorities acted to document and verify the identities of those on the move and 
to reinforce distinctions between the city centre, its suburbs, the regional areas under 
siege and the frontline zone. They continued to make calculations about the population 
according to these spatial categories and heightened the regulation of movement across 
boundaries between them.240 As in the prewar period, though, official controls and 
classifications floundered on messy human realities, above all on widespread 
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dislocations, both planned and unplanned, prompting renewed attempts to order and 
count the population according to certain bureaucratic visions.241  
  
Aggregate population statistics compiled by the Statistical Administration from the 
system of passportisation and population registration had been fraught with inaccuracies 
from the system’s inception. Before the war, the administration’s attempts to monitor 
fluctuations in the population of the city and its suburbs on the basis of registration slips 
filled out by people arriving and leaving, together with records of births and deaths in 
these localities, had been undermined by the lack of control over population movements 
in practice. Just as the passport and residency permit system was ineffectual in preventing 
independent and uncontrolled movement by people into passportised areas, it also failed 
to provide reliable records of population flows.  
  
Gijs Kessler has discussed in detail the considerable discrepancies between registration 
data and actual numbers of residents in the passportised areas of the Soviet Union before 
the war. Periodic checks by the Central Administration for Economic Accounting 
revealed wildly inaccurate registration of urban arrivals and departures by local police 
authorities. Many houses and barracks harboured scores of people without residence 
permits, while large numbers of people registered at particular addresses in fact no longer 
lived there, having left without annulling their residence with the police. The actual 
figures for arrivals and departures in and out of urban centres were likely to have been far 
higher than the registration data suggested.242   
  
In 1939, for example, for every 1,000 registered arrivals in Leningrad, there were 1,655 
people who had indicated their departure to the city from other places. The 
Administration for Economic Accounting concluded that the people who had gone 
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missing on the road must have been refused residence in the city or been unable to obtain 
housing and so settled in nearby rural areas of the Leningrad region. It seems likely, 
though, Kessler concludes, that some of these people had ended up in the city as illegal 
immigrants. Taken together with those who left without notifying the authorities it is 
clear that on the eve of the war party and state organisations did not have reliable 
information on the number of inhabitants within the city limits and that aggregate 
population statistics may either have under- or over-represented the actual number of 
urban residents at any one time.243  
  
The onset of war propelled many more people into movement. The rapid incursion of 
German forces and the Soviet mobilisation of the population engendered mass 
displacement, especially in the western border areas of the Soviet Union. Attempts by the 
Soviet state to organise the transfer of people to and from the frontline that was moving 
ever deeper into Soviet territory, and closer to Leningrad, frequently devolved into, or 
merged with, unplanned comings and goings, crossings and stoppages.244 Between the 
beginning of the German invasion on 22nd June 1941 and the start of the blockade the 
local authorities recorded hundreds of thousands of people on the move into and out of 
the city, across and around it. These people were joined by many others who were 
making their journeys without official direction, often in contravention of government 
laws, who do not appear in the statistical reports. 
  
From the first days of the war hundreds of thousands of inhabitants of Leningrad who had 
been drafted into the army and navy or volunteered for a people’s militia (narodnoe 
opolchenie) marched towards the front.245 As the frontline came to meet them, many 
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ended up fighting and dying in battles in the Leningrad region, between the Luga river 
and the city.246 Thousands of civilians were sent out along with them in the direction of 
the front to perform auxiliary work such as burying mines, digging trenches, building 
barricades.247 Travelling out of the city they passed thousands of other people coming the 
other way ahead of the German advance and the retreating Soviet forces. 
  
On the trains heading towards Leningrad came deportees and evacuees who were being 
transported by the Soviet government from the Baltic states, the Karelo-Finnish republic 
and the south-west areas of the Leningrad region to destinations in Siberia and central 
Asia.248 Families who ordinarily lived in Leningrad city but were spending the summer at 
dachas in surrounding rural areas when war broke out also boarded trains heading to the 
city, as did several hundred thousand children who had been evacuated into the path of 
German troops in the countryside to the south and east of the city and had to be sent 
back.249 Some people went from one displacement to another. One interviewee in the 
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European University project recalls being at the dacha about 60 miles from the city with 
her grandmother when they heard the war had begun. Her grandmother quickly took her 
back to Leningrad, whereupon she became one of a group of 200 children evacuated out 
to a town in the region who within a month had to travel in goods wagons back to the city 
to escape the German advance.250 
  
At the same time, people from areas to the south and west of Leningrad who had not been 
incorporated into organised evacuation procedures were making their own way along the 
railways and roads into the city.251 The official evacuation of parts of the population had 
broken down quickly in western areas of the Soviet Union, including the Belarusian and 
Ukrainian republics, especially once soldiers in retreat could be seen passing on the roads 
through towns and villages.252 In rural areas, including parts of the Leningrad region, 
many people were left to flee the German advance by themselves, compelled to disregard 
increased wartime restrictions on the independent movement of individuals if they 
wished to escape occupation.253 According to an executive member of the regional Soviet 
in August 1941, for example:  
  
Thus far from the frontline regions we have mainly evacuated the families of 
party and Soviet activists, children and their mothers from the cities, but the 
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collective farm population has been left until the last minute and has departed on 
its own.254 
  
Often, in practice, even people living in towns in the region had to flee the advancing 
troops on their own accord.255 A woman interviewed in the European University 
blockade project recalled the journeys being made on the road between Leningrad and 
Gatchina, a town in the Leningrad region about 30 miles south of the city, on the eve of 
the blockade. The woman herself was travelling with fellow students from Leningrad 
towards the town, where they were charged with digging trenches. They soon became 
aware that German forces must already be drawing near as they encountered people 
coming the other way who “were fleeing from Gatchina”:  the “whole time [we were] on 
the road”, she relates, “we saw people with bags, with a few belongings, leaving 
Gatchina”.256  
  
Unable to completely organise and direct the displacement of certain civilians through 
evacuation procedures, or to restrict the movements of the rest of the population by 
means such as limiting the issue of train tickets, the central and local authorities 
implemented measures to identify people trying to enter the city of Leningrad and to 
tighten control over access to the city, in particular the inner urban districts.257 A 
succession of decrees issued from the end of June 1941 by the Supreme Soviet, the City 
Soviet and the Military Soviet of the Leningrad Front limited entry to the city to people 
already registered at accommodation inside Leningrad who had the permission of the 
authorities to come in; those living in suburban areas who could provide certificates to 
attest that they worked in an enterprise within the city; or people mobilised with the 
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sanction of the head of the police administration or the chairman of the City Soviet.258 
The decrees obliged the local police to organise a defence line (zagraditel’naia liniia) in 
the southern part of the city near to the front and set up special checkpoints on the 
approaches to Leningrad, in its outskirts and within the city proper, where they would 
check the identity documents of pedestrians and people travelling on public transport.259 
Additional police patrols were also instituted throughout the city to verify people’s 
documents on the spot and special police groups were established at train stations, jetties 
and evacuation centres to oversee departures from the city into the rear.260  
  
By heightening checks and controls over people moving across the composite borders of 
wartime Leningrad, the authorities sought to regulate more closely the number of people 
in different parts of the city, to organise the allocation of labour and resources such as 
food and housing and to preserve social and spatial stratifications by excluding people 
who were not entitled to enter and settle in the different civic zones.261 The tightened 
identification procedures were also, though, a product of state concerns about the nature 
or ‘true identity’ of people on the move and were aimed at protecting the core space of 
the city from displaced citizens suspected of concealing dangerous anti-Soviet intentions 
and loyalties.262  
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The regime was especially wary of people from the newly annexed regions that had not 
yet been fully Sovietised. The Leningrad police paid particular attention to escorting 
those in transit from the Baltic republics across the city and ‘filtering’ them en route in 
search of criminal and other ‘suspicious’ individuals.263 The concerns of the authorities 
also extended more generally, however, to people travelling into and across the city. 
According to a survey of the wartime activities of the local police compiled for the 
chairman of the City Soviet towards the end of 1943, evacuees from the Leningrad region 
being transported in and out of the city and urban residents going into evacuation were 
also closely guarded and ‘filtered’ for dubious ‘elements’.264  
  
While the police account from 1943 does not make reference to anyone managing to 
enter Leningrad without the authorisation of the regime, a journalist for Leningradskaia 
Pravda was reportedly told by an officer on patrol in the city outskirts in August 1941 
that the main purpose of the guard was to “prevent Germans entering the city in the guise 
of refugees”.265 The term refugee appeared rarely in Soviet policy documents from the 
end of the 1930s onwards as all discussion of the possibility of wartime displacement was 
formulated under the rubric of organised evacuation, conceived as the antithesis of the 
spontaneous flight of ‘refugees’ that occurred inside Russia during World War I.266 The 
use of the word by a police official implies, therefore, a large number of people making it 
into the city outside of state plans and procedures. This “disorderly flow of refugees into 
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the city” was suspected, according to the journalist’s source, not just of harbouring 
Germans but also deserters from the front, spies and other “hostile elements” in 
disguise.267 
  
When, at the end of August, German bombardment and occupation of the railway lines 
and stations on the approach to Leningrad brought train travel in and out of the city to a 
halt, the closing blockade did not just circumscribe people living in a mixture of 
administrative territories but also encircled the different groups of people who had been 
on the move or were about to set off, trapping them in transit. 268 On the railways, for 
example, according to Cherepenina, “tens of thousands of people congregated in the 
station buildings and on trains at suburban stations awaiting a possible breakout to the 
east”, a miracle which failed to happen.269 As the blockade closed, the authorities looked 
to order the groups of people displaced by war and further fortify local borders and 
spatial hierarchies, underscoring distinctions between who belonged in the city proper 
and who in the rural regional areas or the suburban buffer zones.270 
  
From the start of the blockade on 8th September, special permission had to be granted by 
the authorities to purchase even suburban train tickets and on 13th September the Military 
Soviet of the Leningrad Front issued a decree about the distribution within the blockaded 
territory of evacuees from frontline areas.271 These were the people who had been brought 
from the Baltic states, the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Republic and from parts of the 
Leningrad region who had not yet been evacuated further into the rear. The decree 
stipulated that within two days 32,000 people who had arrived from these areas and were 
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currently living in trains at the Leningrad railway junction or at evacuation centres inside 
the city must be moved out into the farms, schools, hostels and flats of the Leningrad 
region that were located inside the blockade ring, although in practice thousands more of 
these evacuees were accommodated in the city itself.272 The decree also charged the chief 
of the rear guard troops with carrying out further checks on anyone arriving into the city 
on foot or on carts, by trams or suburban trains, and instructed the Regional Soviet to 
create assembly points on main roads and at railways stations around the city to prevent 
any more new arrivals getting through to the urban centre.273  
  
Three days later the Military Soviet turned its attention to the relocation of women with 
children, and hospitals and nurseries out of the southern outskirts of Leningrad that were 
adjacent to the frontline. The Soviet ordered that those living in the suburbs to the south 
of the city were to be resettled within two days into areas of the Leningrad region. About 
51,000 women and children living within the southern limits of the inner city, on the 
other hand, were to be moved into other districts in the centre of Leningrad. The local 
police were charged with arranging their settlement in the rooms of people who had been 
evacuated from the city prior to the onset of the siege or moving them in with other 
residents.274 
  
The ongoing implementation of measures to order and verify the people moving across 
and around the various zones of Leningrad suggests both the importance to the authorities 
of establishing the origins and whereabouts of those present in the city and also their 
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fears that their knowledge and control of the population were being undermined by an 
unorganised and incalculable influx of people ‘torn loose’ from their previous positions 
in the polity.275  
  
Leon Gouré estimated in his work of 1962 that, despite state regulations, on the eve of the 
blockade there were anywhere between 400,000-800,000 ‘refugees’ in the city who had 
arrived outside of official mobilisation and registration and that to these must be added 
refugees who continued to arrive even after the blockade had begun.276 He makes this 
very rough calculation on the basis of daily bread output which went up in the city in July 
and August even as people were being evacuated out of Leningrad and, therefore, he 
reasons, must have been for consumption by the incomers. The point is, however, that the 
number of unofficial migrants in the city and their subsequent fate cannot be established 
with any reliability.277 What is likely, however, is that many of those who escaped 
territories coming under occupation but found themselves caught within the blockade 
were deprived of access to basic foodstuffs as a corollary of their statistical invisibility.  
  
By evading state controls over their movement and residence they enabled the Soviet 
authorities to exclude them from the provisioning of food through the ration system, as 
well as the allocation of housing. This unintended consequence of the registration system, 
as Cynthia Buckley has argued, provided the state with a minimum level of power over 
the distribution of resources in times of scarcity, when their controls over the placement 
of people proved to be ineffective.278 Non-residents who circumvented barriers to 
entering the city were likely, as a result, to have been among the first to die when hunger 
and cold began to take hold in Leningrad in November.  
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Some, however, may have found means to obtain access to food and shelter. They may 
have been able to obtain work in the city’s factories, hired by directors who had lost 
much of their labour force, both skilled and manual, to the Red Army and the doomed 
Leningrad people’s militia, but who were still, in the first months of the blockade, 
required to meet high production targets.279 Factory employment could provide access to 
a canteen or a ration card or edible raw materials and to somewhere to stay, from living 
space in an apartment to a workshop floor, with or without formal residence 
registration.280 Even a worker’s ration did not necessarily protect people from the ravages 
of starvation but some unofficial migrants may have survived in the city through the end 
of the blockade and some, but not all, may have eventually shown up as civic inhabitants 
in sets of demographic statistics based on the issue of ration cards or residence permits. 
  
Minutes from a meeting of the City Party Committee in January 1942 on ‘strengthening 
vigilance’ reveal that the local party leadership worried that insufficient checks on people 
recruited to factories were undermining the final level of state control over access to 
distributional networks in the city.281 Aleksei Kuznetsov, second regional party secretary 
at the time, claimed at the meeting that factories were persisting in hiring people or 
admitting them onto the premises without asking to see identity documents, even at a 
time when many enterprises were without light and fuel and had effectively shut down 
work. Kuznetsov and several of the other party secretaries present voiced fears that this 
practice had enabled people, particularly those with origins outside the city, to utilise 
strategies of visibility and invisibility and to lose and acquire categorical ‘identities’ for 
their own ends, disrupting the “surveillance order” by means of which the party state 
deployed labour and determined entitlements.282 Kuznetsov, for example, expressed his 
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alarm that at several factories a “fairly large” collection of people would turn up at the 
start of the month, receive a ration card and then “vanish” from the sight of the 
authorities.283 Another secretary raised as a problem the large group of people who had 
arrived into his city district from regional towns like Luga, and were managing to become 
temporarily registered as party members in the city by paying dues for a few months in 
advance and thereby acquiring “the rights of a full citizen of the city”, without actually 
possessing any documents to this effect.284  
  
Once again these fears about loss of power to ascribe and verify who people were, and to 
confer or restrict access to spaces and resources accordingly, were bound up with 
perceived threats from people adrift from their social moorings, with a “spoiled identity”, 
to the security of the city and the state.285 Kuznetsov gave the particular example of one 
worker at the Stalin factory, a former Red Army soldier, who had been recruited without 
verification of his passport or military papers, and was one of those who received a 
monthly ration card and then ‘disappeared’. And who, asked Kuznetsov rhetorically, did 
he turn out to be? The answer, apparently, was a serviceman who had earlier been taken 
prisoner by the Germans and, according to Kuznetsov, would spend the time away from 
the workplace “systematically” crossing the frontline to give information to a German 
spy.286 
     
                                                                                                                                                  
Garcelon, ‘Colonizing the Subject: The Genealogy and Legacy of the Soviet Internal Passport’, in J. Caplan 
and J. C. Torpey (eds.), Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the 
Modern World (New Jersey and Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp.83-100, here p.83; for a  
critical discussion of ‘strategies of invisibility’ among groups of displaced people and whether their ability 
to deliberately ‘lose’ their identities and move in and out of official categories should be considered a form 
of social freedom or a symptom of their subjection to government prohibitions, repression and harassment 
see G. Kibreab, ‘Revisiting the Debate on People, Place, Identity and Displacement’, Journal of Refugee 
Studies, Vol.12, No.4 (1999), pp.384-410, here pp.391-399 and Malkki, Purity and Exile, p.16; of course, it 
could be argued that both these assertions have validity. 
283
 Dzeniskevich (ed.), Leningrad v Osade, p.416. 
284
 Ibid, p.417; on the numerous reports testifying to the routine hiring of peasants and issuing of passports 
by labour hungry industrial managers and the ease with which peasants could acquire and use false identity 
documents in the 1930s, in this case in relation to Moscow, see D. L. Hoffman, Peasant Metropolis: Social 
Identities in Moscow, 1929-1941 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994), p.53. 
285
 Malkki, ‘National Geographic’, p.35 on refugee-ness regarded as a ‘spoiled identity’; Baron and Gatrell, 
‘Population Displacement’, p.53 on the transient subject assumed to be “adrift from the moorings of social 
identity and markers of status” and therefore dangerously distanced from means of state control. 
286
 Dzeniskevich (ed.), Leningrad v Osade, p.416. 
 85
Another official present at the January meeting averred that the local police could not 
maintain patrols to monitor the population, as they themselves were suffering from the 
effects of hunger, and had told him they believed they would collapse on the way to their 
posts. Kuznetsov retorted immediately “they are lying, they have lost their discipline”, 
adding that the police were fed three times a day in special canteens and were obliged to 
work.287 It is likely, however, that in the extreme conditions of the winter of 1941-42 
lower level agents of the administration responsible for the surveillance of the population 
or the maintenance of demographic records, although better provisioned than many 
people in the city, themselves died of starvation or, weakened with hunger and cold, 
struggled to continue to work. Despite the opening of a route across frozen lake Ladoga 
from November 1941, that winter few foodstuffs reached Leningrad, except for flour and, 
reportedly, an abundance of supplies for those at the apex of the party elite, and even in 
some of the ‘closed’ cafeterias the availability of food was only marginally better than the 
pitiful bread rations provided for the rest of the population.288 According to an official at 
the Elektrosila works, in January and February: 
  
people were dying everywhere: in the yard, in the shop, in the canteen, in the 
street. They walked about all black, sooty, wrapped in rags, leaning on sticks, 
barely moving their legs. The healthiest, strongest men died.289 
  
The report on the wartime activities of the police commented upon the deaths and 
physical exhaustion among rank and file officers during the winter and the Statistical 
Administration ceased functioning altogether from the end of December until the 
following spring.290 Throughout the winter of 1941-42, therefore, these agencies in 
charge of registering and de-registering residents and collating information on the 
population operated poorly and intermittently. At the same time, people in the city were 
dying in vast numbers; others were managing to leave Leningrad as evacuation resumed 
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by air and boat shortly after the blockade began and later took place along the ‘road of 
life’ across the frozen lake; as the housing of “hundreds of thousands of inhabitants of the 
city” was damaged by bombing and fires or broken up for firewood, many more people, 
regardless of their physical weakness, the heavy snow and cessation of public transport, 
were moving themselves and what belongings they could into apartments of 
acquaintances or people who had left Leningrad.291 Some made their way in from the city 
suburbs near the frontlines on their own accord to settle in empty rooms in the city centre. 
One interviewee in the European University project moved with her mother from their 
house in the outskirts of the city when it burned down completely at the start of the 
blockade and then, she relates, had to ‘roam’ around the flats of their relatives living in 
central districts.292  
  
These circumstances no doubt exacerbated the patchiness of the records of how many 
inhabitants were living at which addresses within the city.293 This led to further 
inaccuracies in demographic statistics compiled on the basis of the issue of ration cards. 
Several accounts by interviewees suggest that breakdowns in the system of annulling the 
residence of inhabitants who had moved away or died was used by people who remained 
as one means of illegally claiming additional ration cards that could be vital to 
survival.294  
  
In response, the local authorities conducted almost monthly re-calculations of who was to 
be issued with ration cards, regularly reporting thousands of falsely claimed cards 
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throughout the blockade. Dmitrii Pavlov, a representative of the State Committee of 
Defence in charge of food supply in Leningrad from September 1941 to January 1942, 
for example, later railed against the continued fraudulent acquisition of extra ration cards 
by “swindlers” who didn’t turn in their cards, claimed them for people actually living 
outside the city limits and imaginary individuals, or “printed false ration cards by 
hand”.295 The discovery of such “cases of misuse”, he asserts, was the main factor in the 
reduction of the number of ration cards issued by 97,000 in October 1941.296 A report on 
the registration of ration cards of April 1942 stated that 9173 illegally obtained ration 
cards had been discovered that month by the authorities.297 In July and August 1942, once 
the severe winter was over and the supply route across lake Ladoga was functioning well 
and easing conditions within the city, the Leningrad police conducted a re-registration of 
passports, prompted by the belief that enemy troops were falsifying Soviet documents. 
On the basis of the re-registration the Statistical Administration attempted to make more 
precise calculations about the size and composition of the population, and the police 
sought to remove transgressors of the passport system and other “undesirable elements” 
from the city.298  
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The verification of documents in summer 1942 formed the basis for subsequent statistics 
on the population, however there is evidence that the re-registration did not expose all the 
demographic consequences of the mortality and displacements of the winter.299 Some 
interviewees in the blockade project, for example, claimed that members of their family 
and neighbours who left the city into evacuation were never removed from the residence 
records for particular houses.300 One woman, for example, recalled that her sister-in-law 
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was among many people who returned from Central Asia to discover that according to 
official paperwork she had been living in the city for the entire of the blockade.301  
  
The ever-changing demographic situation in the city, moreover, soon rendered any data 
on the population out of date.302 While there were many fewer deaths in the besieged city 
from starvation after the spring of 1942, the increasingly effective functioning of 
transport across lake Ladoga from this time and a breach in the German encirclement in 
January 1943 facilitated the passage of more people in and out of the blockaded area. The 
decrees limiting travel in and out of the city remained in force and population movements 
in the second half 1942 were organised by the authorities as part of a plan to turn the city 
into a “military encampment” by sending out mothers with several children, the injured, 
pensioners, students and workers of evacuated factories and keeping just “necessary” 
personnel in the city.303 This plan, however, was not translated seamlessly into action, 
partly due to large inaccuracies in the population estimates on which it was based, noted 
later in the year by administrators.304 It is likely, moreover, that people also continued to 
travel on their own initiative in the latter months of the blockade, disregarding the visions 
and controls of the authorities. According to Elizabeth White, many people resisted 
evacuation and “some returned illegally even before January 1944”.305 Certainly Dmitrii 
Pavlov, the State Defence Committee representative later claimed in a polemic about 
establishing the number of blockade victims that: 
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in the ensuing 11 months [after the breach of the blockade in January 1943] until 
the end of the year huge changes occurred in the number of inhabitants of the 
city. How many people left Leningrad and how many arrived using railway 
transport no-one knows.306 
  
Pavlov may have been overstating the case in order to support his argument that estimates 
about the number of people who died in the blockade based on who was left at the end 
are not accurate and over-represent the total number of victims. The frustration of 
numerical certainties by population movements, though, was a perennial feature of Soviet 
data gathering that did not cease even in besieged Leningrad and none of the official 
figures for the population of January 1944 is likely to capture the actual number of people 
who remained in the city.  
  
While it is not possible to arrive at a reliable total of people surviving in Leningrad when 
the blockade was lifted, the discussion of the comings and goings of the population 
during the siege does reinforce the argument that the post-siege population was more 
complex than Kirschenbaum’s community of blockade survivors occupying and 
rebuilding haunted yet familiar spaces. Interviews conducted by the European University 
reveal ways in which survivors have defined themselves and their experiences during the 
blockade not just in relation to a community of people defending their native city but also 
with regards to their own displacement or that of others. They demonstrate how 
widespread itinerancy and the state’s response to people on the move shaped self-
perceptions, even among those who stayed in the city for the whole 900 days.  
  
References to the ‘refugees’ of the blockaded city in several interviews highlight both the 
significance and the complexity of wartime dislocations for some people in Leningrad 
during the blockade. While the label ‘refugee’ was replaced in official policy by 
‘evacuees’, denoting population “contingents” being resettled in an orderly fashion by the 
state, it remained common currency among the population at large during the war.307 One 
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interviewee in the European University project, a young girl when war broke out, recalled 
that in July 1941 “we heard this word refugees, that refugees were fleeing”. 308 According 
to Leon Gouré, people from Leningrad questioned after the siege “were greatly impressed 
by the number of refugees in the city”.309 But who were the refugees who made such an 
impression? The European University interviews demonstrate how multivalent popular 
notions of ‘refugeedom’ stand in for a variety of wartime upheavals that mark some 
narratives of life within the besieged city.310 These notions are used by the interviewees 
to express not only the breakdown, but also the reconstitution of daily life or a sense of 
self.311  
  
One man, Vladislav, also a child during the blockade years, spoke in his interview of 
how: 
  
at the start [of the blockade] a mass of refugees poured (khlynula) towards us 
into the city from the Baltics there, probably, from…from Belarus. I don’t know 
where they were from. And, basically, these refugees began to occupy empty 
rooms that part of the people had left. And there were some children – they 
didn’t speak quite in the right way. And they were dressed somehow, how can I 
say…in a rural fashion. More sort of simply…And all the same we somehow 
began to…Began to make friends, to mix.312  
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In his account the ‘pouring in’ of people from a different, unfamiliar, national republic is 
mixed together with the appearance of troops on the city streets, the continuous departure 
of family and neighbours from their apartment, some of whom died at the front, and the 
onset of hunger and bombing in the city. As he begins to befriend the refugee children, he 
notes how they all mastered fire fighting, even teaching the adults how to put out fires 
and raise an air raid warning. In his narrative, “hydrophobic metaphors” yield not to 
expressions of the symbolic danger of ‘refugee-ness’. 313 For Vladislav, his acceptance of 
the ‘flows’ of refugees and their otherness signified his assimilation of the “asocial 
chaos” wrought more generally by the war and blockade on the once familiar terrain of 
the city.314  
  
Many residents of the city would not have been so struck by the speech and dress of 
arrivals from the western republics or the rural Leningrad region. Some of the 
interviewees who were resident in Leningrad at the start of the blockade had themselves 
been born in Vitebsk or Gomel’ in Belarus, or in settlements in the Leningrad region and 
other Soviet regions.315 Some had only just arrived shortly before the war, for example 
one woman from Gomel’ who had come to Leningrad after leaving school in 1939 and 
settled in with the help of many acquaintances from Gomel’ living in the city.316 The 
parents of others had made the journey earlier from these areas or from the Baltic 
countries.317  
  
                                                  
313
 On hydrophobic metaphors for migration – flows, streams, waves, tides – see Daniel, ‘The Refugee’, 
p.273 and also Malkki, Purity and Exile, p.16. 
314
 Malkki, , Purity and Exile, p.109 on the theme of ‘asocial chaos’ in narratives of displacement. 
315
 For example interview with S. A. I., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-033, p.1; interview with anonymous, 
ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-024, p.1; interview with S. A. I., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-033, p.1; 
interview with M. V. V., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-004, p.1; interview with M. S. Sh., ATsUI, Interview 
No. BL-1-020, p.1. 
316
 Interview with anonymous, ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-024, p.1; the woman observed that the town of 
Gomel’ always somehow had more connections with Leningrad than with Moscow and that Gomel’ school 
leavers always strove to study in the city. She gives examples of how she was helped with finding a place 
to study or provided with information about the fate of loved ones during the war by a network of former 
Gomel’ residents (Gomel’chane): ibid, p.2 and p.20; on the continuation of traditional migration patterns to 
Moscow and Leningrad through the 1930s see Hoffman, Peasant Metropolis, pp.58-59 and ibid pp.60-63 
on the role of networks of fellow in-migrants from the same place in facilitating settlement in a city (a 
practice known as zemliachestvo). 
317
 Interview with B. M. A., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-040, p.1; interview with M. S. Sh., ATsUI, 
Interview No. BL-1-020, p.1. 
 93
For other inhabitants, people just crossing the internal civic boundaries from the suburbs 
or the outskirts of the city into the city centre were conceived as a “fleeing mass” and as 
representing the disintegration of the familiar.318 One woman, when recalling her terrible 
fear during the bombing raids emphasised the “strange” habits of the new inhabitants in 
their apartment, the family of her father’s colleague who had moved in with them in the 
city centre from the outlying southern district of Avtovo. Particularly strange, she related, 
was the colleague’s wife, who “was very, that kind (of woman), well, of coarse 
appearance, she smoked and spoke somewhat sharply” and left her adopted son in bed for 
the duration of the air raids.319  
  
Another interviewee, Anna, in contrast, incorporates an account of her own ‘refugee-
ness’ into the “emplotment” of her experiences and sufferings during the blockade.320 
Anna and her mother, father and brother lived before the war in the Dachnoe 
neighbourhood in the southern outskirts of the city. When the German forces closed in on 
the city and began to bombard the area heavily, they made their way under fire on foot 
and then by tram away from the frontline areas to stay with her aunt in a wooden house 
on Krestovskii ostrov, an island near the centre of Leningrad. In the course of the 
blockade, Anna relates, all her immediate family died and the wooden house where they 
had been living on Krestovskii Ostrov was demolished. Anna spent some time sleeping in 
a factory canteen and then serving at a sentry post in another outlying city district as a 
member of the local civilian air defence force (MPVO), before she started work “to 
reconstruct Leningrad” and was allocated a room in another wooden house and later in a 
flat belonging to a man who had been evacuated and was working in Moscow.321  
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Describing the early days of the blockade, Anna detailed a return visit by the family to 
their prewar house in defiance of official prohibitions, where they found their room 
destroyed. Above all she remembers her brother’s mandolin and her mother’s large pot 
for dough lying broken into fragments. She reflects shortly after that:  
  
We didn’t have any foodstuffs, we [left] with nothing…we had no foodstuffs 
from the very start. In short, we were refugees. Besides the fact that we, so to 
speak, were blokadniki, we were also refugees. Moreover, you understand, no-
one advised us, when we were leaving. We simply assembled ourselves and 
left.322  
  
Utilising a compound concept of refugee-ness based on an absence of food and loss of 
personal possessions, including a room of one’s own, and on the failure of the state to 
organise, care and provide for its civilians, she frames her experiences in terms of a 
hybrid identity as both refugee and blockade survivor.323 Anna’s story is an interesting 
counterpoint to the poetic representation of estrangement from one’s former home during 
the blockade by Ol’ga Berggol’ts. Berggol’ts was one of the many Leningrad residents 
who, during the war, had to move into another apartment whose owner had left for the 
front or evacuation. A poem written by her in October 1942 foregrounds the experience 
of having lived among someone else’s belongings, and a feeling of having become a 
‘foreigner’ without leaving the city. Unlike Anna, however, her sense of dislocation, 
however, is reinforced by the very practices used by the authorities to document and 
verify identity and the right to residence, the demand to know ‘who are you?’, rather than 
the breakdown of government efforts to order and monitor the population. While Anna’s 
much later account weaves displacement and loss into a composite identity as a city-
dweller who survived the blockade and a ‘refugee’, moreover, Berggol’ts asserts her 
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physical identification with the besieged city against an experience of displacement that 
threatens her sense of self:  
  
The muted (slepen’kii) yellow torchlight flickers 
And your heart suddenly clenches with anguish 
When you hear: 
      - Your permit, comrade… - 
As if you were a stranger, a foreigner. 
     - There is my permit. Please, check it. 
  
I am from here, and this city – is mine. 
We share one breath, one mind, one heart… 
I am from here, comrade sentry. –   
  
…But I live in a flat, where this winter 
Someone else’s family died. 
All that is around – was amassed not by me. 
All – is not mine, as if I – am not me. 
  
And indeed in other latitudes of the world, 
Two whole quarters (blocks) away from me, 
Is my other – former flat, 
Without the smell of the living, without light.324 
  
These complex, “cross-cutting and contradictory” renderings of displacement in 
blockaded Leningrad intersect with official wartime Soviet understandings of refugee-
ness as the negation of orderly resettlement or with fears about a spoiled identity but 
refashion them in a variety of ways.325 In the years between Berggol’ts writing her poem 
                                                  
324
 O. Berggol’ts, ‘Otryvok’, in Sobranie sochinenii, pp.74-76. 
325
 Baron and Gatrell, ‘Population Displacement’, p.54 and Homelands, p.2. 
on the stubbornly unclassifiable “fluid, cross-cutting, and often contradictory nature” of the itinerant’s 
social and self-identifications. 
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and the collapse of the Soviet Union, though, there was little scope for stories of 
dislocation in the emerging public memory of the war and blockade.326  
  
The final war years and immediate postwar period in Leningrad witnessed a public 
process of ascribing meaning to the siege that was reined in and then obliterated by Stalin 
but later resumed along with the mythologising of the war on a national scale after 
Stalin’s death.327 This public commemoration of the siege in published texts effaced the 
multiplicity of interactions between home and front and the comings and goings of the 
population in favour of the metanarrative of ‘Leningraders who stayed and struggled’.328 
The particular sufferings of civilians and displaced people were minimised or reputed, the 
state preferring to represent those trapped in the blockade as “heroes of the Leningrad 
front”: prewar inhabitants who defended as one their city, streets and buildings.329 The  
early production of this narrative can be seen, for example, in a series of articles 
published in Leningradskaia Pravda throughout 1944 under the title ‘All efforts to the 
reconstruction of our native (rodnyi) city’, which called upon Leningraders who had 
worked day and night to defend their beloved city to begin to rebuild it.330  
  
The heroic mythic narrative had resonance for many people who lived through the siege, 
enabling them to make sense of their experience as something other than victims, and 
capturing the attachment many felt to “their city” in the wake of the blockade.331 It also, 
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 Even the evacuation remained on the margins of public memory of the war, as tales of panic and flight 
threatened to undermine the carefully constructed state history of the war as a vindication of the 
Communist party and Soviet system: Manley, To the Tashkent Station, p.271. 
327
 Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege, p.34; Tumarkin, The Living & The Dead, p.100; and Brooks, 
Chapter 5: ‘The Theft of the War’, Thank you, Comrade Stalin!, pp.195-232, especially p.198 on the chief 
postwar domestic story quickly becoming not the wartime achievements of the people but the task of 
“socialist construction”. 
328
 Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege, p.14. 
329
 Kirschenbaum, ‘“The Alienated Body”’, p.220. 
330
 Leningradskaia Pravda, 6/6/1944, p.2; 9/6/1944, p.2; 15/6/1944, p.2; 16/6/1944, p.2;18/6/1944, p.3; 
8/7/1944, p.3; 13/7/1944, p.3; 15/7/1944, p.3; 22/7/1944, p.3; 28/7/1944, p.3; 30/7/1944, p.2; 1/8/1944, p.3; 
6/8/1944, p.2. 
331
 Kirschenbaum, ‘“The Alienated Body”’, p.224 for survivors whose accounts were published outside of 
the reach of Soviet censor – in emigration or the post-Soviet era – and who criticised the Soviet state 
nevertheless employing the rhetoric of heroism to make sense of their experiences; and Kirschenbaum, The 
Legacy of the Siege, p.33, for the example of Vera Karatygina, curator of the Public Library’s Petersburg-
Leningrad collection, noting at the end of 1942 that Leningraders had braved the hunger, cold and bombs in 
order to have the right to say after the war “I was in Leningrad during the blockade, and I did all that was in 
my power to defend my city”.  
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however, entailed the persistent ‘enforced forgetting’ of certain aspects of life in the 
besieged city.332 Even under Khrushchev, when some of the wartime stories of “the 
people” emerged as part of the formation of a cult of the war, the largely female 
experiences of the siege were figured as a parallel to male heroism, deflecting attention 
away from the failures of wartime planning and provisioning.333 Flight, disorder and 
unplanned resettlements of the population remained blank spots in the remembrance of 
the war and blockade.  
  
This is encapsulated in the fate of the painting Roads of War, submitted as a graduation 
piece at the Repin Institute of Painting in Leningrad by the artist Ilia Glazunov in 1957 
and based on his observations of the crowds on the routes in and out of Leningrad in 
1941.334 As a boy, Glazunov had been among the last people who managed to board a 
train into Leningrad before the railway lines into the city ceased running at the end of 
August 1941 as he returned with his parents from their dacha.335 Glazunov’s parents later 
died during the siege and he was evacuated in 1942 into a village in the Novgorod region, 
from where he returned in 1944 and entered the art school. In the painting Roads of War 
an assortment of peasants, workers, warriors, and women with children group at the side 
of a dusty road, all facing in different directions, while a division of soldiers and a herd of 
sheep pass each other on the track, seeming to emerge from and disappear back into the 
dust itself.336 The painting was unanimously rejected by the board of the institute for 
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 Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege, p.140 on ‘enforcement of forgetting’ after the war.  
333
 Tumarkin, The Living & The Dead, p.111; Kirschenbaum, ‘“The Alienated Body”’, p.222 on the Soviet 
state seeking to deflect attention from the Soviet failure to stockpile food in the city and onto the efforts to 
combat German bombs and artillery.  
334
 www.glazunov.ru for the painting and a biography of Glazunov: last accessed 11/08/2010.  
335
 Salisbury, The 900 Days, p.210. 
336
 These became stock figures in Glazunov’s depictions of Leningrad and then his later militantly 
nationalist paintings: for Glazunov as a member of the nationalist Russian intelligentsia that began to 
organise during Glasnost’ and his pictorial themes of stoical peasants, decent mothers and warriors see R. 
Service, Russia: Experiment with a People (London: Pan Macmillan Ltd, 2003), pp.73, 184 and 245-246; it 
is interesting that his civic and nationalist pictorial typologies should have first been evident in embryonic 
form in his depiction of wartime displacement. This supports the idea that the ‘refugee’ experience is not 
simply disruptive but also constitutive of social and national, as well as individual, identities: see P. Gatrell, 
A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War One (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1999), pp.162-165 on “the crystallization of Russianness” with reference to refugeedom during the 
First World War; see also Baron and Gatrell, ‘Population Displacement’, for example p.54 and Holquist, 
‘New Terrains’, p.167. 
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distorting the meaning of Soviet victory in the war and was later destroyed by the 
authorities after it was displayed at the Manezh Exhibition Hall in Moscow.337 
  
The Soviet regime had earlier grappled with the statistical invisibility of displaced 
citizens then subsequently ensured the cultural invisibility of its ‘refugees’, an invisibility 
that is often replicated in the scholarship on the blockade.338 Also missing from accounts 
such as that by Kirschenbaum, when touching on the post-siege period, are the hundreds 
of thousands of people who arrived into the city every year once the blockade was lifted. 
The following chapter investigates what it is possible to glean about the incomers, their 
number and ‘identities’, from archived statistics and reports. 
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 On Glazunov’s website it seems to imply that the painting was removed and destroyed as part of 
Khrushchev’s infamous attack on an exhibition by contemporary artists at Manezh, however the website 
also gives the date that the painting was exhibited as 1964, whereas Khrushchev’s excoriation of the 
abstract artists took place in 1962: see, for example, W. Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man, His Era 
(London: The Free Press, 2005), pp.588-592 for a description of the November 1962 exhibition. 
338
 See Malkki, Purity and Exile, p.7 on the structural or “systematic invisibility” of unclassifiable refugees 
in policy, literature and scholarship.  
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Chapter 3. A “City of Migrants?” Reconstructing the 
population of the post-siege city (part two) 
  
3.1 The village rushed in   
  
Viktor, the interviewee who reflected on the repopulation of the city that “quickly-
quickly they settled all our empty space”, was responding to a question about whether the 
arrival of re-evacuees in the city was noticeable.339 His reply, in more detail, was: 
  
Yes. In greater part it was not even evacuees. I mean. Clearly the city required a 
great number of builders, of, on the whole, such (people). As we say, the whole 
village rushed in, you know, from the former Leningrad region.340 And our city 
very quickly filled up, our house filled with people, who had not lived in a city. 
These were people from villages, from small towns….quickly-quickly they 
settled all our empty space. And we had many vacated rooms, in the hostel.341 
  
Was Viktor’s hostel typical of the city as a whole? The work of Blair Ruble would 
suggest that it was. Ruble’s post-siege city is very different from the one depicted by Lisa 
Kirschenbaum. Instead of a “city of memory”, whose spaces and buildings were being 
reconstructed and navigated by inhabitants who knew them intimately and mapped their 
memories onto them, his is a city “in shambles”, its population depleted by evacuation as 
well as deaths from starvation, disease and bombardment, and its housing, streets and 
water lines destroyed.342 It is a city which “would be repopulated and rebuilt, but not 
necessarily by…[its] prewar residents”, many of whom had been hauled along with most 
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 Interview with V. Kh. V., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-006, p.23. 
340
 The borders of the Leningrad region were altered in 1944, when the Novgorod and Pskov regions were 
formed from territories previously belonging to the Leningrad region: Vakser, Leningrad Poslevoennyi, 
p.20 on the political reasons for forming new regions from parts of the former Leningrad regions that had 
been under evacuation and therefore were to be carefully monitored.  
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 Interview with V. Kh. V., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-006, p.23. 
342
 Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege, p.14 on the “city of memory”; Ruble, ‘The Leningrad Affair’, 
p.305 on the city being “liberated but lay in shambles”.  
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of the city’s factories “halfway across Russia to the Urals, Siberia or the Chinese 
border”.343 It was, rather, reconstructed by demobilised soldiers and unskilled, 
predominantly female “peasants in workers’ clothing” from regions such as Iarosavl’, 
Kalinin, Saratov and Sverdlovsk, and became, in short, a “city of migrants”.344  
  
His inhabitants are not the emaciated blockade women of Berggol’ts’ poetry, but instead 
resemble Tat’iana in the postwar parody of Evgenii Onegin written by Aleksandr Khazin. 
In Khazin’s humorous verses Pushkin’s story is relocated to the post-blockade city and 
Tat’iana is recast as a woman recently come to Leningrad from the countryside, who 
finds work as a house painter.345  
  
Ruble bases his claims about the ‘city of migrants’ primarily on the assertion that the 
population of Leningrad doubled between March 1943 and September 1945, from 
639,000 to 1,240,000.346 As we have seen, according to a range of figures recorded by 
local government institutions, the population dropped even lower than 639,000 before the 
end of the blockade, however none of the aggregate figures can be taken as reliable. 
Figures collated by the Statistical Administration for migration in and out of the city in 
the post-blockade years, though, do indicate that whatever the number of people living in 
the city in January 1944, they were rapidly joined by hundreds of thousands of people 
travelling to Leningrad once the blockade was lifted.347 The following table is a 
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 Ruble, ‘The Leningrad Affair’, p.305. 
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 Ibid, p.304 on peasants in workers clothing; Ruble, Leningrad, p.51 on the city of migrants. 
345
 The verses are recalled by an interviewee in the blockade project as he describes the “mass of new 
arrivals” (massoi priezzhie) after the war: interview with V. N. N., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-001, p.19;  
the verses were published in the journal Leningrad in 946 and were attacked by Zhdanov as slander against 
contemporary Leningrad for its portrayal of crime and crowding in public civic spaces in the same Central 
Committee resolution that censured the journals Zvezda and Leningrad and condemned the writers 
Akhmatova and Zoshchenko in particular: ‘O zhurnalakh Zvezda i Leningrad’, published in Kul’tura i 
Zhizn’, No.6 (20/8/1946), p.1. 
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 Ruble, ‘The Leningrad Affair’, p.305; Ruble cites the population figure for September 1945 with 
reference to a piece in the journal Leningradskaia Panorama from 1982 that gives this statistic without any 
reference to the primary source: ‘Iz letopisi sobytii. 1945-1950gg’, Leningradskaia Panorama, No.6 
(1982), p.7; A. Z. Vakser relates the same figure in an article where it appears without reference: Vakser, 
‘“Chudo” Vozrozhdeniia’, p.321 and in a book, where he references a document of the city Party 
Committee that I was not permitted to access: TsGAIPD, f.24, op.2v, d.7666, ll.101-102, cited in Vakser, 
Leningrad poslevoenny , p.6; in any case, as we have seen, all recorded aggregate population figures for the 
city are likely to be inaccurate.  
347
 This chapter is concerned with the demographic shifts which occurred in the city on account of 
migration. It should be noted here, however, that the population of the city also grew on the basis of natural 
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reconstruction of the growth of the population of the wider city of Leningrad on account 
of migration in the years immediately following the blockade. It is composed from data 
recorded by the Population and Health Sector of the Statistical Administration on the 
basis of registration vouchers filled in by the police upon the issue of residence 
permits:348 
  
Table 1: Arrival and departure from Leningrad, 1944-1947, including suburban 
settlements under the authority of the Leningrad City Soviet (19 districts 1944-1946, 21 
in 1947) 
  
Year Arrived during 
year 
Left during year Mechanical growth 
1944 448,455 53,578 394,877 
1945 660,102 88,406 571,696 
1946 (famine year) 489,162 161,518 327,644 
1947 (famine year) 254,331 194,740  59,591 
                                                                                                                                                  
increase in the immediate post-blockade years but that the increase in population due to higher numbers of 
births than deaths was negligible in comparison with what is termed ‘mechanical growth’ by the Soviet 
statisticians, i.e. growth due to migration: according to the 1967 compilation of data by the Statistical 
Administration the recorded natural increase in the population of Leningrad and suburban towns was  
was in the region of 10,600 people in 1944, 26,200 in 1945, 39,000 in 1946 and 32,200 in 1947; the death 
rate, which had already fallen below the 1940 levels in 1943, rose slightly in the famine years of 1946-
1947, while the birth rate jumped from 31 per thousand in 1944 to 35.5 per thousand in 1945, then flattened 
out at 35.1 per thousand in 1946, before dropping to 29.2 per thousand in 1947; this represented a baby 
boom of sorts as soldiers returned from the front. The birth rate fell further in later years, levelling out at 
8.0-8.6 per thousand from 1950, lower than anywhere else in the Soviet Union, apart from Moscow and 
Odessa. The post-siege natural increase in the population by tens of thousands, however, is dwarfed by the 
migration of hundreds of thousands of people to the city in the immediate post-siege years: for figures on 
natural population growth see TsGASPb, f.4965, op.8, d.738, l.6 and also Vakser, Leningrad Poslevoennyi, 
pp.10-11. 
348
 There are some discrepancies between this table and the one produced by Vakser on arrival and 
departure from Leningrad in the post-blockade period: Vakser, Leningrad Poslevoennyi, p.7; this is partly 
because Vakser’s table is incomplete and uses the more approximate figures from the 1967 Statistical 
Administration data file, rather than the detailed breakdowns contained in the files of the Population and 
Health Sector and also reproduced by N. E. Chistiakova, to whose work Vakser makes reference: N. E. 
Chistiakova, ‘Problemy izucheniia demograficheskikh protsessov v Leningrade (Sankt-Peterburge): 1930-
1950-e gody’, in Narodonaselenie: sovremennoe sostoianie i perspektivy razvitiia nauchnogo znaniia 
(Moscow: Dialog MGU, 1997), pp.175-6; there is a particularly large difference – of over 20,000 people – 
between Vakser’s figure and that given by the Population and Health Sector and cited by Chistiakova for 
‘mechanical’ population growth in 1944 but this can be explained by the different territorial definitions of 
the city used in the primary sources for this year. Local Statistical Administrations sent copies of the tables 
of demographic data they compiled to the government in Moscow and so this information can also be found 
in the records of the demographic department of the Council of Ministers: for 1945, for example, see 
Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Ekonomiki (RGAE), f.1562, op.20, d.616, ll.53-43 and for 1946 see 
ibid, d.661, l.31. 
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TsGASPb, f.4965, op.1, d. .4746, ll.11-11ob; d. d.4748, ll.6-6ob; d.4751, ll.7-
7ob; d.4756, ll.16-16ob 
  
These figures must also, of course, be treated with caution. It is likely, though, given that 
data based on residence registration do not include people housed in state institutions, or 
anyone arriving or leaving without notifying the police, that these numbers under-
represent the turnover of the population. In all, then, over 1,852,050 people came to live 
in Leningrad in the first four post-siege years, while more than 498,242 left. These 
figures attest to the fact that many thousands of people were making journeys into, as 
well as out of, the city at the end of the war and in the first years of reconstruction. The 
expansion of the population registered as resident in Leningrad slowed significantly in 
1947, in part on account of fewer arrivals, although also because of almost 200,000 
recorded departures in this famine year.349 On their own, however, the data tell us little 
about the extent to which this constituted a ‘replacement’ of prewar residents with post-
siege newcomers.  
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 In the course of the famine government policies forcing collective farmers to surrender more grain, 
rescinding the entitlement of workers and employees of other rural institutions to ration cards and also 
removing some urban residents form the rationing system compelled some people into Leningrad from the 
starving countryside and smaller towns: Zubkova, Russia After the War, pp.40-47, see especially p.47 on 
industrial enterprises in Leningrad, whose workers still received ration cards for themselves and their 
dependents, hiring twice as many employees in October as September after the Party’s Central Committee 
issued a decree on 1st October reducing the number of people entitled to provisioning through the ration 
system. Food scarcity and price increases also affected people living in the city, however. In March 1947, 
for example, medical staff determined that over 30 per cent of the workers they examined at factories in the 
city were suffering from the effects of hunger and malnutrition: At some enterprises over a half of workers 
were identified as suffering from the effects of severe hunger. At the Sevkabel’ factory, for example, of 300 
workers examined 42% were diagnosed with ‘alimentary dystrophy’ (the Russian term for a complex of 
symptoms arising from acute malnutrition, including emaciation, swelling and weakness and, if untreated, 
death) and 10% with vitamin deficiency. A similar situation was discovered at other enterprises, including 
the Izhorsk factory and prestigious Kirov plant: Zima, Golod v SSSR, pp.75-76 and D. Filtzer, ‘The 
Standard of Living of Soviet Industrial Workers in the Immediate Postwar Period, 1945-1948’, Europe-
Asia Studies, Vol.51, No.6 (September 1999), pp.1013-1038, here p.1025 and p.1035, footnote no.23, on 
the definition of ‘alimentary dystrophy’; see also Cherepenina, ‘Assessing the Scale of Famine’, p.41 for a 
definition of dystrophy, in relation to the mass starvation of the blockade when over 75 per cent of deaths 
according to Leningrad doctor were from dystrophy; the unthinkable levels to which the death rate rose in 
the blockade will be discussed below, in 1946 and 1947 the death rate in Leningrad was actually lower than 
that in the last full prewar year but higher than in subsequent years: TsGASPb, f.4965, op.8, d.738, l.6; it 
seems that while a very rough estimate puts the number of deaths caused by the postwar famine across the 
Soviet Union at 2,000,000 in Leningrad the effects were mainly non-fatal malnutrition and psychological: 
see Zubkova, Russia After the War, p.47 on famine deaths and interview with A.A.V., ATsUI, Interview 
No. BL-1-017, p.21 on the constant feeling of hunger, even in 1948, as a result both of continuing meagre 
meals and sensations from the blockade that did not pass for some time. 
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Some individuals, for example, may have come and gone during these years and may 
show up in the figures more than once. A personal letter written by a student at a 
Leningrad medical institute in October 1946, that was intercepted by the local department 
of the Ministry of State Security (MGB), suggests that as the hunger and deprivations of 
the postwar famine years began to affect even the urban Soviet population, a number of 
the people who had recently come to study or work in the city went back ‘home’, at least 
temporarily.350 In the letter, the student writes that she has just embarked on study in the 
institute but that the standards of living have dropped sharply that autumn and “many of 
the girls have left for home”.351 It is not possible to glean from statistical reports how 
many people arrived for a short time and left like this. Another letter quoted in an MGB 
report, though, written this time by a student at a teaching college, indicates that some of 
those leaving were likely to have been not post-siege incomers but blockade survivors 
who feared the return of famine conditions experienced during the siege and who 
themselves, as we have seen, may have still had strong ties to places outside the city. The 
teaching college student relates: 
  
Many of us in the college are being put on grants, and that means that you 
receive just 170 rubles a month…for shoes, clothes and food, everything. Many 
are now moving away to stay with someone, to relatives…Things are also bad 
with me and towards winter it will be even worse…I really wish that I could slip 
                                                  
350
 TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.214, ll.71-83, here l.76; the Ministry of State Security (formerly People’s 
Commissariat of State Secuirty, or NKGB) was responsible for counterintelligence activities. All people’s 
commissariats became known as ministries in March 1946, for example the People’s Commissariat of 
Internal Affairs, NKVD, became the Ministry of Internal Affairs, MVD. The thesis will refer to whichever 
institutional name was in use at the particular time being discussed.    
351
 TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.214, ll.84-90, here l.86; it is difficult to assess how representative this letter 
is of the situation in the city. Firstly, the sender may be exaggerating. Secondly, it refers to the situation in 
higher education institutions, which had just returned from evacuation out of the city during the war and 
which even in peacetime conditions probably contained a greater concentration of people arriving in the 
city from elsewhere than other places of work and study did. Thirdly, it is one of a group of letters collated 
by the local department MGB in part with the aim of demonstrating the circulation of ‘false rumours’ about 
mass departures from institutes, so reveals perhaps as much or more about the focus of the security services 
than about commonplace activities of the population. The letter also raises the issue of people who were 
inhabitants of the city but did not feel themselves to be at home or were not seen to be at home by others 
and the more general question of what it means to be at home which will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter 3. 
 104
away…leave for the village, so that I am not returned to what I witnessed in 
1942.352  
  
The data also do not reveal whether those recorded as arriving in these years were in fact 
new in-migrants or former inhabitants returning from the front or evacuation, several 
hundred thousand of whom had themselves lived through the worst of the blockade in the 
winter of 1941-1942.353  
  
3.2 The varied population 
  
Reminiscences by workers about “labour heroism” during the period of reconstruction in 
Leningrad that were collected by the local party organisation in later years characterise 
the people rebuilding Leningrad in a number of different ways.354 Memoirs by workers 
and employees of the frontline Izhorsk factory, for example, kept by the local party 
Institute of History variously foreground the presence of those who had lived through the 
terrible blockade days; the arrival of young men and women from rural areas such as the 
Orlov region who were trained at the city’s trade schools; and the return of workers from 
evacuation in the Urals or from service at the front, including in the Izhorsk workers’ 
battalion; as well as the reconstruction carried out by German Prisoners of War.355 In 
1977 local historians published a set of recollections gathered from the archives of the 
party History Institute and from contemporary contributions by people living in the city 
about the postwar period. One contributor described the return of soldiers demobilised 
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 Ibid, l.89; we don’t know, of course, whether this correspondent, or any of the others, actually left. Also 
she may well have been someone who evacuated after the worst blockade winter of 1941-1942 and then 
returned, rather than a resident who was still in the city at the end of the blockade. The problems with 
making a clear distinction between re-evacuees and blockade survivors will be discussed further below. 
This source, nevertheless, does reflect the fears of people who had experienced the siege, which could 
inform a decision to leave Leningrad in the years after it had ended. It also demonstrates the contacts 
people had outside of the city that could enable this.  
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 According to the figures cited by Poliakov and Zhiromskaia, for example, in the periods of mass 
evacuation from the city that lasted until the end of 1942 871,000 prewar residents were evacuated, almost 
400,000 of whom after the end of May 1942: Poliakov and Zhiromskaia, Naselenie Rossii, p.44 
354
 Phrase from V. A. Kutuzov and E. G. Levina (eds.), Vozrozhdenie: Vospominaniia, Ocherki i 
Dokumenty o Vosstanovlenii Leningrada (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1977), p.4. 
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 TsGAIPD, f.4000, op.18, d.68, ll.53-92. 
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from the Izhorsk battalion and of re-evacuees to their former factory.356 Another wrote of 
the role of prewar workers of the Kirov factory in its restoration, some who had started 
when it was the Putilov works in the pre-Revolutionary era, and who had stayed in the 
city during the war or come back from evacuation and the front in the first post-siege 
years.357 Others emphasised the re-builders of Leningrad who came from the ranks of 
young trade and factory school trainees, many of whom had been brought in from the 
villages in areas such as the Voronezh and Kalinin regions.358 
  
The people who were replenishing the population and the workforce no doubt varied 
depending upon the occupation or workplace in question.359 These impressionistic 
accounts suggest that among the immediate postwar workforce were people who had 
lived in Leningrad before the war and had made the journey back. What proportion, 
however, of all incomers did the returnees make up? The figures on migration in and out 
of the city produced by the Population and Health Sector of the Statistical 
Administration, from which the data presented in the table above are drawn, break down 
the incoming and outgoing population according to gender; the city or region from which 
they had departed and whether the point of departure was urban or rural. The tables of 
statistics in these files note, for example, that from 1944-1946 about one third of the 
incomers registered in the city each year had arrived from rural areas, and slightly under 
10 percent from the Leningrad region, but also that the point of origins of tens or 
hundreds of thousands of other arrivals had not been established.360 These tables do not, 
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 G. V. Vodop’ianov, ‘Rabochee Kolpino’, in Kutuzov and Levina (eds.), Vozrozhdenie, pp.53-60. 
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 N. V. Kukushkin, ‘Vesnoi 1944 goda’, in ibid, pp.28-29; another man interviewed for the collection also 
recollects how “families returned from evacuation” and people took up work at the Kirov factory: ‘Rasskaz 
L. V. Dobrokhotova’, in ibid, p.106; a woman wrote of her work in several places in the city following her 
re-evacuation in 1944: O. Ia. Mushtukova, ‘Litsevye scheta ekonomii skorokhodtsev’ in ibid, pp.142-145; 
and one more contributor portrayed his demobilisation and return to the Baltiiskii shipbuilding factory in 
the city where he had worked before the war, although he added that many prewar workers had died in the 
war and the workforce was replenished by girls and boys from factory schools: I. I. Berezhkov, ‘Rabotali 
stol’ko, skol’ko nuzhno’, in ibid, pp.121-124. 
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 For example E. L. Efimova, ‘I my stali priadil’shchikami’, pp.146-152. 
359
 White points out that people with skills needed for reconstruction were more likely to return early: 
White, ‘The Civilian Return’, p.1151; this group may have been larger, for example, among workers 
evacuated from the prestigious Kirov factory. 
360
 Of the 448,455 people recorded as arriving to Leningrad and its suburban towns in 1944, 228,029 came 
from other urban settlements, 151,934, or about a third, from rural localities and 68,492 from unknown 
places of departure, Just under a tenth (8.8%) of the total incomers registered were from the Leningrad 
region: TsGASPb, f.4965, op.1, d.4756, l.11 and ll.8-9(ob); a similar pattern persisted for the next two post-
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however, include a section on whether the in-migrants were former inhabitants of the city 
who had been in evacuation or were new arrivals from the towns and villages of other 
regions.  
  
This lack of attention by the authorities to the differentiation between prewar inhabitants 
and newcomers initially seems surprising in the light of the wartime efforts of the local 
administration to retain distinctions between the city and surrounding areas and monitor 
people crossing the civic boundaries. The templates according to which local Statistical 
Administrations collated information on the population on a regular basis, however, were 
issued by the central authorities. The Central Statistical Administration of the State 
Planning Agency (Gosplan) was interested not in the relationship of incomers to the city 
but in checking the numbers of people on the move and confirming their immediate 
points of origin and departure, in particular whether or not they had been in the 
countryside before their arrival. The data reveal, in this way, something about the 
priorities and interests of Moscow, including the desire of the regime to locate fixed 
points between which people were moving and continuing Soviet concerns about the 
influence of the village and fears about the ‘ruralisation’ of the cities.361 At the same time 
they say little about the complex wartime and postwar movements of the population.  
  
Other central and local organs of government with jurisdiction over incomers to the city 
compiled partial statistics on the post-siege population, categorising and counting 
according to their own criteria and aims. These records also tell us a little, scattered 
                                                                                                                                                  
blockade years. In 1945, a little under a third (30.6%) of the 660,102 in-migrants had travelled from 
villages, an absolute number of 201,945, of the remaining 458,157, there were 245,197 people from towns 
and a large number, 212,960, whose origin had not been identified and about 7% of the total arriving 
population had come from the surrounding Leningrad region: TsGASPb, f.4965, op.1, d.4748, l.6 and ll.1-
2; finally, in 1946, the last year of such large scale postwar in-migration, again a third (34%) were fixed as 
arriving from rural areas, 166,119 of the total of 489,162, and 179,588 people from towns, leaving 143,455 
with an unknown point of departure: TsGASPb, f.4965, op.1, d.4751, l.7. 
361
 On the actions of policymakers and officials, and also historians, to locate the migrant in place and time 
by assigning them identities qualified, for example, by place of origin, sojourn or destination see Baron and 
Gatrell, Homelands, p.2; on the mistrust of the peasantry as by nature ‘petit bourgeois’ in the forming 
Soviet system, the simultaneous settlement of millions of peasants in cities in the 1930s, and the part played 
by the reaction to this ‘ruralization’ of the towns in the coalescing Stalinist system of violence see Lewin, 
The Making of the Soviet System, p.300-304, especially p.303 for the term “ruralize”.  
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information about the different people organised by the government to come to 
reconstruct the post-blockade city. 
  
From the end of 1943 until May 1946, for example, a local bureau of the Committee for 
the Accounting and Distribution of the Labour Force operated to recruit, mobilise and 
direct groups of people into work in the city while the stringent wartime controls over 
individual entry into Leningrad remained in force.362 The records of the local bureau 
include details of the 790,530 people channelled into Leningrad’s industry from outside 
the city in this way from 1st December 1943 until 15th April 1946.363 They identify these 
incomers according to age, gender and whether they were capable of working, or had 
arrived as dependents, and also break down their numbers by nationality. The records 
show, for example, that individuals with many different national identities stamped in 
their passport, both Soviet and non-Soviet, were brought in to work by the Committee but 
that by far the largest group, as in the prewar population, were identified as ethnic 
Russians.364  
  
The Committee was also responsible for organising the employment of demobilised 
soldiers and its central organisation made note of how many former servicemen were 
going to live in each republic, region and city of the Soviet Union, whether they had 
found work and if they had done so independently or through local Labour Force 
bureaus. From the files of the Committee in Moscow it can be ascertained that 211,199 of 
all the in-migrants recorded by January 1947 were demobilised soldiers.365   
                                                  
362
 Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (henceforth GARF), f.9517 Komitet po uchetu i 
raspredeleniiu rabochei sily pri SNK, 30/6/1941-15/5/1946, op.1, ‘Predislovie’, on the functions of the 
committee, i.e. to mobilise the non-working population into industry and distribute the workforce around 
different branches of the economy. In May 1946 the Committee was merged with the Main Administration 
of Labour Reserves into the Ministry of Labour Reserves, mainly responsible for the recruitment, often 
involuntary, of young people into trade and factory schools; the limitations on the travel of individuals into 
Leningrad, even former residents, to those with special permission from the City Soviet lasted until June 
1946: Karpenko, ‘Sotsial’naia podderzhka reevakuantov’, pp.88-89. 
363
 TsGASPb, f.327, op.5, d.304, ll.1-24. 
364
 Ibid; see Vakser, Leningrad Poslevoennyi, p.20 on the prewar ethnic composition of Leningrad’s 
population being predominantly Russian (up to 90%), followed by Ukrainian, Belorusian, Tatar and Polish; 
the main change after the war was the non-return of exiled Germans and Finns, which will be discussed in 
the next chapter.  
365
 GARF, f.9517, op.1s, d.56, ll.1-129, here l.1; mass demobilisation from the wartime army occurred in 
several waves from 23rd June 1945 when the first demobilisation law was passed until March 1948, but 
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In addition, from 1940 the Leningrad City Administration of Labour Reserves was 
charged with sending adolescents between the ages of 14 and 17 to train for two years in 
trade schools or six months in factory schools in the city, after which they would then be 
required to work for four years in state enterprises according to the direction of the 
Central Administration of Labour Reserves.366 The City Administration produced 
monthly and quarterly reports for the Central Administration in Moscow on the 
fluctuations in the numbers of young people attached to each type of school, how many 
had been recruited in that period, and how many sent out to work; how many had been 
released due to illness, been expelled, or had run away and how many been brought 
back.367 The reports indicate that at any one time there were thousands of teenagers 
present in Leningrad who had been brought in and compelled to train at labour reserve 
schools in the city. At the start of April 1946, the time of the spring fair recollected by 
Petrov, for example, 8,600 trainees were registered at Leningrad’s factory schools and 
20,878 at the two year trade schools.368 The secretary of the city committee of the 
Leningrad Komsomol organisation remarked at a national Komsomol conference which 
took place at the end of 1947 that by this time 40 percent of all the city’s industrial 
workers were young people, most of whom had arrived from the trade schools.369  
  
Once again the preoccupations of the central Soviet authorities at the end of the war 
shape the data. The records point, for example, to the importance of ethnicity in 
classifying the population and particularly to an emphasis on identifying the proportion of 
Jewish people among those entering the city. People determined to be of Jewish ethnicity 
were counted by the city’s Committee for the Redistribution of the Labour Force not just 
                                                                                                                                                  
most of the soldiers released during mass demobilisation – almost 90% - returned in the first three waves 
that had ended by September 1946; some officers were retained until later years and some forced to make a 
career in the army because the authorities would not demobilize them: Edele, ‘A “Generation of Victors?”’, 
pp.68, 73 and 103 for a reconstruction of the figures.  
366
 On mobilisation to the labour reserve schools as a widespread form of migration in the war and postwar 
years see Poliakov and Zhiromskaia, Naselenie Rossii, p.280. 
367
 See, for example, ‘Svodnye otchety o dvizhenii kontingenta uchashchikhsiia remeslennykh uchilishch i shkol FZO 
(kvartal’nye otchety), ianvar’ 1946 – dekabr’ 1946’, TsGASPb, f.5016, op.2, d.50  
368
 Ibid, ll.30-31. 
369
 Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politicheskoi Istorii, henceforth RGASPI, f.1M, op.5, 
d.33, l.125. 
 109
in absolute numerical terms, as were other nationalities, but also as a percentage of the 
total number of people coming into Leningrad in this way.370 Fixing people at a place of 
employment (trudoustroistvo) also emerges as a key organising concept in the 
marshalling of statistical information on the population, especially on veterans and young 
people. The available statistics from these sources do not, though, provide evidence for or 
against Ruble’s claim that the city was repopulated and rebuilt by complete newcomers to 
the city, largely from rural areas of the Soviet Union. 
  
It cannot be assumed, for example, that all the demobilised soldiers were prewar residents 
returning to Leningrad, like the surviving fighters of the Izhorsk workers’ battalion. Work 
by V. N. Donchenko has suggested that about half of all those demobilised settled in 
urban areas, which, given that two thirds of the Soviet population lived in rural areas on 
the eve of the war represents a significant shift among this group from the countryside 
into cities such as Leningrad.371 By the same token, not all students of the trade and 
factory schools were adolescents transported into Leningrad from the collective farms of 
various regions. Newspaper accounts from the post-siege years about the biannual call up 
of young people to factory and trade schools mention Leningrad children taken out of the 
regular schooling system, or returning from the places across the Soviet Union to which 
they had been evacuated, as well as boys and girls recruited from the peasantry of the 
Leningrad, Kalinin and Orlov regions among others.372  
  
The breakdowns of the composition of the population arriving in Leningrad as part of 
official mobilisations into the labour force or with permission of the authorities, 
                                                  
370
 TsGASPb, f.327, op.5, d.304, ll.2, 4, 5, 7; see Manley, To the Tashkent Station, pp.249-251 on state 
anti-Semitism, particularly directed against Jewish intellectuals and cultural figures, that could be 
manifested, for example, in additional obstacles to their return from evacuation.  
371
 V. I. Donchenko, ‘Demobilizatsiia sovetskoi armii i reshenie problemy kadrov v pervye poslevoennye 
gody’, Istoriia SSSR, No.3 (1970), pp.96-106, here p.100; and Fitzpatrick, ‘Postwar Soviet Society’, p.136; 
Edele questions whether half of all soldiers did move into cities upon demobilisation but states that many of 
those who initially returned to the village did migrate into towns and cities of the Soviet Union in the next 
few years: Edele, ‘A “Generation of Victors?”’, pp.314 and p.329. 
372
 In general, newspaper reports from 1944 and 1945 tend to focus on adolescents re-evacuated from “the 
depths of the country”: Leningradskaia Pravda, 14/1/1944, p.1; 30/3/1944, p.3; 10/6/1945, p.3; articles 
from 1946 on the other hand depict the mobilisation of young people from collective farms in the 
Leningrad, Kalinin, Orlov, Vologda, Omsk, Ivanov, Gor’kii, Tambov and Iaroslavl’ regions as well as from 
the city of Leningrad itself: Leningradskaia Pravda, 29/9/46, p.1 and 15/11/1946, p.1. 
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moreover, exclude a potentially large number of statistically “invisible people” 
altogether.373 As with the people left in the blockaded city, the invisible incomers include 
both those deliberately excluded from representations of the population by the authorities 
and those who travelled outside of official regulation.  
  
Several groups of people mobilised by the state into Leningrad in the reconstruction years 
after the blockade do not show up in figures based on residence registration and could not 
be mentioned by historians writing during much of the Soviet era. These were the so-
called “special contingents” of un-free labourers, made up of prisoners; repatriated 
citizens and former Soviet prisoners of war who were not allowed to return to their 
previous residences; and German prisoners of war captured on Soviet territory.374  
  
That these groups played a significant role in the rebuilding of the cityscape can be 
gleaned from fragmentary evidence that can now be accessed in the archives and in 
recollections recounted in recent years. A report by the director of factory no.936 filed at 
the end of the 1940s, for example, objected to the closure of an MVD labour camp 
appended to the factory because the “special contingent” of labourers were fulfilling up 
to 75 percent of heavy construction.375 German prisoners of war, moreover, seem to have 
been a striking presence in the cityscape for many post-blockade inhabitants, in contrast 
to their lack of visibility in statistical surveys. An interview respondent in the European 
University project, for example, recounted meeting and observing a large group of 
German workers under escort rebuilding houses many times on the way to his institute 
after the war.376 Another claimed that German prisoners had been responsible for the 
reconstruction of the suburbs of Pushkin and Pavlovsk and had also worked as engineers 
in the factory in which she was employed, sharing the common canteen.377 
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 Vakser, Leningrad Poslevoennyi, p.33 for the term “invisible people” (nevidimki) denoting those not 
captured in official data and reports. 
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 Ibid, p.31. 
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 TsGAIPD, f.24, op.2v, cited in ibid, p.31 without reference to the specific file. 
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 Interview with A. F. F., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-030, pp.12-13. 
377
 Interview with R. M. K., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-2A-027, p.6.  
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The frustration of attempts by the authorities to manage and monitor in-migration to 
Leningrad in 1944 is conveyed in comments made by the heads of the police service in 
that year.  In the summer of 1944 the deputy chief of the Leningrad police, Ivan 
Averkiev, described the attempt to control movements of people into Leningrad in the 
following way: 
  
Filtration is being carried out on all major stations and in Moscow. Constant 
checking is conducted on the (railway) routes. Apart from that, there are special 
defence posts (zagraditel’nye posty) on pedestrian routes crossing into 
Leningrad. But, so far as the striving to return to Leningrad is very great, 
individual people are getting through all the same, using various illegal routes. 
They are repeatedly thrown off trains. They cling on to goods wagons, to coal 
boxes. They get close to Leningrad and then try to pass through on military 
vehicles or on foot.378 
  
A report sent to the chairman of the City Soviet from the chief of the NKVD, Shiktorov, 
on the activities of the police in Leningrad in 1944, echoed this assessment about the 
violation of legal obstacles over entry to the city: 
  
After the lifting of the blockade the size of the population sharply increased in 
connection with the re-evacuation of Leningraders and the mobilisation of 
workers for Leningrad’s industry. Regardless of the stringent restrictions on 
entry, all the same a significant influx has been observed of individuals not 
possessing documents for the right to live in Leningrad, who have ‘seeped 
through’ by means of various illegal routes.379 
  
Given the shortfall in the labour force experienced by most factories for the entire Soviet 
period and in particular in the postwar years, it is likely that many individuals continued 
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 As quoted in V. Kutuzov, ‘Vernite v Leningrad’, Dialog (formerly Bloknot Agitatora), No.13 (May 
1988), pp.14-18, here p.18. 
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 TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.148, ll.11-17, here l.15. 
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to ‘seep through’ illegally, find work and settle in the city but how many and to what 
extent they were people who had lived in the city before the war cannot be calculated.380 
  
3.3 The lost population 
  
Ruble acknowledges that any reconstruction of the postwar population is attempted “on 
the basis of scattered and incomplete information” and that the numbers cannot be 
established with any certainty.381 He supports his assertion that Leningrad became 
primarily a city of in-migrants in the first two years after the blockade, though, with the 
argument that substantial numbers of prewar city-dwellers died in the blockade, at the 
very least 632,253, and that many evacuees would not have made the trek back to the city 
in the first few years after the lifting of the siege. Aleksandr Vakser makes a similar case, 
although he claims that it was later, by the middle of the 1950s, that newcomers after the 
blockade came to constitute over half of the population.382 He attempts to prove this 
claim by quantifying the numbers of the prewar population who were lost during the war 
and could not have survived or returned to live in the post-siege city.  
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Vakser posits that of a prewar population of 3,400,000 only 600,000 were left in the city 
when the blockade was lifted. Up to 1,200,000 died in the city during the siege, he 
continues, while of the 1,000,000 who were evacuated over 200,000 perished, as did 
120,000-140,000 of the 600-700,000 who joined the army, navy and people’s militias. 
This produces an approximate total of 1,500,000 residents who did not survive the war. 
As a result, he states, theoretically only about 1,300,000-1,400,000 of the pre-war 
population could have returned from evacuation or the front to the city to join those who 
remained in the city. In practice, according to Vakser, far from all of these returned. He 
estimates the number of those who remained in their place of evacuation or settled in 
other cities and villages as a minimum of 100-200,000 and concludes, therefore, that the 
maximum possible number of “Leningraders returning to their native land” could not 
have exceeded about 1,100,000.383 When added to the 600,000 left in the city this comes 
to 1,700,000 people. As the recorded population grew to 2,814,000 by the middle of the 
1950s, primarily on account of in-migration, it reached a level of over twice the number 
who could have been prewar city inhabitants.384 
  
In his attempt to quantify the ‘lost population’ Vakser uses very approximate figures, 
without reference to his sources. If all Soviet demographic statistics should be treated 
with caution, moreover, then this is never more the case than when dealing with estimates 
of the number of people who died in the course of the blockade and evacuation from 
Leningrad. Assessments of these figures are particularly beset by issues such as the 
frustration of the efforts of institutions responsible for demographic records to keep pace 
with developments; the impact of the definitions and criteria employed by observers; and 
the effects of the political climate, in particular the implications of the evolving myth of 
the war for investigations made within the Soviet Union.  
  
A total of 649,000 deaths was established by the Leningrad City and District Commission 
for Ascertaining and Investigating the Crimes of the German-Fascist Invaders by the end 
of the war on the basis of lists compiled by 6445 members of the commission working in 
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the districts and suburbs of Leningrad from May 1943 and drawing on the records of the 
city’s registry offices (ZAGSy). These included 632,253 deaths from starvation in the 
fifteen city districts and two suburban settlements of Kolpino and Kronshtadt and 16,747 
fatalities as a result of the bombing of the city.385 According to Andrei Dzeniskevich, a 
Russian historian still working on the subject of the blockade, a special commission was 
been set up by Andrei Zhdanov in 1944 to check conclusions about the number of 
starvation victims but if it produced any findings then these must have disappeared along 
with other documents of his personal file after his death.386 The figures of 632,253 people 
dead from starvation and 16,747 from bombardment were submitted evidence at the 
Nuremberg Trials, which took place from November 1945 to October 1946.387 Then, in 
the words of Dzeniskevich “for ten long years the subject of the heroic defence of 
Leningrad was practically excluded from the historiography of the Great Patriotic war of 
the Soviet Union”.388 
  
The experience of the siege and the number of victims became a topic of study once more 
during the Thaw occasioned by Krushchev’s secret speech of 1956. Initially publications 
appearing in the wake of Khrushchev’s speech tended to reproduce the Nuremberg 
figures, however a number of works were issued in the Soviet Union throughout the 
1960s and 1970s that questioned the officially accepted figures for the number of 
blockade victims.389 Some referred to documents produced by organs of the city 
administration which suggested that many more people had been buried or cremated in 
the city during the siege than those accounted for in the Nuremberg figures and some 
accounts maintained that no fewer than a million people had died in all.390 The 
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researchers Koval’chuk and Sobolev made calculations based on the number of people 
living in the city at the beginning and end of the blockade and concluded that “no fewer 
than 800,000 Leningraders died from hunger”.391  
  
The higher figures for people who did not live through the blockade were reproduced in 
publications in the west that appeared at this time. In his book of 1969, for example, 
Harrison Salisbury maintained that the death toll in Leningrad had been minimised by 
Stalin and the Leningrad leadership to suppress questions over their wartime failures and 
mask the country’s weakness at the end of the war. He reported a number of alternative 
figures from those of 800,000 and just over 1,000,000 to estimates apparently made by 
foreign students that as many as 2,000,000 people had died.392 He speculated that a 
number in the vicinity of 1,300,000 deaths seemed reasonable, and a similar conclusion 
was reached by Leon Gouré.393 
  
Then in 1975 any further investigation, clarification and debate on the numbers of 
blockade victims within the Soviet Union ceased for another ten years. From the early 
1970s Brezhnev, his personal authority secured, promoted an increasingly narrow and 
idealized version of the war as a legitimising myth for the Soviet polity. For the next 
decade, in the words of Tumarkin, “a full blown cult of the Great Patriotic War trumpeted 
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a nationwide celebration of a tinsel-covered triumph of the Forces of Good over Forces of 
Evil”.394  
  
It was in this context that Dmitrii Pravlov, who had railed angrily against the suppression 
of the story of the siege in the wake of the Leningrad Affair but who, as the official 
responsible for food supply in the city in the early part of the blockade, wished to 
emphasise the successful struggle with the invaders and with hunger waged by the party 
leadership and the Leningrad population, sent a letter to Central Committee secretary 
Mikhail Suslov. Pavlov demanded that the figure of 649,000 dead presented at the 
Nuremberg trial should be preferred in Soviet publications to the higher numbers, which 
had been seized upon by “falsificators of history in the west”, who wished to show that 
practically the entire population left in the city after evacuation perished.395 The 
Nuremberg figures, being the most reliable, according to Pavlov, and buttressed by 
evidence from the number of ration cards issued throughout the siege, were evidence that 
“the absolute majority of inhabitants of the city, thanks to the efforts of the party Central 
Committee and the Government, was saved”.396 The deputy head of the Central 
Committee’s Propaganda Department and the head of the Administrative Organs 
Department concurred with Pavlov’s assessment and, in response to his request not to 
allow the publication of any other figure, advised Suslov that a strict approach should be 
enforced with regards to publishing data about losses during the blockade.397 
  
In the wake of this correspondence the censor did not allow figures to appear in print that 
deviated from the official position and subsequent works on the city and the blockade, 
including the well known collection of memoirs edited by Ales Adamovich and Daniil 
Granin, which came out in 1982, avoided printing any statistics on the number of 
deaths.398 The historiographical landscape shifted once more with the introduction of 
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Glasnost’ and then the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the opening up of the 
archives and the removal of restrictions on debates over Soviet victims of the Second 
World War. Interestingly, while scholars from the west tend to reiterate a figure of about 
1,000,000 deaths, Russian researchers who have resumed their investigations often cast 
doubt on both the lower and higher totals.399 Koval’chuk’s more recent assessments of 
the archival evidence of changes in the population have led him to conclude that in 
Leningrad itself during the blockade, “not 800,000 but roughly 700,000 Leningraders 
died” and a similar number is arrived at by Poliakov and Zhiromskaia.400 
  
The analysis of the number of deaths offered in a particular account depends not just on 
the changing political climate but on the definition of a ‘siege victim’ and of a 
‘Leningrader’ employed by the researcher themselves. The argument made in different 
accounts varies according to how the author approaches questions such as whether the 
total should include deaths from starvation or from bombing and other causes as well; 
deaths in the entire blockade period or just the winter of 1941-2; military as well as 
civilian deaths; and deaths in evacuation or only those that occurred within the city limits. 
Where the aim of researchers has been to establish the number of ‘Leningraders’ who 
died then the conclusion reached is also affected by differing social and geographical 
delineations of the population, such as whether a ‘Leningrader’ includes the soldiers 
posted in the city, people in the regional areas under siege, and of course the ‘refugees’ 
from the Baltics and Leningrad region. 
  
As we have seen it is not possible to clearly separate these different groups in practice but 
the attempt to do so affects statistical representations of demographic consequences of the 
blockade. The authors of one account from 1965, for example, argued not only that the 
Nuremberg figure was inaccurate but also that to it should be added deaths from 
starvation in regional areas such as Oranienbaum, Sestroretsk, which were situated within 
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the German encirclement.401 Another volume published the following year in the Soviet 
Union, which made reference to a figure of over a million people buried, stipulated that 
servicemen who had been buried within the city and those who had died before 
November, that is from causes other than starvation, needed to be deducted from the data, 
while the large but unknown number who had died going into evacuation should be 
added to it.402 Koval’chuk and Sobolev in 1965 included 100,000 refugees from the 
Baltics and Leningrad region in their calculation of population numbers and losses in the 
blockade, while more recently Poliakov and Zhiromskaia have attempted to separate out 
data for these ‘non-Leningraders’, while also stating that to their figures should be added 
uncalculated numbers of deaths among evacuees.403  
  
Any of the methods that have been used for establishing the number of deaths within the 
blockade, and also in evacuation, are unreliable in the final analysis. There is validity to 
criticisms levelled by Dzeniskevich, Koval’chuk and Sobolev at both the Nuremberg 
figures and the higher data based on the records of the Funeral Trust and city cemeteries. 
Koval’chuk and Sobolev argue, for example, that the Nuremberg figures based on lists of 
the dead who had been registered in the city towards the end of the war were not likely to 
include all those who had died as:  
  
Leningraders registered the death of their friends and family in ZAGSy, standing 
for many hours in sorrowful queues in order to do this. But with the onset of 
winter and the sharp increase in deaths, the weakened population, not having the 
strength to bury the dead, far from always registered their deaths.404 
  
They cite a document generated compiled by the City Commission, attesting that 
statements were still being received by the commission from demobilised soldiers about 
the death of their family in 1947, after the figures had been presented at the Nuremberg 
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Trials.405 Koval’chuk also took issue with Dmitrii Pavlov’s defence of the figure on 
account of evidence provided by the number of ration cards issued, citing Pavlov’s own 
admission that there were many abuses of the ration card system.406 Dzeniskevich 
demonstrates that the document produced by the city’s cemeteries claiming that over a 
million people had been buried or cremated was also unreliable and prone to exaggerate 
the actual number of people buried. According to Dzeniskevich, a report by the chief of 
Leningrad’s police provides evidence for the possibility of overstatements in the records 
of bodies transported for burial at the cemeteries. The report confirms that progressive 
pay was introduced for drivers and labourers engaged in this task in order to speed up the 
removal of bodies from the streets. There was very little control over the work of these 
people and cases were discovered in which their delivery records claimed for more 
bodies than had actually been taken to the cemeteries in order to receive the additional 
vodka and bread.407  
  
The figures calculated on the basis of population numbers are also, however, likely to be 
inaccurate. No reliable data on death rates or population levels are likely to have been 
established given the situation in the winter of 1941 described thus by Dmitrii Pavlov 
himself: 
  
Death overtook people anywhere…Employees of the municipal public services 
and health service cruised the streets and alleys to pick up the bodies, loading 
them on trucks. Frozen bodies, drifted over with snow, lined the cemeteries and 
their approaches. There was not strength enough to dig into the deeply frozen 
earth. Civil defence crews would blast the ground to make mass graves, into 
which they would lay tens and sometimes hundreds of bodies without even 
knowing the names of those they buried.408 
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M.I. Frolov, who has worked with Dzeniskevich, avers that a precise figure cannot be 
obtained on the basis of demographic data from the archives, however his approach using 
registers of household tenants (domovye knigi) has its own problems.409 Many of these 
registers were destroyed in the war, however, and Frolov’s method of extrapolating from 
registers of a ‘typical’ street for which data is available is flawed. The household 
registers, moreover, themselves became very quickly out of date as people ‘roamed 
around’ the city to find secure places to live. It is likely, therefore, that the final word on 
the number of blockade deaths will have to remain the statement from the Soviet 
government made in 1964 in response to an official Swedish enquiry was published in the 
military newspaper Krasnaia Zvezda, in which it admitted that “no-one knows exactly 
how many people died in Leningrad and the Leningrad area”.410 
  
Certainly no-one knows how many people died in evacuation from Leningrad. 
Recollections by survivors of the journey into evacuation often refer to the deaths of 
fellow passengers on the trains on the way. Vera, an interviewee in the blockade project, 
for example, related how “when we were travelling, many people died. They didn’t make 
it (into evacuation), and were taken off the train somewhere”.411  
  
How many actually died though is not likely to be ascertained from the fragments of data 
available. A memorandum written by the head of the transport section of the NKVD of 
the northern railway in March 1942 mentioned “cases of mass illness and death” among 
evacuees from the city in transit.412 He gave several examples, including the case of a 
trainload of people arriving into Vologda from Leningrad on 22nd February from which 
62 bodies had already been removed at other stations and 8 were discovered on arrival at 
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Vologda. In total in February and March 1942, according to Poliakov and Zhiromskaia, 
2102 bodies were removed from the trains carrying Leningrad evacuees on the way to 
Vologda alone.413 Poliakov and Zhiromskaia give other figures for deaths at particular 
stations in certain time periods, stating for example that in the town of Iaroslavl’ and the 
Iaroslavl’ region more than 8,000 evacuees from Leningrad died in 1942.414 They make 
no claim for a complete, overall total of those who died based on these various scattered 
pieces of data, however. 
  
In a recent monograph A. Sokolov extrapolates an aggregate number of deaths in 
evacuation from figures of about 20,000 evacuees buried in Vologda and Iasrolsavl’ in 
total and a death rate of about 26.9% among students evacuated from the special Air-
Force school, from which Sokolov himself graduated in 1944, into Oirot-Tura, 4105km 
away from Leningrad in Siberia. On the basis of these he projects that 200,000 to 300,000 
Leningraders perished in evacuation, in railway wagons, in hospitals at stations en route 
or on arrival.415 The examples from which Sokolov draws his conclusion, however, are 
not necessarily representative of the evacuation as a whole and Sokolov himself admits 
that “not in every collective were the victims the same as in the special school”, adding 
that losses were higher among some groups and lower among others.416  
  
Finally, Vakser’s claim that a minimum of 100-200,000 people remained in their places 
of evacuation or settled in other cities and villages is also impossible to substantiate. 
Impressionistic accounts from other sources suggest that this figure may be too high. M. 
N. Potemkina discusses in her work on re-evacuation the “suitcase” moods 
(chemodannye nastroeniia”) among the evacuated population in general at the end of the 
war and among those from Leningrad in particular, which contributed to high labour 
desertion rates in places of evacuation, as they strove to return home.417 Interview 
respondent Tamara described how there were many people from Leningrad in evacuation 
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in the Kirov Region and as soon as they heard the city had been liberated the mood was: 
“Home. Home. Home. Home”.418 Many of these evacuees, whose sense of attachment to 
Leningrad as a collective homeland was being simulated by their absence from the 
besieged city rather than, or as well as, their presence there, were no doubt among those 
who got through into Leningrad without being counted by the authorities on goods 
wagons and on foot.419  
  
3.4 The unruly population 
  
In addition to large wartime losses among the population in Leningrad, both Ruble and 
Vakser advance other claims for a postwar ‘city of migrants’. In particular they both 
assert a qualitative change in the population as well as a quantitative one. Ruble, for 
example, identifies three characteristics of the postwar population from the regime’s 
records that suggest many of its members were newly arrived from rural areas rather than 
returning evacuees: “[it] was predominantly female, it was relatively undisciplined, and 
relatively unskilled”.420 Leningrad had, of course, like other Soviet cities, lost many of its 
prewar male residents and workers, however Ruble imputes particular significance to this 
occurrence in the second capital as marking a rupture with its past. In the postwar years, 
“behind the neo-classical and baroque facades of the Moika and Fontanka”, he writes, 
were no longer living “dispossessed gentry and honoured revolutionary heroes” but 
dislocated, female, untrained and unruly peasants.421 The same premise underlies 
Vakser’s framing of the demographic consequences of the blockade in terms of the loss 
of a particular culture and style of behaviour belonging to “Petersburg-Piter-
Leningrad”.422 
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Ruble’s claim that official documents bemoaning the unruliness of the postwar 
population are evidence of the qualitative demographic change from a city of nobles and 
skilled workers to a city of ill-disciplined in-migrants belies a ‘sedentarist’ perspective 
that not only replicates the equation of displaced people with disorder but does not take 
into account the migrations that had played a role in the constitution of the city for many 
years before the siege.  
  
A quick look at the data on migration recorded by the city’s Statistical Administration for 
prewar years, however, points to the high turnover in the population that had been taking 
place since the revolution:  
  
Table 2: Arrival and Departure from Leningrad, including suburban towns 
  
Years Arrived 
(thousands) 
Departed 
(thousands) 
Mechanical Growth 
(thousands) 
1923 201.9 135.9 66.0 
1924 376.1 245.3 130.8 
1925 426.2 299.1 127.1 
1926 465.0 380.7 84.3 
1927 464.5 421.0 43.5 
1928 491.7 404.8 86.9 
1929 524.8 398.1 126.7 
1930 719.4 414.1 305.3 
1931 867.5 380.8 486.7 
1932 767.7 576.4 191.3 
1933 408.1 387.7 20.4 
1934 450.4 427.4 23.0 
1935 438.0 462.3 -24.3 
1936 512.4 444.5 67.9 
1937 502.6 485.4 17.2 
1938 492.9 461.2 31.7 
1939 273.7 373.8 -101.1 
1940 383.6 332.6 51.0 
  
TsGASPb, f.4965, op.8, d.738 
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These figures again, if anything, underestimate the annual fluctuations in the city’s 
population as they do not include people arriving and departing outside the purview of 
the authorities. They show that the arrival of several hundred thousand people into 
Leningrad in a year was nothing unusual. Many of these in-migrants, furthermore, came 
from rural areas, for example in 1932 less than 20 percent of all recorded migrants came 
from towns.423 The Soviet regime, at the same time, had encouraged, and at times 
enforced, the occupation of rooms in houses in the centre of the city formerly belonging 
to the local upper and middle classes by workers and new arrivals. This process, resisted 
by many at first, accelerated during the early 1930s as the first Five Year Plan prompted 
particularly high migration into the city. The social structure of much of the city’s 
housing behind the baroque facades on the eve of the war, therefore, was already 
heterogeneous.424  
  
The interviewee Vladislav, who spoke of the friendships he formed with the children of 
‘refugees’ during the blockade, also provides a glimpse of the diverse residents of his 
parents’ communal flat on a central Leningrad prospect on the eve of the siege. In two 
rooms of the flat lived Vladislav, his sister, his father, an engineer who had been born in 
Kronstadt, and his mother, a member of the old ‘intelligentsiia’ from Moscow who had 
been denied entry to study in an institute because of her undesirable class background. 
They had lived there since the early 1920s. A party member, formerly a worker at the 
Putilov works and now a director of a cardboard enterprise, lived with his wife and 
daughter in one large room and a family who had arrived from the countryside after the 
revolution lived in another. A couple of teachers and their children occupied two big 
rooms at the front of the building and another family inhabited a small space in the corner 
of the kitchen. In the late 1930s a young woman from the countryside outside Leningrad 
arrived to live with Vladislav’s family as a nanny.425 In short, Vladislav recalls, “there 
were various kinds of people”.426 
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Katerina Gerasimova has explored how people from different backgrounds, who had 
lived in the city for different amounts of time, often lived side by side, in some cases 
distancing themselves from each other, in others spying on each other and in others 
providing mutual assistance and exchanging protection, knowledge and traditions.427 
Vladislav emphasises both the friendly relations in his communal apartment, where 
families baked together in the kitchen, for example, and also habits that marked him out 
as different from the children of workers and peasants in the flat, such as his tendency to 
stay at home, indoors.428 The conditions of the siege prompted further moves, overturned 
the substance of everyday life, and interrupted in some ways the developing interrelations 
and creation of “micro orders” inside the city’s housing.429 At the same time the blockade 
period can be understood in many ways as a continuation of such prewar processes and 
their intensification.  
  
Vladislav, for example, relates the death of some of the prewar residents of his apartment 
at the front or from starvation, the arrival of new residents into their rooms, the departure 
of his father to start a new family with a woman he met while digging trenches, his own 
evacuation and return and that of others, in a narrative that foregrounds both the 
continually shifting landscape of the communal apartment and the centrality of 
connections formed there in his life.430 For others, the blockade period was their first 
experience of the movement of people from the traditional workers’ districts and 
accommodation into flats in the city centre, which, even if emptied of their former 
inhabitants, were often still full of their possessions. One interviewee, for example, 
recollected how her father moved from an outlying workers’ settlement that had been 
heavily bombed into a more central apartment, where “what struck me was that there was 
someone else’s furniture there. Still more, there was a piano, something which my father 
had never had in his life”.431 The unfamiliar surroundings of the apartment here engender 
not so much a sense of ‘homelessness’ but of social change.  
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The recollections of other interviewees also reflect on the blockade as a period of social 
transformation and exchange, often manifested in the bartering of once valuable items for 
any kind of food with Soviet officials, army officers, black marketeers or with people 
from the suburbs who were able to grow some food. One interviewee, for example, 
depicted the trade of her mother’s antiques, including a porcelain clock and a candelabra, 
for some grain and coconut oil. They later used the remaining money to buy a hut and a 
cow while in evacuation in Siberia.432 Another recalled bartering clothing for vegetables 
with people “not of the highest social standing” who came in from the suburbs.433 His 
mother also traded their antique crystal with the wife of a director of a wood treatment 
factory, who “took what she liked…some wine glasses, a decanter…And gave us joiner’s 
glue in return”.434  
  
Richard Bidlack has discussed this process of barter in terms of the entrenchment of the 
privilege of a Soviet elite likely to possess valuable trading items.435 Wartime population 
movements in the city and exchanges of goods, however, also probably informed the 
creation of narratives that understood the hunger, sufferings and deaths of the blockade in 
terms of a civic transformation. These narratives included ones that gave meaning to the 
war as a time of social levelling and the formation of a cohesive community of 
Leningraders and also ones that conceived the siege in terms of the loss of prewar 
Leningrad, the loss of ‘Petersburg’.  
  
In a short story written for children in 1975, for example, Liudmila Matveeva drew on 
her own wartime childhood experiences in a depiction of the clothes, belongings and 
habits that marked out ‘bourgeois’ residents of a house in Leningrad from the rest of its 
working class occupants. The story traces how these two worlds are bridged during the 
war by a common experience of maintaining fortitude and dignity in the face of hunger. 
The family from the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia in this tale retain some of their 
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luxurious possessions and habits but become no longer alien as they share their dinner of 
small, brown potatoes with bitter cotton-seed oil. It “was before the war that they were 
rich and now it is another story” comments one of the neighbours.436 On the other hand a 
Leningrad poet who survived the blockade wrote in 1996 of his reaction to reading the 
document that stated over one million people had been buried during the blockade. He 
describes how he commented to a friend that it was as if all Leningrad had died and “only 
we were saved by a miracle”.437 Well, replied his friend, “the prewar Leningrad, about 
which you speak, those who were still Petersburgers – they all died”.438  
  
This chapter has shown that the actual number of people who did die in the blockade, and 
the extent of the “non-return” of members of the prewar population in general, cannot be 
established. It is possible to conclude, however, that the argument made by historians 
such as Ruble and Vakser that Leningrad changed fundamentally from a city of gentry 
and skilled workers to a ‘city of migrants’ as a result of the blockade is based on a 
commemoration of loss that, as with Kirschenbaum’s story of blockade survivors, 
actually effaces many of the different comings and goings that were occurring before, as 
well as after, the war. Prewar residents returned from evacuation alongside newcomers, 
where they joined a population of blockade survivors many of whom had experienced 
their own displacements before or during the war.  
 
This chapter and the proceeding one have highlighted some of the diverse mobilities and 
cross-cutting identities of the city’s post-siege population that resist attempts at 
categorisation and quantification by government officials and scholars alike. The next 
chapter will examine further the processes by which the population was reconstituted 
after the blockade. It will explore the decisions by the authorities and by individuals that 
shaped demographic growth in the city. It will discuss, for example, how the composition 
of the population was affected by competing visions of the civic and national polity 
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developing at the end of the war and how these visions were forged, enacted and 
undermined through the movements of the population.  
 
 129
Chapter 4.  The constitution of a ‘Family of 
Leningraders’ 
  
4.1 ‘Pure’ and ‘Impure’ Leningraders  
  
On 23rd January 1944, while Soviet troops were still fighting German forces in the 
suburban towns of Pushkin and Pavlovsk, and the last shells were falling on the territory 
of the Izhorsk factory, the chairman of the Leningrad City Soviet, Piotr Popkov, wrote to 
the Leningrad party leadership about preparing the city’s housing for the return of 
evacuees.439 Popkov had been responsible for much of the day to day administration of 
the besieged city while Andrei Zhdanov, first party secretary at the time and a member of 
the Politburo, was involved in military matters and executing instructions emanating from 
Moscow.440 Popkov recounted to Zhdanov and other secretaries of the city’s Party 
Committee, Aleksei Kuznetsov and Iakov Kapustin, how the proximity of the frontline, 
the devastation of the housing stock by German bombing, and the sequestering of 
wooden buildings for firewood had necessitated “the resettlement of a large number of 
citizens who had remained in Leningrad”.441 The rooms of servicemen had, in accordance 
with a government decree, been preserved for them, as had the accommodation of the 
city’s scientific and cultural figures.442 A “significant part” of the housing of people 
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evacuated to the east, however, was now inhabited by those in the city who had lost their 
prewar rooms, as well as by people who had arrived from occupied territories.443   
  
Now, Popkov continued, the city authorities had to prepare for the impending task of 
placing in accommodation the “citizens who will return to Leningrad”.444 In order to 
facilitate the allocation of living space to returnees, he proposed that several changes 
should be made to Soviet wartime housing laws in the case of Leningrad. Firstly, he 
suggested that the additional measures limiting ‘unplanned’ (samoupravnyi) entry into 
Leningrad should be buttressed by a law that accommodation would only be given to 
people who had been resident in housing in Leningrad previously and were returning to 
the city with the permission of the municipal Soviet. Returning evacuees, however, 
should not be guaranteed their pre-war accommodation. Decrees issued by the Soviet 
government in 1942 stipulated that people who had been evacuated with institutions or as 
individuals, although not those who had left with their factories, retained their entitlement 
to the rooms in which they had lived before the war. If the Leningrad administration were 
to abide by this law, though, Popkov argued, it would entail the “resettlement of a large 
number of citizens who had lived in and looked after the space for more than two years in 
the conditions of the siege”.445 Instead he proposed that those returning from the east be 
allocated accommodation from the general housing stock.  
  
Finally, Popkov concluded, anyone who had moved into their current living space on 
their own initiative before 1st July 1943, without the sanction of the authorities, should be 
evicted. Those citizens who had arrived during the war as a result of the occupation of the 
Baltic republics, Karelian isthmus and Leningrad region and had been granted 
somewhere to live in the city, “not being Leningraders”, should be deprived of the 
housing they had been given and returned to their regions.446  
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It seems that the Council of People’s Commissars did consider ruling that in Leningrad 
re-evacuees should not necessarily be returned their prewar accommodation but that this 
foundered on objections from the state prosecutor, who had ultimate responsibility for 
adjudicating competing housing claims.447 In the meantime, Zhdanov, who was shortly to 
leave the city to become the Soviet envoy in Helsinki and then to return after the war to 
Stalin’s inner circle in Moscow, formulated a sharply worded resolution in response to 
Popkov’s request. In this resolution, Zhdanov objected to the proposition to remove 
people from Leningrad who had been evacuated out of the Leningrad region and the 
Baltic states in 1941. It was not acceptable, he remonstrated, to display such a “lordly” 
attitude and to make distinctions between “pure” (chistye) and “impure” (nechistye) 
Leningraders.448  
  
The main themes of this chapter are crystallised in this exchange. These include the 
importance of the “housing question” in shaping the contours of the post-siege migration 
into Leningrad; the allocation of rights to travel and settlement and the obligation to 
resettle as crucial sites in the articulation of the desired postwar order on a national and 
local level; and the potential for conflict as well as overlap between competing visions of 
belonging, entitlement, hierarchy and exclusion expressed by different actors at the end 
of the war.449  
  
The chapter begins with a section examining the attempts of the central regime to control 
the distribution of the population after the war as part of its reassertion of power over the 
whole of Soviet territory, in particular newly liberated areas, its attempts to manage the 
country’s heavily destroyed and overburdened infrastructure, and its imposition of a 
postwar order in which service to the state and tasks of economic reconstruction loomed 
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large. The chapter explores how these priorities could be at odds with the expectations of 
the Soviet population themselves and with the particularistic imagining of a community 
of Leningraders by the municipal authorities and the city’s inhabitants.450 The final three 
sections discuss the ways in which the evasion and negotiation of controls over their 
movements by many people, and the response of the Leningrad administration to the 
incoming population, operated in tension with the aims of the centre. The actions of the 
local authorities and of people on the move were also at play in shaping the physical and 
discursive post-siege city.  
  
4.2 Everyone is needed in their place 
  
  
Derek Summerfield has outlined how war and invasion involve the rupture of the external 
boundaries of a state and also disruption of its physical infrastructure and social orders of 
place, roles and behaviour. The challenge of peacetime rebuilding in the aftermath of 
war, he maintains, entails reconstructing boundaries and also a “mode of communal 
order”.451  
  
In the case of the Soviet Union during the Second World War the state borders had 
shifted back and forth. A great swathe of territory had been occupied and undergone 
wholesale destruction and the material cost of the war was put at thousands of billions of 
rubles by a state commission.452 This included the destruction of cities and towns, of 
industrial enterprises, agricultural stock and railway bridges. The country faced 
deprivation and reconstruction tasks on a level with the defeated powers. The war, 
moreover, had left an estimated 27 million Soviet citizens dead “but also millions of 
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widows, orphans and invalids”.453 Millions more people had been dislocated across and 
within Soviet borders, including soldiers, prisoners of war, people sent by the invading 
forces into forced labour in Germany, and also evacuees and the ethnic groups exiled to 
the east.454 The society emerging from the war was made up of new groupings, marked 
“by a mentality born of the war”, including assertive veterans and also people 
distinguished by their type of displacement, such as evacuees or repatriates.455 Despite 
the surge of unifying patriotism other “centrifugal impulses” had affected wartime Soviet 
society, including the separation and alienation of family members from each other and 
divisions in the citizenry, for example between ethnic groups or between those who had 
been at the frontline and those in the rear.456 In short, the “whole social order was in 
disarray”.457 
  
The process of ending the war, moreover, Sheila Fitzpatrick has indicated, “produced 
social dislocations almost comparable with fighting it”, as tens of millions of people had 
to be demobilised, repatriated, returned from evacuation or released from wartime jobs to 
which they had been drafted.458 The poet Joseph Brodsky depicts in his memoir the scene 
at a railway station near Leningrad in 1945:  
  
The war was just over, twenty million Russians were decaying in makeshift 
graves across the continent, and the rest, dispersed by war, were returning to 
their homes or what was left of their homes. The railway station was a picture of 
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primeval chaos. People were besieging the cattle trains like mad insects; they 
were climbing on the roofs of cars, squeezing between them and so on.459  
  
Letters and telegrams sent to the party Central Committee’s transport department by local 
party secretaries similarly convey how the railway system, damaged and commandeered 
for military purposes during the war, was overwhelmed throughout 1945 by people 
characterised in terms of their wartime experience who had been propelled into 
movement by the cessation of hostilities.460 In February, for example, the removal of a 
passenger train from service that ran between Khar’kov and Voroshilograd led to the 
“accumulation of a large number of local passengers and people in transit” at stations 
along the railway line, where, according to the Voroshilograd party secretary, they waited 
days out in the open for passing trains, often ending up travelling illegally in goods 
wagons.461 Later in the year, once the war was over, another secretary wrote to Georgii 
Malenkov at the transport department to complain that the one train a week running 
between Stalinabad in the Tajik republic and Moscow was in no way sufficient. Large 
numbers of passengers were mounting up in the republic and servicemen, demobilised 
soldiers, and war invalids were hanging around near stations for months waiting for a 
train.462 Other letters remarked on the numbers of re-evacuees or repatriated citizens 
crowding at train stations whose buildings were in ruins.463 
  
Against this background, the Soviet state engaged in the task of establishing and 
enforcing actual and metaphorical external frontiers and internal orders.464 The motto of 
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the regime in the immediate postwar years became “social and political harmony”, often 
figured in familial terms.465 Soviet publications asserted that the war had forged the 
Soviet people into “one united whole”, a kinship of blood, led by father Stalin and the 
Russian nation.466 Accompanying this motto of harmonious, but hierarchical, unity was 
another maxim less often discussed in the scholarship on the postwar period: that 
everyone was needed “in their place”.467 At the heart of these intertwining sets of rhetoric 
was the imperative of “service to the Stalinist state”.468 The implication was that Soviet 
citizens would be assigned a geographic and social place in the postwar Soviet polity, 
based, at least in part, on their service in the war effort, as well as on categories such as 
gender and ethnicity, and on state priorities for the reconstitution of the country’s 
population, economy and infrastructure.469 Images of home and family were utilised to 
represent this obedient national service and to “suffuse state policy with a warm glow”.470 
The regime’s own actions to establish its vision of the postwar state and to manage the 
distribution of the Soviet population, however, often prolonged the separation of people 
from their families and their prewar homes and prompted further dislocations for 
others.471 
  
Across Europe the postwar settlement which confirmed new borders for many states 
involved what have euphemistically been termed “population exchanges”: the mass 
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expulsion and resettlement of people with the aim of consolidating political boundaries 
by creating ethnically homogenous or reliable borderlands.472 The Soviet Union 
participated in these large-scale transfers of people, most notably in connection with the 
regulation of its borders with Poland and Czechoslovakia.473 Over 1,500,000 Poles were 
deported from the territory of the Soviet Union, for example, in return for Ukrainian 
citizens from Poland.474 Russians and Ukrainians living in Siberia and Kazakhstan were 
brought in to repopulate the western Soviet borderlands and the Baltic territories, which 
had lost many of their citizens during wartime and prewar deportations. About half a 
million peasants from European Russia were moved to the border areas of Kaliningrad, 
Sakhalin, Eastern Siberia, the Far East and elsewhere.475 
  
At the same time, the Soviet administration policed the boundaries of postwar society by 
carefully screening groups of its citizens who were coming back across the country’s 
western borders and whose wartime experience marked them out as suspect. These were 
the several million people who had been taken from the Soviet Union by the Germans 
either as prisoners of war or as civilian forced labourers, known as Ostarbeiter. Upon 
their return they were isolated at first in collection points and special ‘filtration’ camps 
and interviewed by the security services. Pavel Polian maintains that “as a rule” the 
repatriated prisoners of war were sent to special settlements in remote regions for terms 
of six years.476 Recent work, however, by Mark Edele and by Nick Baron, suggests that 
filtration was not solely, or principally, about retribution or exclusion.477 Mark Edele, for 
example, has demonstrated that a minority of prisoners of war were in fact arrested and 
exiled for being spies or collaborators, although officers fared much worse than rank and 
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file soldiers.478 Instead many were re-enlisted in the army and then released some time 
after the end of the war. As they were permitted to rejoin the ‘united Soviet family’, 
however, their suspect status meant they remained subject to specific “structures of place 
and power”.479 
  
Edele lists the details of the particular regime of surveillance, identification and 
regulation of movement and settlement governing former prisoners of war. They were not 
allowed, for example, to settle in the ‘capitals’ Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev, unless they 
still had “family ties” there, but otherwise were required to return within a month to their 
prewar place of residence and to register there with the NKVD immediately.480 A dossier 
prepared on them during their ‘filtration’ was sent to the branch of the MGB in that 
locality. After registration the former prisoners of war received special identity 
documents valid for just six months at a time that did not entitle them to travel elsewhere 
in the Soviet Union. They could only be issued with a regular internal passport by a 
resolution of the local screening commission. Baron has shown that repatriated civilians 
were also carefully ‘filtered’ for ‘spies and collaborators’ but were in the main allowed to 
resettle at their former places of residence, where their ‘filtration’ file followed them. He 
concludes that the filtration of repatriates, in the eyes of the regime, served to enmesh 
them once more in the bureaucratic machinery of surveillance. It also served to define 
their relationship to the state and their place in the postwar Soviet order, which remained 
marked by the stigma of their wartime displacement on enemy territory.481  
  
The symbolic manifestation of the stigmatised status of repatriates and former prisoners 
of war in postwar Soviet society in laws curtailing their access to certain spaces is 
conveyed in a letter from a former student of the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute sent to 
Stalin in 1945.482 The student wrote to Stalin that he had volunteered for the front and 
                                                  
478
 Edele, ‘“A Generation of Victors?”’, pp.75-92. 
479
 Baron, ‘Remaking Soviet Society’, p.91. 
480
 Edele, ‘“A Generation of Victors?”’, p.149. 
481
 Both prisoners of war and civilian repatriates remained vulnerable to arrests in the postwar years by the 
security police under the category ‘socially dangerous persons’: Baron, ‘Remaking Soviet Society’, p.106. 
482
 See Shearer, ‘Elements Near and Alien’, pp.871 for the argument that “the passport regime did not just 
included and exclude” but created a hierarchical system in which a person’s status was marked by degrees 
 138
escaped from German captivity in April that year. Having made his way back to 
Leningrad, he protested, “I was not permitted to remain in the city or continue my 
education…I am treated with suspicion…I was given a temporary document with the 
inscription “without the right of departure from the Pavlovskii [suburban] district”…And 
so already for more than a year I have not been able with this document …to take a single 
step, without provoking cautious glances, distrust”.483 
  
In contrast, soldiers who had not been taken prisoner and were demobilised from 1945, as 
well as war invalids, were distinguished in the first few postwar years as belonging to a 
privileged category of Soviet citizen.484 This privilege was enshrined in their status in the 
postwar Soviet spatial order. Not only did they retain their right to their prewar housing 
but they were also exempt from the continuing wartime restrictions on movement that 
applied to the majority of the population. They were specifically spared, for example, the 
obligation to obtain permission from the police before purchasing tickets for train travel, 
a requirement that remained in force for the majority of the population until well into 
1946.485 Their theoretical freedom of travel and settlement was buttressed by the labour 
shortage and demobilisation laws which stipulated that local bureaus for labour 
distribution should assist them in finding jobs on the same or higher level than they had 
before but also permitted veterans to find work outside of official channels.486 The 
stringent labour desertion laws of the war and immediate postwar years were even 
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waived for war invalids, if they wished to leave work to return to the place of residence 
of their families.487 
  
The meagre pension which most disabled soldiers received was not enough to live on, 
however, and further assistance given to them by the state after the war was predicated on 
their integration into the labour force and contribution to “the needs of reconstruction”.488 
The rhetoric of Soviet publications at the end of the war, moreover, made it clear that all 
returning soldiers should find ‘their place in [civilian] life’ and that ‘place’ in this context 
equated primarily to a position in the difficult work of reconstruction. An article 
describing the adjustment to peacetime life of an army captain appeared in 
Leningradskaia Pravda in May 1946, for example, under the title ‘One’s place in life’.489 
The author of the article, I. Golovan’, outlined how the captain had marched into 
Germany during the war, been injured there and then returned to his wife and daughter in 
Leningrad in June 1945. Upon his return, he had struggled to settle into civilian life, 
becoming irritated by his wife’s concern and by the ‘easy’ work being offered to him. 
Then suddenly one day all became clear. He would undertake the difficult task of training 
young trade school students, making “real people” of them.490 Now he had embarked on 
this work he felt that he had finally returned home and found his own place in life, just as 
many others like him were doing. The article suggests that following this decision his 
domestic life also improved, however it is finding his place at the factory and his fatherly 
role in relation to the new recruits that give meaning to his ‘return’ and to ‘home’.  
  
A short novel published in the journal Zvezda towards the end of 1947 similarly dealt 
with the adjustment of frontline soldiers to a de-heroised postwar landscape.491 Entitled 
Finally at Home (Vot my i doma) it too provides a depiction of the successful integration 
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of soldiers into postwar life through their devotion to the dictates of a factory. Once 
again, moreover, the factory also represents a site for the satisfaction of yearnings for 
domestic and family ties.492 The positive characters in the story are the returning veterans 
who enter the workshop like they are going into their “native home”, and the type who 
could be said to have been “a modest hero in the war, a modest and persistent re-builder 
of peace”.493 They include Semen Il’ich, who cannot feel at home in his empty flat 
without his wife and son who have died in evacuation but who resumes work at the 
factory and eventually meets an orphaned trade school student there. The boy’s family 
have all been killed by the Germans but he escaped and joined the partisans before being 
sent via a children’s home to the wallpaper factory at the heart of the story. By the end of 
the tale the boy has moved in with Semen to live with him as a son.  
  
In a gendered discourse of ‘place’, ‘home’ and ‘public duty’, the character of Semen is 
complemented by the veteran army nurse Taia.494 The demobilised frontline nurse is 
disappointed in her plans to work with a surgeon at the city hospital but eventually 
acquiesces to be sent to work where she “is needed”, looking after the children at the 
factory’s nursery.495 She takes pride in the fact that she has “found herself a place” by 
putting aside her personal wishes “for the good of the country” and spends the rest of the 
tale trying to secure her personal happiness by finding a husband.496 Both of these 
characters are contrasted to the negative figure of a returning soldier who cannot settle 
into the life of a simple worker in a provincial town. Instead, he dreams of moving away 
and working at a large, prestigious factory in the Urals and spends his days drinking and 
dealing on the black market.  
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In practice the limited postwar horizons were resented by veterans, despite their 
privileged position. One former serviceman who actually arrived in Leningrad following 
his demobilisation wrote to a friend about the restrictions of civilian life. He described 
the bureaucracy of demobilisation, with its documenting practices, its questionnaires, its 
certificates and its photos “as if I am a criminal”.497 He also complained that higher 
education institutes were not enrolling anyone for a year.498 Finding himself in Leningrad 
with nowhere to live and no ration card he felt obliged to register at a railway college. It 
would not be possible, he lamented, to leave the college to enter an institute at a later date 
as anyone no longer wishing to study there was not discharged with their documents but 
directed into the labour force at the disposal of the Oktiabr’skii Railway. Is this really 
life, he concluded, “when they make me do what I don’t want to and live where I don’t 
want to”.499 The former soldier understood the bureaucratic procedures to document his 
return as a demonstration of state power to define his identity and place in postwar life, a 
power to discipline and even criminalize people crossing the boundaries of the civilian 
community.500  
  
While demobilised soldiers were encouraged in official discourse to find or accept their 
‘place’ in the postwar economy, most of the population was being given an even more 
explicit message that they were obligated to work and live wherever the state required. A 
discussion about cadres on 11th January 1944 in Leningradskaia Pravda, for example,  
emphasised that they must be developed from workers already in the factories, without 
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waiting for returning specialists from evacuation, as every person in the country is 
“needed in their place of work” (nuzhen na svoem uchast’e).501  
  
Again the social integration and attachment to ‘place’ of the women who had been 
displaced by war was figured within a distinct symbolic framework in which women 
functioned not only as paragons of self-sacrifice but also as emblematic of national 
suffering and the nexus between the people and the state as provider.502 When an article 
appeared in the newspaper devoted to ‘Russian women’ in September 1945, for example, 
it depicted the “sufferings and torments” of [ethnic] Russian mothers who had been 
evacuated half dead from the blockade or taken to Germany against their will and who 
were now returning and “assembling in their corners, their nests”.503 In the narrative the 
women returning from German prison do not come under suspicion as they are 
represented as the passive victims of German aggression who have been rescued by the 
Soviet state, in the guise of the Red Army, that acts in the stead of their ‘real’ husbands. 
The particular story of one woman is told in detail in the first person. She reportedly 
describes the road home to the “Soviet motherland” as a journey to becoming “happy 
Soviet people”, enabled by the care shown them by the Red Army soldier, who feeds 
them and keeps them warm.504 We knew, she is quoted as saying, “that Iosif 
Vissarionovich [Stalin] cared about us…saw our mother’s torments and tears, saved us 
and our children”.505 Her husband, she states, had looked for them in Germany but had 
not been able to locate them, it was “Soviet power” (Sovetskaia vlast’) that had found 
them.506 
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Women, in this way, were confronted with both the imperative of being fixed to a labour 
collective that applied to ‘every person’ and also a domestic role, both of which were 
formulated as a concordat with the state not as a matter of individual attachments and 
wishes.507 The state’s particular definitions of the ‘place’ of people in the postwar order 
meant that at the end of the war many women and men who had not served in the army 
were enmeshed in a web of regulations over their movements that in practice meant 
continued or renewed dislocation from their families and prewar residences. In addition 
to the continuing application of the limits in train travel well into 1946, the draconian 
legislation on labour force desertion remained in place for the first three postwar years. 
The regime envisaged that the main vehicle for the distribution of workers to industrial 
sites across the country at the end of the war would be through the institutions of 
organised recruitment and training.508 Access to certain urban spaces within the ‘united 
whole’ of the Soviet Union, including Leningrad, was particularly tightly controlled at 
first. Of those who had evacuated from the city, for example, only children who had left 
with state institutions were automatically permitted to return. Other evacuees who were 
not brought into the city as part of an organised labour mobilisation had, like all 
individuals seeking to travel there before June 1946, to obtain a special permit from the 
city’s authorities as well as a document releasing them from their work in evacuation.509  
  
An article published on the front page of Pravda towards the end of the war asserted that 
the demands of the state economy would entail the channelling of new workers into areas 
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in need of reconstruction and the retention of evacuees at factories in the east.510 The 
article emphasised the importance of enlisting new workers into Soviet industry and 
directing them into the branches of heavy industry and geographical areas most in need of 
a labour force for reconstruction, in particular those that had undergone occupation. It 
underscored that “to recruit workers and to distribute them – does not mean that the 
whole task is done. Now, as before, the most important task is securing the workers in 
production”.511 The mobilisation of new workers into the regions of reconstruction was to 
be accompanied, the article continued, by efforts to fix evacuees from frontline and 
occupied localities at enterprises which remained in the Urals, Siberia and Central Asia. 
Any personal attachments to a native hometown that were undermining the 
reconstruction and production effort by contributing to high labour turnover must be 
overcome. While, the article’s author acknowledged, the “attraction is understandable of 
Muscovites and Leningraders, Kievians and Donbass-ers, Kharkovians and Odessites, to 
their native cities…the interests of the socialist state demand the preservation of 
evacuated enterprises in the east”.512 The solution proposed was not only the enforcement 
of desertion laws but the improving of conditions to encourage their settlement in these 
areas.  
  
This article illustrates the dismissal by the authorities of understandings of ‘home’ and 
attachments to ‘place’ that conflicted with its tenets of membership in the united Soviet 
family and service to the state. Refuting the intensity of sentiments of belonging that 
were not defined by loyalty to a Union-wide or Russian homeland but which centred on a 
region, a city, an individual family, the government promoted criminal sanctions and 
improving living standards as means to guarantee people stayed put.513  
  
A letter sent in January 1946 to Molotov by a group of 69 factory workers living in 
Saratov who had been evacuated from Leningrad in 1941 indicates the way in which the 
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punitive restrictions on movement impacted on people’s postwar lives and on the 
reconstitution of Leningrad’s population. It also points, however, to how government 
measures continued to run up against individual concepts of native home that were only 
strengthened by the consequences of the state’s policies of population distribution. 
Finally it shows that expressions of these personal connections could draw on the state’s 
own rhetoric of the family and motherland as well as particular local narratives of 
place.514 In the letter the workers do refer to the influence of the poor living conditions in 
Saratov but they stress that, having been transferred out of the blockade and forced to 
leave their families and then having worked hard for years:  
  
We wish to go to our…families and the native places, where we all grew up, 
where we were raised, where each of us left an old father, or mother, who needs 
material help…Sending us home to our places will give us more strength to 
devote to the fatherland. And we will gather our shattered families into one 
united indestructible family.515   
  
Unfortunately the reply from Molotov, if there was one, has not been kept with the 
document.  
  
Enacting the social and spatial priorities of the central authorities after the war also 
required the involvement of local officials, some of whom had developed a keen sense of 
autonomy and local identity during their wartime experience.516 Nowhere was this 
perhaps more so than in Leningrad, a city cut off from the rest of the country to a certain 
extent during the war, where the local administration and population were engaged in 
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making sense of a particular type and scale of suffering endured on its territory, drawing 
on local mythic narratives in the process. 
  
This does not mean, however, that the visions of the central and local authorities for the 
postwar repopulation were completely opposed. Elizabeth White is right to point out that, 
contrary to Ruble’s analysis, the discouragement of the immediate return of the city’s 
former inhabitants was not a deliberate strategy by the centre to ‘provincialise’ 
Leningrad.517 Local officials, for example, had their own reasons to be interested in 
tightly controlling and regulating the number of people arriving in the city. Above all, as 
we have seen, this was connected with the damage that had been done to the city’s 
housing stock during the war. Individuals, including those in evacuation, applying for the 
permit to be allowed to travel to the city had to include information about whether or not 
they were certain of acquiring lodgings in the city, for example with a friend or relative. 
The summons was often issued on this basis.518 In early 1944, moreover, the State 
Committee of Defence began to issue quotas for the number of people to be sent to work 
in Leningrad that included tens of thousand of re-evacuees whose departure would not 
harm production in the east, as well as thousands of young people from other regions.519 
A decree passed the Defence Committee in September 1944 which brought a halt to any 
re-evacuation into the city until 1945 arose out of concerns of the City Soviet that the 
population was increasing too rapidly for local infrastructure to accommodate.520  
  
The intentions of the city and state authorities did not entirely overlap either. The letter 
sent to Zhdanov by City Soviet chairman Popkov about the allocation of housing 
demonstrates that the local authorities may have wished to control the timing and 
conditions of a re-evacuation but nevertheless they conceived of the repopulation entirely 
in terms of the impending ‘return’ of its inhabitants. Popkov ranked the claims of these 
former inhabitants to specific places of residence below those of the people who had 
lived in them during the blockade. He was clear, however, that it was prewar inhabitants 
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who should join the siege survivors in the city as a whole. This differentiation between 
people based on the level of their connection to the city was anathema to the central 
regime that regarded “everything in its territory as re-placeable” according to its 
requirements.521 As the central regime resumed sending trainloads of newcomers, as well 
as re-evacuees, to take up work in Leningrad in 1945, city officials tried to find ways to 
impress their model of a community of Leningraders on the re-population process.  
  
The minutes of a meeting of the City Soviet’s Executive Committee in March 1945, for 
example, contain a resolution on ‘ordering the entry and registration of recruited workers 
who have not lived in the city of Leningrad before’.522 The resolution expresses the 
conviction of Popkov and other members of the committee that new arrivals without any 
previous ties to the city were agreeing to come to work in the city simply in order to 
receive a permanent residence permit there and then were disappearing from the 
factories, constantly changing their place of work and disrupting the functioning of the 
city’s enterprises. It specified a number of special measures to be targeted at this category 
of incomer that made use of the passport system and police force in order to circumscribe 
their presence in the city. The police were only to provide them, for example, with 
temporary six month residence permits initially and if they refused to start work at the 
enterprise to which they had been mobilised then the police should remove them from the 
city altogether. These in-migrants should only be granted a permanent residence pass, 
according to the resolution, if the enterprise petitioned the city authorities for one once 
the temporary permit had run out. In addition, factories were instructed not to recruit 
newcomers with dependents and the police not to register any dependent family 
members. 
  
Throughout the first few post-siege years the local Leningrad newspaper, moreover, 
printed articles and letters reinforcing the notion of an indissoluble bond between the fate 
of the city and its inhabitants currently in evacuation or the army. These pieces insisted 
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that ‘native Leningraders’ displaced by the war continued to share a link with the city, 
either through their attempts to understand the experiences of the blockade or by 
behaving in a way that was worthy of Leningrad culture.  
  
In January 1944, for example, a letter attributed to the director of a school in evacuation 
asserted that “we are a small particle of Leningrad and sacredly preserve the traditions of 
the battling city”.523 The letter by a director of a factory evacuated to Siberia similarly 
highlighted the unbroken connection between evacuees and Leningrad. The director 
claimed that workers from Leningrad had been distinguished from others while in 
evacuation by the culture, harmony and friendship of their work collective, and by a 
“Leningrad style of work cultivated in us in our native and beloved city”.524 He claimed 
that they were prompted to work determinedly in evacuation by the “constant, invisible 
but extremely palpable bond with Leningrad” and repeated the verses of Ol’ga Berggol’ts 
that: 
  
We cannot be cut off from you now 
Wherever the war has conveyed us   
The soul is filled with its greatness              
And here, there and everywhere we are –  
Leningraders.525 
  
In another letter published that month the author claimed on behalf of herself and other 
girls separated from Leningrad in faraway Siberia that:  
  
With all our thoughts and feelings we are with the heroes of the city of Russian 
glory, the city of Lenin. Together with the whole country here, in a small fishing 
village, we are defending the city in which we were born and in which we 
laboured. The city which taught us to love our motherland boundlessly.526  
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Articles and letters promulgating similar sentiments continued to be published in the 
following years.527 A piece from September 1945 on the return of 200 specialists 
evacuated from Leningrad to the Urals elucidated the significance of their continuing 
connection with the city for the integration of evacuees into a postwar and post-blockade 
Leningrad community. It compared the evacuees who left their home and family to 
soldiers going to the front and noted that “the concept of Leningrad for them was wider 
than the city’s borders and there, in the East, they strove to be Leningraders”.528 This 
broad understanding of the entity of Leningrad, according to the article, meant that the 
evacuees, although cut off from their city, obtained news about its blockade, endured its 
pain and sufferings, fought for its honour and, when they returned, “arrived in its 
factories not as its guests, but as its own people (svoi liudi), as direct participants in its 
revival”.529 Former soldiers from the city were also depicted as remaining ‘Leningraders’ 
at the front, through reminiscing by the campfire about common acquaintances, streets, 
and houses in the city or acting as an example to others and commanding respect in their 
service conduct.530 As former inhabitants or defenders of the city they could also be 
considered to be returning to ‘their own city’.531     
  
This rhetoric did not affect the right to return for former residents in the first few post-
blockade years. The primary criteria according to which individuals were issued 
summons to come to the city by the local authorities remained access to housing and the 
temporary limitations set on numbers.532 Evacuees who accentuated their ‘rootedness’ as 
‘natives’ of the city in their applications in late 1944 and early 1945 were denied permits 
along with almost everyone else writing when the limit was in force. These included a 
navy major and his wife living in evacuation with their children in Ul’ianov who supplied 
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references to the effect that all the family were ‘natives’ (urozhentsy) and that  the 
major’s wife had “lived continuously (bezvyezdno) in the city of Leningrad” from her 
birth in 1907 until her evacuation in 1941.533 Another rejected application made on behalf 
of a woman to secure her return in January 1945 “is a native (korennoi) inhabitant of the 
city of Leningrad”.534  
  
One woman, Mariia Razumova, who appealed to party secretary Kuznetsov in March 
1945 to have her application reconsidered was, following his intervention, granted 
permission to return. The majority of Mariia’s letter was devoted to the service carried 
out by members of her family as longstanding party activists or to substantiating the ways 
in which the family belonged to the city of Leningrad and a community of Leningraders. 
In this regard, she pointed out that her husband was a native of Petersburg, had been a 
Piterskii worker and that all his “revolutionary and party life”, as well as the happy 
domestic existence and party work of all the family, was closely bound to the city.535 She 
particularly underscored their presence in the city for some of the blockade, repeating 
several times that they had experienced the blockade along with other Leningraders and 
had only left when forced to by reasons of health, when they could no longer act as the 
city’s active defenders. We lived, she wrote, “through the most severe period in 
Leningrad, together with all Leningraders, and think that we have a right to return to our 
native city”.536 It is not apparent from the archives why the decision was made to give her 
a summons to return to the city, however it may well have been due to the increase 
permitted in the population of Leningrad from April 1945 or to Mariia’s record as a party 
member rather than her claim to ‘nativeness’.   
  
Through the language of the local press, however, the city administration sought to 
fashion a discursive community of rooted, moral and civilised Leningraders that was 
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structured around the experience of the blockade but could incorporate those who had left 
the city and would at some point, it was hoped, return. While the local authorities were 
‘negotiating’ and ‘accommodating’ the demands of the centre, the pressures on local 
infrastructure, and their own vision for the postwar city, however, the population of 
Leningrad was being altered day by day by the decisions of people to travel there even 
without the sanction of the authorities.537 
  
4.3 “Everyone thought up their own way of how to get to Leningrad”   
  
Despite the additional laws and penalties governing population movements in the 
immediate postwar years, people continued to circumvent the administrative restrictions.  
Official strictures aimed at sculpting the population were overlaid or undermined by 
people’s own wishes and the resources at their disposal.  
  
Prewar residents wanting to return, for example, could be helped by relatives and friends 
still living in the city who could obtain a summons for them by vouching that they would 
provide them with somewhere to stay. Vera, an interviewee in the European University 
project, for example, recalled how she and her mother and brother returned to Leningrad 
from Tobol’sk in August 1945 with the assistance of an aunt who procured a summons 
for them by agreeing to register them in her accommodation. Having secured the 
necessary documents they sold Vera’s doll at a market to pay for their tickets home and 
made it back by foot, boat and goods wagon.538  
  
Other prewar residents and newcomers managed to receive a pass to come to the city by 
offering bribes or favours to employees in the municipal bureaucracy. There were likely 
to have been plenty of opportunities for the use of bribery and connections with 
officialdom to enter and settle in Leningrad. Material bribes, informal exchanges, the use 
of personal networks and contacts, all encapsulated in the Russian word blat, were a 
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permanent feature at the core of the everyday workings of the Soviet state.539 The 
deprivations, dislocations and breakdowns in formal state mechanisms caused by the war 
and its aftermath had, moreover, according to a recent study, facilitated the proliferation 
and entrenchment of these methods of conducting business and securing services in the 
Soviet Union.540  
  
In October 1944, for example, the local party newspaper Leningradskaia Pravda 
publicised the sentencing by the city court of an employee of the district Bureau for the 
Accounting and Distribution of the Labour Force who had been dispensing permits to 
enter Leningrad in return for bribes.541 According to the article, the employee, N. 
Chernoushenko, had provided permits for the relatives of one woman who could arrange 
for a coat to be mended ahead of the waiting list. She also formulated official documents 
for entry and work in Leningrad for a man who had arrived without a permit, in return for 
a length of material for her coat, some honey and other products. She issued permission 
for another woman’s husband to enter the city, on receipt of a gold pendant and a box of 
perfume. The court sentenced her to imprisonment for seven years with the confiscation 
of her property and gave two of her clients prison terms of three years and another one 
year of corrective labour.542 The advertisement of such penalties did little, however, to 
prevent the widespread use of blat among the population.  
  
People without contacts in the city found other ways of making it into Leningrad without 
an official summons. Vasilisa is another interviewee who lived through the first blockade 
winter and then went into evacuation.543 She refers in her interview to her use of a 
number of devices in order to bring about her return journey. According to Vasilisa, she 
made up her mind to return to Leningrad from Krasnoiarsk in central Siberia in autumn 
1944 but was not able to secure an authentic summons, as she could not provide evidence 
of guaranteed accommodation in the city. The housing where she lived in Leningrad at 
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the start of the war had been destroyed to provide firewood and she had departed into 
evacuation from someone else’s flat. She had no immediate family left in the city, 
moreover, in 1944. Her brother had gone to the front and her grandmother had been 
buried during the first year of the blockade in a communal grave in the Bogoslovskii 
cemetery. Vasilisa’s mother, a party member, was not allowed to accompany her into 
evacuation but was later sent into the remote north of the Soviet Union due to her 
German ethnic origins. In addition, of course, very few people were being officially 
permitted entry to the city towards the end of 1944.  
  
Without the necessary legal documents Vasilisa decided she had to come up with an 
alternative, unofficial means of returning. Everyone, she claims in her interview, 
“thought up their own way of how to get to Leningrad” at the end of the blockade.544 In 
Vasilisa’s case, she narrates that she and a friend employed several tactics including 
subterfuge, forgery, their status as ‘Leningraders’, the information network among 
students and even flirtation, to make it back illegally.  
  
Fortunately, Vasilisa recalled, she had been evacuated as a student with a medical 
institute and the students there “could devise anything you wanted”.545 The first step was 
to secure permission to leave the evacuated institute in Krasnoiarsk and then to create 
fake documents to get them to Leningrad. At that time, medical students were being 
invited to transfer to an institute in newly liberated Odessa and Vasilisa wrote off and 
secured a place there. She justified this move to the director of the Krasnoiarsk institute 
by claiming that she wished to transfer to a warmer climate. The director, according to 
Vasilisa, understood, of course, “that we Leningraders (were) all bursting to get to 
Leningrad”, however there was nothing he could do once she had been accepted at 
Odessa and so he signed the statement that she was released from his institute.546 She and 
her friend then wrote out documents which claimed that they were being sent on a 
business trip to Leningrad to secure equipment for the Krasnoiarsk institute and managed 
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to obtain signatures and stamps for these attestations. The certificates were apparently 
full of mistakes but no-one paid any attention to this and they were ready to go. 
  
They travelled from Krasnoiarsk to Kirov, just west of the Urals, without incident. At 
Kirov, however, they had to change trains for Leningrad and there they ran into 
difficulties. It was impossible, Vasilisa recollected, for the two of them to get a place on a 
train. There were long queues and people stood in the station for days on end trying to 
obtain tickets. Those with money could manage to secure themselves a place but Vasilisa 
and her friend had nothing. Her friend, however, came up with a way round this 
difficulty. She told Vasilisa to wait with the suitcases while she went to enquire at the 
military ticket office, as after all, “we are blokadniki, we are Leningraders”.547 Vasilisa 
never found out what her friend, who had no connection to the military at all, said at the 
office but they acquired tickets and were allowed onto a military carriage travelling to 
Leningrad. She hints, though, that it may have had something to do with the fact that her 
friend was quite an attractive girl. 
  
The next obstacle was to pass through Mga, a railway town about thirty miles southeast 
of Leningrad. Two other students from the institute who had earlier attempted to enter 
Leningrad without permission had warned them about the situation in Mga, which was 
still under strict military control. The documents of all those travelling through Mga into 
Leningrad were being checked thoroughly, including the permits to enter Leningrad. The 
other students had been caught out there, thrown off the train and obliged to return to 
Krasnoiarsk. Vasilisa and her friend had more luck. As they approached Mga they curled 
up together on the third level bunk and pretended to be asleep. The soldiers in the 
carriage convinced the inspectors not to wake the girls up, arguing that they were coming 
to Leningrad for work purposes and were tired out from the difficult journey. The 
inspectors left them alone and they made it into the city.548  
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Documents indicate that the Leningrad authorities were particularly concerned about the 
number of people, those who had not lived in the city before, who were entering 
Leningrad based on illegitimate documents certifying they were being sent there on 
official assignments.549 In February 1945, Averkiev, the deputy police chief, sent a report 
to the City Soviet about a number of such instances. In one case, he highlights, the 
mother of a director of a Leningrad factory, who had not previously lived in the city, 
obtained a false attestation that she was going to Leningrad on official work signed by the 
Commissariat of the Tank Industry, even though she had never been employed in this 
industry at all.550 
  
Other in-migrants who arrived without permission from the authorities relied solely on a 
strategy of ‘invisibility’, making their way to the city without the required documents by 
dodging the police patrols and identity checks en route. NKVD reports tell us something 
about when these attempts failed. In January 1945, for example, 10,163 people were 
detained at police barriers for illegal passage and the attempt to enter Leningrad without 
permission. Of that number 4,590 were returned to regions in the rear of the country, and 
fines were imposed on all those arriving illegally.551 Many other people, however, did 
make it into the city outside of the official system of identification and verification. In a 
personal letter of 12th March 1946, intercepted by the Military Censor, an inhabitant 
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wrote about the difficulties facing those who had not lived in Leningrad previously, 
particularly as, the writer averred, “the majority, like me, arrive without permits”.552  
  
An interviewee, Nina, described her journey to Leningrad illegally on the trains without 
any permits or tickets.553 Nina had been evacuated from Leningrad with a children’s 
home as a thirteen year old, when she was left all alone by the death of her family in the 
blockade. In evacuation in Omsk she was sent, along with fourteen other children from 
the home, to a newly formed factory school and after studying there for several months 
was dispatched to work at a military factory. In 1945 she made an attempt, with another 
girl and some men, to run away from the factory and they joined an assortment of people 
journeying towards Leningrad on the roofs, footboards and platforms of railway 
carriages. Some, like them, travelled with nothing but the clothes on their back and others 
with suitcases full of things, which were often stolen during stops at stations. She recalled 
how they were frequently chased off by the officials who were present in every carriage 
to check people’s documents but nonetheless they made it all the way into Leningrad. 
  
What happened next to those who made it into the city without official sanction? Upon 
arrival in Leningrad the fates of the two interviewees, Vasilisa and Nina, differed 
dramatically. Their stories highlight various factors determining the continued presence 
in Leningrad of those who arrived outside of official channels. Once again the trajectories 
of this incoming population could be shaped by personal networks and assets, as well as 
by the visions of the central and local authorities for the postwar spatial order and social 
composition of the city.  
  
Once in Leningrad, for example, Vasilisa and her friend were given assistance from 
friends and family living there. They stayed with various relatives and former classmates 
on alternate nights, thus managing to avoid the raids of flats regularly being carried out 
by the police to check the documents of residents and seek out the people who had 
arrived in the city illegally. At the same time, Vasilisa sought help at the branch of her 
                                                  
552
 Ibid, l.78. 
553
 Interview with N. I. P., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-2A-029, p.8. 
 157
medical institute that had not gone into evacuation to obtain official registration in some 
accommodation and to receive a ration card. This took time but the director of the 
institute undertook to act on behalf of Vasilisa and a group of 10-15 other people who 
had arrived in similar circumstances. This was partly, in Vasilisa’s opinion, because the 
institute had suffered losses and was greatly in need of students, particularly from the 
higher years of study. The director also told the group that he would approach the city 
authorities for them because “it is our students who have arrived. Our native (korennye) 
Leningraders, not just anyone”.554 He settled them in a hostel in the grenadier barracks in 
the Petrogradskii district and upon payment of a fine of 100 rubles Vasilisa was granted a 
residency permit for Leningrad. 
  
Vasilisa was convinced that she was aided by her level of study, as well as her status as a 
‘native Leningrader’. First year places at the institute, she relates, were given to people 
already registered properly in the city, among whom there were enough eligible 
candidates to fill the places. If she had been in the first year of her course, rather than at a 
higher level of study, then as someone who had arrived in Leningrad without a summons, 
she asserts, she would have been sent away to spend a year working at logging sites or 
peat bogs, before being able to start at the institute. Another interview respondent, 
Tamara, who had returned to Leningrad from evacuation towards the end of the war, 
living there without a residence permit with an aunt, told of her narrow escape from being 
assigned menial labour when she tried to take up her studies at a medical institute.555  In 
her case the institute refused to accept her without proof of a residence permit, despite the 
fact she had several years of study behind her. She decided then to go to the recruitment 
office in her aunt’s district and request to be assigned to the institute. The official there, 
according to Tamara, took one look at her passport and announced “tram depot”.556 
Tamara managed to grab the passport back, however, before an order for two years 
labour at the depot was stamped onto her documents.  
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Following this attempt she recalls that she continued to leave without registration at her 
aunt’s house in the city centre, panicking everyday when she passed a policeman and 
hiding in a cupboard at night if she heard a rustle. Eventually she acquired official 
residence through a friend’s acquaintance who worked at a passport office. She concealed 
from the acquaintance that she had gained a permit to access the city on the basis of a 
fake business trip and instead professed to have made her own way on transport and then 
on foot. Apparently impressed by her bravery he signed a resolution registering her and 
she was able to enrol in her fourth year at the medical institute. 
  
It seems from these accounts, therefore, that prewar inhabitants who possessed a valid 
passport but not all the required residency documents were not necessarily ejected 
completely from the city if caught. Those who were less skilled or without connections, 
though, may have been forced to work in undesirable workplaces in and around the city 
for a year or two before being granted registration as a resident once more. Again an 
incomer, either from the prewar population or new to the city, who had the means to 
bribe the employees they encountered at workplaces, passport offices, labour bureaus and 
housing offices could become registered as inhabitants of the city immediately. The 
prices related by correspondents in the letters seized by the Military Censor for a permit 
securing permanent residence in the city ranged from 400 to as much as 5000 rubles. 557 
  
Unlike Vasilisa, the returning Nina was immediately arrested and removed from the city 
on her arrival.558 Once she had made it into Leningrad she went with her companions 
straight to the counterpart of the military factory where they had been working in 
evacuation, just as Vasilisa had done with her institute. In Nina’s case, however, as she 
recounts, this turned out to be a foolish step. They went into the department of cadres and 
announced that they had just run away from Omsk, without official dismissal from the 
factory there. They were asked to wait for a minute and then two policemen came in, 
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grabbed them by the collar and threw them into prison. A group was then gathered 
together from the prison for deportation and they were sent back to Omsk, to work at the 
same factory as before and live in the same hostel. 
  
What had made the difference in Nina’s treatment? In contrast to Vasilisa and Tamara, 
Nina did not even have an internal passport, having been too young to be issued one 
before she left Leningrad with the children’s home. She had left work in evacuation 
without an official document legitimising her departure, moreover, from a factory that 
was still engaged in military production, and so she would have been considered a 
‘deserter of the labour front’. As a graduate of a factory school, furthermore, she was 
effectively an indentured labourer, who had been drafted to work at that particular factory 
and could not seek her own employment elsewhere until she had worked out her four 
years wherever the Ministry of Labour Reserves sent her.  
  
Police reports from the time suggest that a small proportion of those caught by the city’s 
police for violations of the passport regime were immediately removed from Leningrad 
like Nina. Of the 40,834 people picked up for breaking passport regulations in 1944, 
according to one report, about half were issued with fines like Vasilisa, while only 1799 
were evicted immediately from Leningrad.559 Others who had entered illegally were 
obliged in signed statements to leave within 24 hours. It is not entirely clear from the 
report, though, how many people were given notice to leave the city within a certain time 
period. One anecdotal account, however, suggests that not everyone obliged to leave the 
city within one or two days necessarily obeyed this injunction, despite the fact that one of 
the main tasks of the Leningrad police for 1945 was to effect “daily control over the 
departure of people being removed from the city, (who are) required to leave in signed 
statements”.560  
  
A respondent in the blockade interview project recalled how a neighbour returned from 
evacuation with her two sons and found that her husband had been charged with spying 
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for the Germans and shot. She learnt that, as the family of a traitor, their room had been 
sealed up and they were deprived of anywhere to live and the police, on discovery of her 
return, immediately gave her twenty four hours to leave. Her relatives who were living in 
the same house were too afraid to take her in with them. The interviewee’s sister, 
however, had been friends with the woman and their mother took pity on her family and 
let them live in hiding together with them in their room. Some time later, following the 
death of one of the sons, who was run over by a tram, the woman and her remaining son 
managed to secure a residence permit and their own accommodation.561 Even those 
stigmatised by their wartime behaviour or associations could sometimes, therefore, 
manage to continue to avoid the gaze of the authorities and to circumvent the ‘needs of 
the rulers’.  
  
Nina herself made another attempt to leave Omsk permanently in 1947 and eventually, 
with difficulty, succeeded in becoming an official resident in Leningrad. She took some 
official leave from the factory in March to visit her grandparents in the Tver’ region 
between Leningrad and Moscow and although she reassured her boss that she would 
return, in fact she intended never to go back. In Tver’ region she got a job at a milk 
factory and a friend of her father managed to obtain a passport for her. Nina’s 
grandparents worried nevertheless that she would be apprehended and taken to court for 
her refusal to return to Omsk but she was sure that it was such a large distance between 
Tver’ and Siberia that she would be safe. One day, however, she received a summons to 
go to court, where she was judged by a military tribunal as an underage criminal for 
deserting a defence factory. The tribunal was lenient with her, however, and she was 
given a one year suspended sentence and permitted to remain in Tver’.  
  
Nina’s intention remained to return to Leningrad, however, and from Tver’ she made her 
way back to the city, where she settled with the help of the contacts and accommodation 
which her family had possessed before the war. She managed to secure a right to 
permanent, legal residence in the room where her family had lived before they had all 
died in the blockade and which had been transferred into an aunt’s name until Nina 
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returned, whereupon the room reverted to her. She was also given work at the ‘Progress’ 
factory, the enterprise in which her father had worked before the war. Once more, 
however, according to Nina, things turned out not as she planned but “as was necessary 
to our rulers”.562 In order to develop shipbuilding in Leningrad after the war workers 
were mobilised into this industry and Nina was moved on from her factory to work 
instead at the ‘Marti’ shipyard. 
  
The restrictions imposed by the central authorities on population movement according to 
social and geographical hierarchies and the needs of the economy, therefore, shaped post-
siege migration into Leningrad, especially its timing, the nature of the journey for many 
people and the possible consequences of travel. The repopulation of the city was also 
contingent, however, on the decisions, actions and interrelationships of Soviet citizens 
and by local officials open to bribery or subscribing to particular ideas about the form a 
post-siege community of Leningraders should take. Arrival into Leningrad and even the 
possession of a permanent residence permit, moreover, often did not signal an end to 
displacement for large numbers of the population. With much of the city’s housing 
damaged or disputed, many people’s ‘place’ in the physical cityscape and in the postwar 
civic order remained uncertain or contested.563  
  
4.4 Endless resettlements 
  
A letter from a war invalid, N. Khvorost’evskii, to the editor of Leningradskaia Pravda 
was published in September 1945 under the title ‘Endless resettlements’ (Beskonechnye 
pereseleniia). The letter described his family’s experience during and after the war in the 
following way: 
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In 1941 our flat in house no.58 on Liteinyi prospekt was destroyed by a bomb. 
My family was re-settled into flat no.10 and again in spring 1942 to flat no.29 of 
this house. After five months our room was needed by a caretaker and my 
relations had to move to flat no.33. But because the ceiling threatened to cave in, 
the Kuibyshev district housing department (zhilotdel) “kindly” granted a flat in 
house no.15 on Vladimirskii prospekt. After some time it turned out that it was 
not possible to occupy this flat either. The necessity arose of a fifth re-
settlement. Last year I returned home following injury at the front. When some 
other accommodation was put aside for me in that same house I, informed by 
bitter experience, decided to ascertain in advance to whom the flat belonged. The 
house-manager (upravkhoz) and district housing department (raizhilotdel) 
assured me that it would not be necessary to move again. I moved in, made 
repairs and….again received notification about the vacation of the flat.564  
  
This letter imparts the continuing dislocation that was the hallmark of the immediate 
postwar years for many people. It also underscores how narratives about postwar 
settlement that were being articulated by officials on a local and central level and by 
people themselves were undermined by the realities of persistent unsettlement and 
resettlement. The war invalid’s ‘return home’, the state’s ‘care for the family’ of a 
serviceman, the veteran’s privileged status in postwar society and the notion of a ‘rooted’ 
local community all seem to be belied by the ‘endless resettlements’ experienced by 
Khvorost’evskii in practice.565  
  
The continuing displacements of people in Leningrad at the end of the siege took many 
forms. For some people who were returning to the city their journey remained 
“incomplete” even if they were evacuees or soldiers who managed to return to the city 
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and to their prewar housing.566 As Yi-Fu Tuan discusses, attachment to ‘place’ can 
operate at the scale of a “favourite armchair”.567 This is the way in which the author 
Evgenii Shvarts in his diary entry of 23rd July 1945 wrote about his return home from 
evacuation: 
  
17th July 1945 I moved into my old flat, which in February 1942 was badly 
damaged by a shell. The flat has been restored. The walls have been painted. I sit 
behind my former writing table, in the same armchair. A lot of the furniture has 
been preserved. To be more exact – it seems to us that it is a lot, because we 
thought that it had all perished. Some of our things were stowed for us by 
Pinegina, who lives in the flat diagonally across from us. She went away to the 
front. Her flat was sealed up and therefore the things were protected. And so, 
after the blockade, hunger, (the towns of) Kirov, Stalinabad, Moscow, I sit and 
write behind my table in my own home, the war is finished, Katiusha is in a 
room nearby, and we even brought a cat from Moscow, so that, when going out, 
I open the door as carefully as four years ago, in order that the cats do not 
escape. Before my eyes are the former windows of the flats opposite – only the 
inhabitants are not the same. Of the approximately eight flats, with which we 
had become so familiar in the course of seven years of peacetime life that we 
immediately knew if familiar faces were approaching the window, no-one was 
left. No, one flat has remained, where three reckless boys used to eternally hang 
out over the windowsill…They are all here now. They have become older, of 
course, but hang out over the windowsill as before…And so, I sit in my former 
place, and my old porcelain inkwell has returned to me, but a strange feeling 
worries me…But I am home, home.568       
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While Shvarts is disturbed by a strange feeling, he feels that he is ‘home’ as he sits in his 
‘place’ in his armchair and watches the boys lean out the window ‘as before’. Many other 
people who came back to their former residences, however, did not return to any of their 
prewar belongings or to familiar, if aged, faces.  
  
The deaths of so many people during the blockade, including whole families and 
households meant that former residents of Leningrad who had been in evacuation or at 
the front often found on their return that, even if they could move back into their pre-war 
accommodation, they could not re-settle into a familiar environment and way of life.569 
Several interview respondents who were evacuated during the blockade evoked the 
disconcerting experience of walking around houses in the city on their return, attempting 
to locate the people they had left behind. One woman spoke of how, on return: 
  
people went to see each other with trepidation. To be more precise, they did not 
know, they went round to an address and whether those there were alive or not – 
no-one, or many people, did not know. So you go there and you don’t know. 
You arrive – perhaps there are completely different people there and where those 
(you seek) are – is completely unknown. And they found out about many people, 
that many had died.570   
  
Feliks D.S., a schoolboy when the war started, recounts how, having made the journey 
back from evacuation, he immediately began to search for his old classmates and a 
beloved teacher, He recollects that “it was horrible, those awful, difficult moments, when 
I went around the old addresses and was asked “who do you want, boy?””.571 As a result 
of his efforts, Feliks discovered that all of his close prewar school mates, and the lads 
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 Interview with E. S. M., ATsUI, Interview No.BL-1-010, p.16. 
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 Interview with F. D. S., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-2A-007, p.4. 
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with whom he had played in the backyard, had died in the blockade or not returned from 
evacuation: “no-one was left”.572  
  
The struggle to trace friends and family in the context of the mass deaths and extensive 
evacuation of the blockade was made harder by the resettlement of people around the city 
and the poor functioning, it seems, of the city’s address bureau. An article in 
Leningradskaia Pravda of July 1944 condemned the bureau for issuing false information 
in response to inquiries about the residence of particular inhabitants. It gave examples of 
employees at the bureau incorrectly informing people that their loved ones were no 
longer living in the city. One woman was told, for example, that her husband was not in 
the city when he was living in a house on Nevskii prospekt.573  
  
Vadim Shefner has communicated the loss of people and the damage done to places in 
blockaded Leningrad in a poem that also suggests that a material object can somehow 
preserve something of these. In the poem ‘The Mirror’, he evokes a house half 
demolished by a blast, in which a mirror has by some miracle remained intact: 
  
People are dead, walls are swept away, -  
It (still) hangs, the blind kindness of fate,       
Over the abyss of sadness and war. 
  
A witness of pre-war comfort, 
On the wall eaten away by damp 
It preserves in its glassy depths     
The warmth of a breath and someone’s smile.574     
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 Ibid, p.5; this was not the experience of everyone, of course, other interviewees recall that most of their 
family and neighbours had survived: interview with N. V. M., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-036, p.4; 
interview with L. V. D., ibid, Interview No. BL-1-002, p.8 and interview with M. F. Sh., ibid, Interview 
No. BL-2A-001, p.22. 
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 ‘Nel’zia li bez “nedorazumenii”’, Leningradskaia Pravda, 7/7/1944, p.3. 
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 V. Shefner, ‘The Mirror’, cited and translated by N. Perlina and C. Simmons: 
http://www.units.muohio.edu/havighurstcenter/publications/documents/perlina-simmons.pdf, p.11. 
 166
According to one blockade survivor, however, often people found when they returned 
that much had changed in the city, and much could not be recovered, including domestic 
furnishing. In the case of some people, according to the interviewee, “their 
accommodation was occupied, for others all their furniture and everything had been 
taken, others had been bombed”.575  
  
The property of servicemen was in principle safeguarded, under resolutions of the City 
Soviet from 1942 and 1943, and preserved for their return.576 Special warehouses were 
also created under the auspices of the district housing authorities, in which the belongings 
of evacuees were to be stored and retained for collection by the owners until September 
1946.577 Investigations by the City Department of State Provision and Social Support for 
Families of Servicemen and by the Leningrad police, however, concluded in early 1944 
that there were many deficiencies in the implementation of these orders and that the theft 
of belongings from the flats of servicemen, evacuees and residents who had died was 
widespread.578 Accounts of thefts from one’s former apartment during the blockade are 
common among interviewees and in memoirs.579 One woman recalls how many of her 
mother’s belongings had been traded for food by another inhabitant of the building where 
they had lived. She adds that she did not even manage to retrieve their personal effects: a 
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 Interview with O. V. A., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-2A-017, p.14. 
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 One woman interviewed recalled that when she settled back in her former flat at the end of the blockade 
it had been cleaned out of most of her belongings, from valuables to clothes to a basket of dirty linen: 
interview with T. N. A., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-039, pp.13-14, here p.14; see also V. G. Levina, Ia 
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table cloth sewn by her grandmother, a gold locket with a Pushkin poem inside, her 
grandmother’s treasured Singer sewing machine and the family photographs.580  
  
Not just personal belongings but entire buildings had been lost, destroyed and damaged in 
the city during the blockade, moreover. Leon Gouré has discussed the damage caused not 
only by bombing but also by the weather in houses where the roofs were broken, He cites 
that there was hardly a “single building in the city which did not suffer to some extent 
from the war”. 581 Buildings which had remained intact had been used to house people 
from other areas and the reconstruction of housing, moreover, proceeded slowly at the 
end of the war.582 For some people arriving in the city their journey was made 
‘incomplete’ by the non-return of their prewar accommodation. For others, both prewar 
residents and newcomers, arrival brought difficulty securing any accommodation at all. 
At the same time people who had moved into a flat during the blockade found themselves 
threatened with eviction when someone else arrived with a valid claim to it.  
  
As we have seen, evacuees who had left the city with factories were not entitled to their 
prewar accommodation. The extensive damage to the city’s housing, moreover, meant 
that the former housing of other returnees no longer existed. A report on the reception of 
the first demobilised soldiers in Leningrad in July 1945, for example, commented that 
some had found their previous living space occupied, others discovered that it was 
completely destroyed.583 The regulations did not stipulate the entitlements of servicemen 
and their families whose prewar accommodation was demolished or temporarily unfit to 
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 Interview with S. P. S., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-003, pp.23-4; the theft of belongings left in vacated 
rooms was not ubiquitous, however, the interviewee’s grandmother, for example, returned to a communal 
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been made ready for utilisation, according to a delegate to the City Soviet: TsGASPb, f.7384, op.25, d.733, 
l.12. 
583
 TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.148, ll.153-155. 
 168
move into.584 The adjudication of some claims to specific accommodation after the war, 
furthermore, was incredibly complicated in practice. There were many scenarios in which 
several parties made valid claims on the same living space. In some cases, for example, 
despite the assertions of Popkov that the former living space of servicemen had been kept 
free, it transpired that the family of one Red Army man had been moved into the former 
flat of another soldier’s family.585 Both were entitled to it as ‘their’ living space 
according to the housing laws. Re-evacuees who did not necessarily retain the right to 
their prewar accommodation could also make claims as relatives of servicemen.586 
Disputes and appeals could take many months to sort out, especially as different 
institutions involved, including the procuracy, people’s courts and district housing 
offices, could favour different resolutions.587 This was particularly the case if there was 
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 Edele, ‘A “Generation of Victors?”’, p.122; see, for example, the case of one serviceman whose prewar 
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ll.36-40. 
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their families see ‘Iuridicheskaia konsul’tatsiia’, in Biulleten’, No.6 (1944), p.1; and also ‘Iuridicheskaia 
konsul’tatsiia’, in Biulleten’, No.3-4 (1944), p.15.  
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 Ivan Matveev, a former soldier, for example, sent a letter to Stalin in March 1946, requesting 
intervention in his family’s unsettled living conditions. The letter detailed how his family had lived in 
Leningrad before the war but their room had been damaged by a shell in 1942 and they had been forced to 
move, with the official authorisation of the housing manager, into a room which had been left vacant. His 
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their living space through a people’s court. The court initially rejected their claim on the basis that they had 
not lived there for two years and awarded the room to Ivan’s family. The former inhabitants appealed to the 
courts a second time, however, and on this occasion the decision was made in their favour on the basis that 
the husband was a soldier serving in the army. Ivan’s family were supposed to be allocated alternative, 
habitable lodging from the district housing office. According to Ivan, however, they had been “thrown out 
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TsGASPb, f.4948. op.1, d.145, ll.53-58, here l.56. 
587
 For a series of appeals made by two women contesting the same apartment, both relatives of 
servicemen, one currently occupying the flat and the other who lived there formerly, that began in July 
1946 and had still not been resolved in February 1947, and involved the district procurator, the housing 
office, the house manager, the city police and the central Soviet authorities, including Stalin, see: 
Leningradskii Oblastnoi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv (LOGAV), f.4380, op.2, d.220, ll.1-32. 
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insufficient housing available in a district to fulfil a decision made by the courts.588 The 
ubiquitous blat of course added to the intricacies and unpredictability of determining 
access to a particular apartment and undermined the articulation of housing rights as a 
hierarchy of entitlement further.589 
  
Some returnees to the city and people forced to leave houses where they had lived during 
the blockade were awarded housing from the ‘general stock’. The poet Ol’ga Berggol’ts, 
who conveyed the dislocation involved in being estranged from her former home during 
the siege, composed a poem entitled ‘My Home’ after the war in which she depicted the 
sensations of passing one’s previous apartment but not being able to walk in, not being 
able to ‘return’ to the place that is still ‘home’. One day, she writes, “I will not resist 
knocking on the door, coming into my home, standing on the threshold”, after all “I have 
come here to my home, and I remember it all and believe in our happiness”.590 An 
interviewee, Vera, however, recollecting her return from evacuation, reflects that to have 
any housing after the war was the source of happiness. Vera had lived with her family 
before the war in a house in a Leningrad suburb that had been built by her grandfather. 
The house had quickly been destroyed by bombing and on return from evacuation she 
and her mother had lived in the house of an aunt in the outskirts of the city. Her mother, 
however, managed to solicit a room in a communal apartment in the city centre. 
According to Vera’s description, the new room was small, cold, without gas or central 
heating, on the fourth floor at the top of a terrifying staircase: 
  
In general, there were no kinds of comforts. The water, naturally, was only cold. 
But this was good fortune (schast’e). This was such happiness. Your own roof 
over your head. Because when you don’t have your own housing – you envy 
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 In the case of Ivan Matveev, for example, the district Soviet informed him, following his application for 
Stalin’s intervention, that it was still not possible to hasten the fulfilment of the second court resolution 
awarding him alternative living space, due to a lack of free housing in the district: TsGASPb, f.4948. op.1, 
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 O. Berggol’ts, ‘Moi Dom’, in Sobranie Sochinenii, tom 3, pp.16-17; my thanks to Anna Reid for 
pointing me toward this poem.  
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everyone. We walked around the streets. And you look in the basements where 
people were living. You think how fortunate they are. They have their 
accommodation. But when we obtained this room, with difficulty, true, with all 
kinds of obstacles, but we somehow managed it via the institute, we were 
happy.591  
  
For many people the obstacles to obtaining any housing persisted for months and even 
years. Some of the people who could not secure their prewar accommodation joined a 
long waiting list of people yet to be allocated somewhere to live.592 An article on Party 
activities which appeared in Leningradskaia Pravda in September 1945 reproached 
housing departments of district Soviets for the delays in housing provision. The article 
referred to files in the housing department of the Vyborgskii district Soviet, whose pages 
were: 
  
filled with lists of names of people, who are officially in the “primary queue” for 
receiving living space. Perhaps for some, who are optimistically inclined, the 
words “primary queue” summon up high hopes. But optimists among the visitors 
to the housing department of the Vyborgskii district Soviet are becoming fewer 
and fewer.593 
  
At a meeting of deputies to the City Soviet in April 1949, one deputy declared in his 
address that more than 3000 families in the Oktiabr’skii district of the city were 
registered on a waiting list for permanent accommodation, many of whom had not been 
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 Interview with V.N.K., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-2A-024, p.7; other people, as we have seen, would 
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 Partiinaia zhizn’: A. Alekseva, L. Vadimenko, ‘Priniat’ k neuklonnomu ispolneniiu’, Leningradskaia 
Pravda, 8/9/1945, p.3. 
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provided with living space from as far back as 1944.594 Again there was a sense among 
people in the city that housing was being allocated not according to one’s turn in the list 
or to one’s entitlement as laid out in the regulations but according to the ability to bribe 
or make use of contacts.595 In a personal letter, of April 1946 an ex-serviceman described 
his long wait for accommodation and expressed the view that “the queue for receiving 
living space exists as a screen, and the living space goes according to blat, bribes”.596  
  
People frequently found that when they did receive their own room the flat in question 
was either occupied or in need of major reconstruction. According to Leningradskaia 
Pravda in March 1944 in a number of districts an inventory had not been made of the 
condition of the housing stock and living space was allocated to people which was 
already occupied, or did not even exist anymore. The article illustrated this with an 
account of a woman who had been assigned accommodation seven different times, in 
each instance discovering that she was unable to actually live there.597 
  
Some people, especially those coming to the city as part of organised recruitments, were 
accommodated in a growing number of hostels.598 The central and civic authorities 
expressed concern that factory directors in need of labour were settling many more 
people in the hostels than had been authorised by the administration.599 An investigation 
by Leningradskaia Pravda in August 1944 apparently found that half of the hostels 
investigated had been settled without permission and concluded that “many rooms are 
crammed over and above any kind of norm”.600  
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Even people arriving as part of the ‘planned’ resettlement found they were not provided 
with either housing or space in a hostel on arrival.601 Workers of a number of enterprises 
were settled in factory workshops, in basements, in the ruins of buildings and, in the case 
of the Kirov factory, under the stands of the factory’s stadium.602 Workers and their 
families who were re-evacuated with factory no.206 in 1944 could not all be 
accommodated within the two houses that had been allocated by the city administration. 
As a result, according to a letter addressed from the People’s Commissar for the 
Shipbuilding Industry to the Chairman of the Leningrad City Soviet at the end of 1944, 
1200 people were currently living in the factory’s office premises and in schools that 
needed to be vacated by May 1945. The vice chairman of the Soviet replied that it could 
only provide the factory with houses in need of major repairs for its workers and no flats 
or rooms with just minor damage.603 
  
The provision by factories of housing to its workers that was still in need of major repairs 
was a common practice.604 In August 1945, Leningradskaia Pravda reproduced a letter 
about the inadequate accommodation provided for 800 workers brought into the city 
according to a contract with a construction trust. The workers described in the letter how 
on their arrival they had been taken from the station in cars and dropped at a house along 
the Moscow highway which was to form the hostel where they were supposed to live. It 
was impossible, however, to enter any of the rooms of the building, as they were in the 
middle of reconstruction: the walls were still being painted, the ceilings whitewashed and 
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the window panes erected. The new workers, therefore, had to “settle on the street”.605 By 
evening it had begun to rain and so they sheltered with their bags and suitcases in the 
basement and slept on the damp cement floor. The head of the trust’s housing-utilities 
department refused to discuss their problem and so they spent a further five days living in 
the basement. Then, the workers declared, they began to settle in the unfinished rooms, 
regardless of the threats of the hostel warden. At the time the letter was written the 
kitchen had not yet been built in the hostel, however, and, according to the letter’s 
authors, “the “lucky ones” manage to make fires and cook out on the street.606  
  
Some people among those on the waiting list for accommodation, or those not entitled to 
a room, also slept out in various public places in the city. One demobilised soldier wrote 
to an acquaintance that in his experience no consideration was shown to those who had 
been demobilised, even if “you go without clothes and sleep on the streets”.607 A woman 
described in a letter of February 1946 how she had endured a lot on account of the lack of 
a room, had approached the regional party committee, the district party committee and 
the district housing office but had been refused everywhere and was spending the nights 
with her children in the city’s train stations.608 Another demobilised soldier, M. I. 
Kasatkevich, claimed in an appeal to the City Party Committee of October 1947 that he 
had been in the queue for housing provision for three years, during which time he had 
been registered in his sister’s room but, not wishing to interfere with her personal life, he 
stayed only occasionally with her. Otherwise, he stated, he passed the nights “in 
basements, staircases, by fences, on benches in parks and gardens, in toilets”.609    
  
The official system of housing allocation that was intended to provide people with a 
physical ‘place’ in the city, to determine who was to be included in its re-settlement and 
who excluded and to rank entitlements according to the ‘place’ of people in the postwar 
social order, was breaking down. In some cases personal networks could once more fill 
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the vacuum for people trying to arrange the basic elements of their everyday lives. Flats 
filled up according to family relationships in some cases. The crowding of those who 
arrived at the end of the blockade, in particular from the front and evacuation, into the 
rooms of friends and acquaintances that had remained intact, is conveyed in the memoirs 
of V. G. Levina. She depicts the scenes in the single room in which she lived with her 
husband, Vladimir, and her mother-in-law, once their relatives began to arrive from the 
front and from evacuation towards summer 1945 and discovered they were without a flat 
of their own. Levina and her family squeezed ten extra people into their room in all, so 
that: 
  
There were thirteen of us, including three adolescents. Of course there weren’t 
enough places to sleep. People slept on the stove in the kitchen, on the writing 
desk, one of our nieces – on the narrow couch, which was slid under the piano 
for the night, someone slept top to tail in the bed with my mother-in-law. An 
elderly aunt slept on two Voltaire armchairs pushed together, and in the morning 
we had to extract her from the abyss which had formed between them. A 
schoolgirl-niece did her homework on a large box for firewood in the hallway. 
We lived in such a way for three years and only dispersed our guests among 
other family and friends at the end of 1947, because Vladimir was diagnosed 
with tuberculosis in the lungs.610  
  
Other people utilised new friendships forged in wartime experiences to help them make 
their living arrangements after the war. In the case of Aleksandr Gorodnitskii’s family, 
for example, they found on their return to Leningrad that their house had burned down 
and “there was nowhere to live”.611 They were accommodated by a family with whom his 
parents had made friends at the start of evacuation, on the goods wagon on the way to 
Omsk. Aleksandr’s family lived with them for half a year while repairs were made to a 
house in which they were to receive their own room. 
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Some people, however, depicted their postwar living situation at the time as one of 
endless wanderings and tensions and divisions between the city’s inhabitants, as a “fight 
for living space”.612 In letters sent at the time to public institutions and to friends and 
family people wrote of their lives in terms of ‘roaming’ around the city. In September 
1944, Leningradskaia Pravda reported the situation of Evdokina Dubrovina, who was not 
given any housing immediately upon her return to the city and so spent the nights with 
her children “wherever comes along (gde pridetsia)”.613 In June 1945 another re-evacuee 
to Leningrad protested in a letter to Leningradskaia Pravda that, due to the wait for living 
space to be sorted out, “it will soon be a year that I have been wandering”.614 A woman 
whose previous room was occupied by people entitled to remain there and had not yet 
been provided with accommodation informed the city procurator in 1945 that she and her 
family had been forced “to roam around other people’s places (chuzhim uglam) for more 
than a year”.615 In February 1946 a woman wrote a personal letter to a friend advising her 
not to come to Leningrad for another year as even demobilised soldiers were not 
receiving rooms. If her friend did arrive, she warned, then she too would have to “roam 
around hostels”.616 Another former soldier addressed an appeal to Mikhail Kalinin, 
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, at the start of 1946 to help him with his housing 
difficulties in Leningrad. In it he described how he had not been allocated anywhere to 
stay and although registered with aunt he was having to “roam around” (skitat’sia) other 
people’s living space, and sleep on the floor covered with his greatcoat.617  
  
The tensions between residents that these arrangements could cause are illustrated by the 
appeal of a woman who had been re-evacuated to Leningrad for help from Mikhail 
Kalinin. Her husband had died and her prewar housing been destroyed and she remained 
in March 1946 on the waiting list for housing. Burganova, along with her mother and 
young son, had found a place to stay temporarily with acquaintances but in February, she 
claimed, they were forced to leave the room where they had been staying by the tenant, 
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who threw their personal belongings out into the corridor. As a result, Burganova 
continued, “I spend the nights with my family in the corridor. The inhabitants of my flat 
curse (us), forbidding us to pass the night here either…my elderly mother roams 
(shataetsia) as well around the city of Leningrad, asking to be allowed to spend the night 
somewhere”.618 
  
There were instances in which people lived in corners in communal areas outside rooms 
to which they believed they were entitled, while the rooms remained registered to, or 
occupied by, the other inhabitants claiming the right to live there. A letter to Voroshilov 
from a demobilised soldier of March 1946 pleaded for his assistance “in my wanderings” 
(v moikh skitaniiakh) and portrayed his current living conditions in the kitchen of the flat 
where he had lived with his aunt before the war.619 According to the veteran, his former 
room had been occupied after the death of his aunt from starvation in 1942 by a new 
tenant who had subsequently been convicted of the theft of his belongings. The room 
remained registered, nevertheless, in the name of this woman, while the former soldier 
was, in his words, “roaming around, living in the cold kitchen, without a permit”.620  
  
Rebecca Manley has described how housing claims were often settled on the contested 
terrain itself: in apartments, hallways and buildings under contention.621 The way in 
which some disputes could be settled is described in a letter discussed in Leningradskaia 
Pravda in August 1944. The author of the letter, A. Nikiforova, wrote of how the room 
allocated to her was already occupied and that the occupant had refused to leave. 
Nikiforova, therefore, moved into the room that had been made available for the person 
in ‘her’ room. She was subsequently evicted, however, from the alternative room when it 
was awarded to someone else. According to her letter, she arrived home to find her things 
thrown out into the corridor and she found herself on the street.622     
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The perception of unfair treatment in the allocation of housing, along with tensions 
arising between inhabitants as people ‘wandered around’ flats and contested rights to 
specific rooms, formed an arena in which people articulated their own notions not just of 
people’s place in the postwar Soviet social order but also of who belonged in the 
community of Leningraders.  
  
In the interviews with those who lived through some, or all, of the blockade, some 
respondents insisted that harmonious relations prevailed among postwar inhabitants. This 
is accompanied, however, in many interviews by references to the values of true 
Leningraders and blokadniki that suggest distinctions made between those who lived 
through the entire blockade, those who were in evacuation and complete newcomers to 
the city after the war.623 Sources from the time indicate that people were engaged in 
making judgements about who merited housing in Leningrad after the war in terms of 
differing conceptions of local identity.  They articulated these in personal letters and also 
fashioned them in appeals to the central and local regime, appropriating public discourses 
of belonging and entitlement in the process but also disclosing their own delineations of 
the postwar community.  
  
The authors of some of these letters and appeals emphasised wartime service. The 
demobilised soldier Aleksei Zvonov couched his appeal to Kalinin for assistance with 
housing, for example, couched them in the rhetoric of entitlement on the basis of wartime 
behaviour. He stressed that he deserved better living conditions on account of his wartime 
service as an officer of the Soviet army. He underscored that “I have worked and fought 
honestly”, noting his decorations for service at the front.624 Another former soldier wrote 
a personal letter to his father about access to housing in Leningrad in which he 
underscored his sense of a divide between those who fought and those who stayed in the 
rear. He expressed bitterness that “those who were giving their lives for Leningrad have 
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been left on the street and those who were engaged in different affairs and in speculation, 
sometimes have two flats”.625   
  
In some applications for official intervention mention of the applicant’s war record was 
accompanied by references to the strength of bond with the city of Leningrad and the 
blockade. In his appeal for Stalin’s assistance in securing somewhere for his family to 
live, the demobilised soldier Ivan Matveev recounted not only his service record at the 
front but also his family’s connection to the city, in particular their presence and service 
in Leningrad during the blockade. He noted his service in defence of the motherland from 
1941, on the Leningrad front and right up to Berlin, during which he was wounded four 
times and earned government decorations and medals for the defence of Leningrad and 
for victory over Germany. In addition he related that his wife and sixteen year old son 
had been awarded medals for the defence of Leningrad, in recognition of their work in 
the city during the blockade and he began his letter with the assertion that “my family 
lived in the city of Leningrad before the war and during the war in the severe conditions 
of the blockaded city of Lenin”.626  
  
Some people employing a narrative of the community who lived through the blockade 
contradicted the model of a broad community of Leningraders, cemented by the blockade 
but incorporating the prewar residents scattered across the country in the army and in 
evacuation, that was being constructed in the local media. Arguments marshalled by a 
woman appealing against her eviction from the room into which she had been resettled 
during the blockade included her husband’s service in the navy and decoration with 
medals, and also the assertion that the evacuee to whom the room belonged “did not live 
in Leningrad for the entire war”.627  
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People returning from the front or evacuation on the other hand made claims about who 
should manage to settle in postwar Leningrad which highlighted the relevance of a 
longstanding connection to the city, stretching back before the war. Demobilised soldier 
M. I. Kasatkevich in an appeal to the City Party Committee for housing alluded to the 
state’s duty to invalids of the war but recited as well his biography as a “native” 
(korennoi) inhabitant of Leningrad, who had been born there in 1916 and left his family’s 
home there to join the army in 1938.628 Some proceeded from assertions of their status as 
‘natives’ to distinguish between people who had lived in Leningrad for some time and 
new arrivals. In a request to Kalinin for his intercession on her behalf, to help reclaim her 
former housing from the man who had occupied it during the war, A. Nazarova, a re-
evacuee to Leningrad, asserted that “my motherland – is Leningrad”.629 She defined the 
relationship of her family to the city in terms of longstanding residence, their service in 
its factories and contribution to its defence during the war. My daughter and I, she writes: 
  
are true Leningraders. I was born in Leningrad and lived in the city for 48 years, 
and my daughter was born in Leningrad in 1925 and lived there until 1942. My 
husband was mobilised into the civil defence organisation of the city of 
Leningrad from 22nd July 1941, where he remained until February 1942. In view 
of an illness he was released from service in the civil defence organisation and in 
March 1942 he died.630  
  
A woman, writing to an acquaintance in 1946 drew on other aspects of identity, including 
class, to construct a model of the Leningraders who should be given privileged access to 
housing that excluded recent incomers. She makes clear, though, that the most important 
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criteria for inclusion and entitlement should be to have lived in houses in Leningrad for 
some time before the war and to have ‘seen’ the city. Declaring that everything was still 
wrong with their living situation, she expounds in the letter: 
  
we are living in some kind of absurd sort of peasant house (khalupe nesuraznoi), 
and besides it is not our own. People who had never even seen Leningrad at all 
before the war, or who had arrived a year before the war and lived in hostels, 
have now obtained rooms by some means and have become big proprietors, 
while you can have lived here for eleven years and you don’t have the right to 
live as people and the people are impudent and these house managers and people 
registering passports – it is terrible…Give them bribes, and then give them some 
more, then they will talk with you.631  
  
Interestingly a letter written by a newcomer to the city at the end of the war expresses his 
conviction that he was discriminated against in the provision of accommodation, work 
and registration documents as someone who had not lived in Leningrad before but also 
that he was able to arrange everything as he wished on the basis of favours and money.632  
  
Finally, Pavel Luknitskii, a Leningrad writer, held a specific group of incomers, those 
arriving in the city without official summons, responsible for overwhelming Leningrad’s 
available housing, noting in a diary entry of June 1944 that: 
  
the city authorities provide those who returned to Leningrad according to a 
summons, who received a residence permit, giving them the right to return from 
evacuation, with new accommodation. But many return in an unauthorised 
fashion and, of course, it is impossible to provide them straight away with 
lodging in a city shattered by the fascists.633 
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While various branches of the city bureaucracy were engaged in untangling competing 
claims to housing the local administration also confronted the conflicting visions of the 
postwar community being elaborated in their memorialising of the blockade, imposed 
from Moscow and articulated by various residents. They attempted to reconcile them in a 
rhetoric of ‘place’, figured in terms of ‘family’ and ‘roots’, that asserted the necessity of 
newcomers coming in from the front or mobilised for the economy to be cultivated in 
Leningrad culture and to prove themselves worthy members of the community. This 
rhetoric implied the exclusion of any of those who remained ‘rootless’. The elaboration 
of this discourse will be discussed briefly next. 
  
4.5 Powerful Roots   
  
 The attitude of the Leningrad city government to those arriving after the war was clearly 
ambivalent. On the one hand, Leningrad officials needed to promote the speedy 
integration of hundreds of thousands of people into the post-war urban environment and 
economy . On the other, they had participated in creating a powerful local wartime myth 
of the city and its inhabitants during the blockade as a special, unique moral and cultured 
community, purified in the course of withstanding unprecedented suffering and 
barbarism. Local officials were concerned with the integration of new arrivals not just 
into the physical environment of the workplace and the city but also into this discursive 
community, which they feared might thereby be weakened or dissolved. The main task 
that we have set ourselves, said the secretary of Leningrad’s Komosomol organisation at 
a conference in 1947, has been to ensure that students arriving in the trade and factory 
schools of the city as ‘non-Leningraders’, have left them as ‘Leningraders’.634 
  
Articles in the press at the time expressed this ambivalence, establishing degrees of 
belonging to the city and the need for some groups to prove that they could fit into a 
normative order in Leningrad that had been cemented in the blockade. While evacuees 
were represented as ‘particles’ of the city, its ‘own people’, who could easily be 
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reincorporated by it, newcomers with official permission to enter the city had to be 
inculcated in its traditions and culture and prove themselves to be ‘Leningraders’. An 
article printed in Leningradskaia Pravda in September 1944, for example, stated that: 
  
Into Leningrad are arriving thousands of new workers, in the main women, 
village youths and students of trade schools. To them a great honour has fallen – 
to live and work in the city of Leningrad… By selfless work they must earn 
(zavoevat’) the honoured right to call themselves Leningraders’.635 
  
Later articles echoed the necessity for the increasing numbers of newcomers to become 
cultured labourers, steeped in Leningrad traditions and imbued with love for their factory 
and the city.636 
  
At the end of the blockade the discourse of local officials had conflated the conceptions 
of the city of Leningrad and the motherland and naturalised ties to the city in images of 
blood and soil, as well as purity, in the process of understanding the meaning of the 
blockade for Leningraders. An editorial by Popkov from the start of 1944 emphasises the 
importance of the love of Leningraders for their native city, which had found its most 
vivid expression in the care shown for its preservation in the difficult conditions of the 
blockade.637 An article from in the same edition of the paper stressed the place of the feat 
of morality and strength achieved by Leningraders during the blockade in the legendary 
history of the city and also asserted the role of this past, as preserved in the hearts and 
souls of Leningraders, in creating the city’s future. It concluded that, in the achievement 
of new feats, “that which is new, which is developing steadily, is growing from a soil 
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thickly watered with the blood of the best people of the city, in an atmosphere of 
enormous love for the motherland”.638 
  
The portrayals of those in the city without a prior claim on the Leningrad soil also 
entailed the application of biological metaphors as the construction of a heroic civic 
community purified by the blockade shaped – and was shaped by – representations of 
those crossing into it.639 These metaphoric practices did not exclude new arrivals to the 
industrial, public and domestic spaces of the city from membership in a community of 
Leningraders but highlighted the unnatural character of their current position as in-
migrants and the significance of their task of integration into the family of Leningraders. 
An article of September 1944, for example, specified the importance of inculcating new 
workers from other areas of the country with the political, cultural and production habits 
of Leningraders, so that they could acclimatise to and master their tasks, know their place 
in the workshop and “join the glorious labouring family of Leningraders”.640 
  
The attainment of membership of this family could not be achieved by a superficial 
mastery of its culture and traditions, according to the local official discourse. An article 
from Leningradskaia Pravda of September 1945, for example, outlined how the glorious 
traditions of Leningrad’s workers should be inculcated into the young people mobilised 
into the city’s trade schools and underlined that this culture of behaviour “should enter 
the flesh and blood of the youths”.641 In April 1946 an article conceived this process in 
botanical imagery. The article was published under the heading ‘Powerful Roots’. The 
article noted that although very few of the old workers remained at the factory and the 
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majority of the labour force was made up of new cadres of women and youths, 
nevertheless the old traditions were being kept alive, as embodied in the person of an old 
worker who was both teaching the new recruits and acquainting them with stories about 
the past of the factory. In such a way, the article concluded, “powerful roots are 
nourishing the young shoots”.642  
  
This chapter has shown how different, cross-cutting conceptions of attachment to place 
and belonging to a postwar family were articulated at the end of the war on a central and 
local level, by the authorities and by residents of Leningrad. Liisa Malkki has argued that 
the same metaphoric practices that create and naturalise links between people and place 
are also “deployed to understand and act upon the categorically aberrant condition of 
people whose claims on, and ties to, national soils are regarded as tenuous, spurious, or 
nonexistent”.643 The next chapter will examine how this privileging of place translated 
into practices and discourses that marked all of those on the move at the end of the war as 
potentially deviant and as sources of contamination. It discusses how people in transit or 
who were deemed ‘out of place’ in the postwar cityscape were treated in the practices and 
rhetoric of the central and local authorities as bearers of dirt, disease, disorder and 
criminality. The ‘markedness’ of itinerant and marginal groups served to reinforce certain 
visions of the postwar civic community.   
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Chapter 5. Matter out of place: the repopulation of 
Leningrad and the ‘danger’ of social contamination 
  
5.1 Protecting the city from ‘dissolute elements’    
  
In July 1946, three months after the city’s spring fair with its ‘motley crowd’ of visitors 
took place, the chief of the Leningrad department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(MVD), I. Shiktorov, penned an article in Leningradskaia Pravda highlighting incidents 
of crime and social disorder in the postwar cityscape.644 The article was one of a number 
of pieces that appeared in the paper from January 1945 written by the city’s head of 
police or its main procurator, A. Falin, about menaces to public order on the streets of 
Leningrad.645 The new five year plan, Shiktorov began in the July 1946 article, was 
opening up “monumental vistas” (velichestvennye perspektivy) for the city.646 Leningrad 
was reviving as an industrial and cultural centre and a model socialist city. There was 
much left to do, however, to combat incidents of crime, social disorder, hooliganism and 
‘mischief’ in Leningrad’s public places.  
  
Persistent violations of the civic order, according to Shiktorov, included drunken brawls 
between inhabitants in clubs, parks and on trams and hooligan acts committed in cinema 
foyers. Children and adolescents, he added, were travelling to the outskirts of the city and 
playing with the ammunition they found there, making up games on bridges and the 
footplates of trams in the city centre, and bothering passers-by. The ‘model’ order and 
cultured external appearance of Leningrad, moreover, was being upset by the untidiness 
of its streets, yards and buildings. Even the central streets of the city, Shiktorov noted, 
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were rarely swept and washed down, while inside houses there were often no numbers on 
flats and no lists of residents posted up anywhere.  
  
The city’s police chief left no doubt in the article where the main responsibility for these 
“intolerable” manifestations of social disorder in the cultured city of Leningrad lay.647 
Although, he claimed, the number of cases of hooliganism had fallen substantially in 
recent months, order on the streets had to be maintained in the face of the rapid flow of 
people into the city. The numbers of people arriving in Leningrad had increased in recent 
months following the removal of restrictions for travel on the railways and, Shiktorov 
continued, the population was changing not just quantitatively. The majority of the 
hundreds of thousands of people who had arrived in the city recently, he reassured his 
readers, were immediately integrated into factories and institutions. Among the mass of 
people travelling into Leningrad, however, there was a certain proportion of ‘unstable’ 
and even criminal elements. These people refused ‘socially useful work’ and formed a 
“breeding ground” for hooliganism and crime.648 Young people who had been brought in 
to train at the city’s labour reserve schools were frequently among those who, having 
spent the day getting up to mischief on the streets, ended it in police departments. Many 
children, and adults, who had been living in the countryside in the last few years, finally, 
had become unaccustomed to the ‘discipline’ of observing regulations for moving about 
the streets on foot or by public transport.  
  
In the interests of ensuring public order and calm, Shiktorov averred, it was necessary to 
uphold strictly the passport regime. Not only the police but also directors of enterprises 
and housing managers should watch newcomers carefully and rigorously check their 
documents, their passports and residence permits. The stringent application of the 
passport system would serve to protect and “cleanse” the city from “all types of dissolute 
elements”.649 Those young people and other incomers who were entitled to settle in the 
city, Shiktorov concluded, must be educated in norms for behaviour in public places and 
elementary habits of ‘discipline’.  
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Blair Ruble refers to the comments made by Shiktorov and other local officials about 
levels of crime, hooliganism and indiscipline in public places and at factories within the 
city to reinforce his argument that the city lost its historic character and declined in status 
after the war, as it filled “with a new population fleeing a war-ravaged countryside”.650 In 
doing so, he replicates the police chief’s conflation of criminality with general ‘social 
indiscipline’ and his equation of this type of conduct with large numbers of rural in-
migrants. Ruble maintains that reports by the authorities bemoaning high crime rates, 
problems with hooliganism and also inordinate levels of labour turnover point to 
behaviour that “could be expected” of peasant-workers who had been demobilised from 
the army or had migrated directly from the village.651 These trends were further evidence, 
therefore, that “the highly skilled workers of whom Leningrad officials had been so proud 
had been swamped by…[a] wave of migrants from the countryside”.652 
  
In the article of July 1946, however, Shiktorov stated that incidents of hooliganism, and 
of certain other crimes, had been falling in preceding months, just as the number of 
people travelling into the city had risen further. Nevertheless, he maintained, “the task of 
organising a model social order in the city remained vital”.653 His association of itinerants 
with crime, disorder and untidiness on the city streets, this chapter will argue, is best 
understood not as indicative of the inherent unruliness of a ‘city of migrants’ but as 
symptomatic of language and procedures that accompanied the socio-spatial ordering of 
the population by the central and local Soviet authorities at the end of the war.  
  
Rhetoric and practices targeting itinerant populations as potential contaminants, 
responsible for introducing not just crime but also manifestations of dirt and disease into 
the civic community, attended the journeys of people towards the city and their arrival 
there and also marked their continued presence in the cityscape. The chapter will explore 
how these discourses and measures emanated in part from a state approach which linked 
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the restoration of the population in a settled spatial order with the establishment of 
control over a menacing sanitary situation and with the imposition of a particular 
normative order in the postwar urban environment. This process was buttressed in 
Leningrad by the ambiguous relationship of the local authorities to the task of integrating 
hundreds of thousands of new arrivals annually into both the physical and mythological 
post-blockade cityscape. The ‘markedness’ of itinerant and marginal populations as 
potentially disorderly, unsanitary and deviant was bound up with the construction of the 
local narrative of a cultured and civilised community, living in a space purified by the 
sufferings and heroism of the blockade, and the establishment of degrees of belonging to 
this community. The chapter begins with a discussion of the obligatory sanitary 
treatments that interpenetrated the regime’s attempts to regulate the movements of the 
population at the end of the war.  
  
5.2 “Where are you crawling to, louse?” Sanitary processing and the 
passport regime  
  
The previous chapter discussed the way in which the central and local authorities sought 
to order the postwar population physically and discursively according to certain 
economic and social priorities. The anthropologist Mary Douglas on the symbolic 
functions of dirt has argued that the process of organising the external environment and 
imposing orders and meanings on society is accompanied by a confrontation with matter 
which is deemed out of place in that order, and that this confrontation can generate 
rhetoric of pollution and contagion and corresponding purification behaviours.  
  
Douglas proceeds from the premise that in any society dirt is a relative concept, 
constructed by the beholders in as much as it offends against their idea of order.  In her 
view, if “dirt is essentially disorder”, or “matter out of place”, then the attempt to 
eliminate dirt, to purify, is part of a movement to structure the environment, to impose an 
ideal, unified order upon it.654  Ideas of pollution and defilement work in the life of 
society to express and reinforce a general view of the social order, its morals and 
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boundaries. They serve to define social rules, uphold values and establish an orderly 
pattern of what and who belongs inside the boundaries of a society, clarifying what 
should be rejected and what can be incorporated. 
  
The unclean, therefore, is what is marked as not fitting the desired order during a process 
of creating a stable, permanent world, from a chaos of shifting impressions.655 The stable 
societal order is envisioned as one with external boundaries and internal lines delineating 
place, role and behaviour, the transgression of which is treated as a dangerous 
pollution.656 This definition of dirt as ‘matter out of place’ suggests that a society would 
be likely to fear contamination from people who have been physically displaced. Douglas 
writes that persons who are in a marginal state, “who are placeless”, transgress against 
the stable pattern and classifications of society and as elements deemed anomalous, 
ambiguous, contradictory, are reacted to as a pollutant.657  
  
Liisa Malkki engages with these ideas in relation to people displaced by violence from 
post-colonial Burundi. In her ‘ethnography of displacement’, she explores how refugees 
are regarded as an aberration of categories and a challenge to accepted boundaries within 
the system of nation-states, which place a moral value on rootedness, territoriality and a 
single national or categorical identity.658 Those on the move, as well as other ‘liminal’ 
groups perceived as neither one thing or another, neither here nor there, between all the 
recognised fixed points in cultural classification, are therefore regarded as immoral and 
contaminating. This explains neatly, she writes, a markedness of refugees in both 
commonplace and official discourse and in state practices as a danger or pollution.659 She 
shows how this was manifested in the administration of refugee camps in Tanzania. In 
this context, she notes the tendency for the governmental and international agencies to 
impose a spatial order on the displaced population in conjunction with establishing other 
kinds of order, including sanitary and legal, regimes.660    
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The adoption of practices linking sanitary measures with control over uprooted 
populations has also been illuminated in the work of Paul Weindling in relation to fears 
about epidemic diseases in Europe from the late nineteenth century. Weindling charts 
how an evolving medical discourse of infection and parasites intertwined with the 
political stigmatisation of ‘surplus’ populations, migrants and minorities. The threat from 
lice as carriers of typhus was particularly prominent in public representations of 
epidemiological danger and became associated with certain groups of people, who were 
classed as human hosts of parasites and disease. In this way, migrants, deportees, 
seasonal labourers, vagabonds, apprentices, peddlers, Jews and gypsies became 
demonised as “human parasites menacing national hygiene”.661 The medical discourse 
was soon extended to social ills and generated concerns about the ‘germs’ of deviant 
behaviour, which were connected with the same population groups.662   
  
The association of migrants with an unnatural ‘uprooted’ state and, consequently, with 
the threats posed to a ‘core’ community by parasites and disease operated in the everyday 
parlance directed at people from Leningrad living in evacuation.  
  
Valentina, an interviewee who had been evacuated with an aunt during the blockade, 
recalled like many others how they strove “by every means possible” to make it to 
Leningrad as soon as the siege was over.663 They moved closer and closer to the city in 
stages, making “dashes” (perebezhki) first from the village where they had been living 
into the nearest city of Novosibirsk and then to Iaroslavl’ in the west of the Soviet 
Union.664 They did not, however, obtain permission to enter Leningrad until 1946 or 
1947. On arrival, Valentina’s “odyssey” of return was marked by further re-
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settlements.665 Her aunt did not manage to secure her former accommodation, in which 
Valentina had also lived in the early months of the siege following the death of her 
mother while digging trenches. Instead they moved into alternative living space that she 
was allocated in the same district. When Valentina’s father came out of the army in 1948, 
moreover, he did not want to stay in the room where he and Valentina and her mother had 
lived before the war and where they remained registered, but which now stood empty of 
all their previous belongings. He quickly married again and insisted the teenage 
Valentina come to live together with him and his new wife in her flat near the city centre.   
  
Describing her interrupted, and in many ways incomplete, return to the city Valentina 
underscores nevertheless how vital it was to her and her family to make the journey back 
towards Leningrad. For one thing, she relates, they had to try any way they could to get 
out of the “God forsaken village” in Siberia where she and her aunt had been living for a 
year in evacuation.666 Relations between evacuees and the collective farmers with whom 
they were lodging had not been good. The villagers, according to Valentina, resented the 
extra mouths to feed, and “called us ‘the uprooted’ (vykovyrennye) and counted the days 
until we would leave”.667  
  
Interactions between evacuees and the people with whom they lived in the east were not 
always marked by such antagonism.668 Several other interview respondents, however, 
similarly remember being referred to as ‘the uprooted’ rather than ‘evacuees’ by an 
“unwelcoming” population in their place of evacuation.669 At times, these tensions were 
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expressed in a language that equated evacuees to disease-carrying animals, to vermin or 
parasites. One woman who had been sent to live in a children’s home in the Sverdlov 
region recalled that the local residents referred to them as “Leningrad rats”.670 Another 
interviewee spoke, like Valentina, of how evacuees in the rural areas of the Novosibirsk 
region evacuees were labelled ‘the uprooted people’. Some, he adds, particularly boys 
and girls who had arrived with children’s homes from Belarus, were given other 
nicknames as well. It was common, or example, for people to approach these groups with 
the taunt “orphaned louse, where are you crawling to?”671  
  
For many people travelling to Leningrad at the end of the war, the journey did not signal 
an end to treatment as an uprooted, parasitical ‘element’ threatening the health of settled 
communities. Individuals returning to the city with the sanction of the authorities, or 
those mobilised in large trainloads to come and work in the city’s factories, encountered a 
network of government institutions conducting ‘anti-epidemic measures’ that entailed the 
isolation, medical surveillance, inspection for lice, and ‘decontamination’ of people in 
transit.  
  
At the end of the war the authorities feared massive outbreaks of disease, above all of 
typhus, similar to those that had followed in the wake of the First World War and 
subsequent civil war in the lands of the former Russian Empire.672 The destruction 
wreaked on Soviet territory by the events of the Second World War included severe 
damage to the country’s sanitary infrastructure. This exacerbated prewar difficulties in 
keeping urban settlements clean, turning “a sanitary nightmare into a sanitary 
catastrophe”.673 Little rubbish was collected in towns and cities in the immediate postwar 
years and cesspits were rarely cleaned, many urban residents did not have indoor running 
water and sewerage systems were either non-existent or in disrepair. In addition, severe 
shortages of soap and the reduced capacity of municipal laundries and bathhouses (bania) 
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meant that “just maintaining basic levels of cleanliness and hygiene for yourself and your 
family was drudgery”.674 Donald Filtzer has pointed out how these conditions “made the 
population highly vulnerable to a whole host of diseases, including tuberculosis, typhus, 
typhoid, dysentery and upper respiratory infections”.675 However, the regime focussed its 
efforts at disease prevention not on improvements in the country’s public health 
infrastructure but on stringent controls over what it deemed a potentially ‘harmful’ 
itinerant population.676  
  
In an article published in June 1945 in the journal of the Soviet Ministry of Health a 
member of the Academy of Medical Sciences, A. N. Marzeev, wrote of the necessity of 
the “sanitary treatment of the masses on the move’”.677 He described the situation in the 
Soviet Union and other combatant countries at that time as one in which “almost the 
whole population” was in transit.678 This itinerant population included armies on the 
move, prisoners of war, refugees, the evacuated and re-evacuated population, labour 
reservists, settlers, waifs, the homeless, vagrants and demobilised soldiers. The increased 
movement of migrants, the article proceeds, harboured within itself “vast dangers” for the 
“rooted population” in the form of epidemic disease.679 Of particular significance were 
those suspected of hosting the parasites, or lice, which were carriers of typhus. Marzeev 
reassured his readers, however, that these itinerant figures could be rendered completely 
harmless, both for themselves and for the population with whom they will come into 
contact.  
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This would be achieved by strengthening the sanitary ‘servicing’ of the transient 
population, both ‘organised’ and ‘unorganised’, already occurring at train stations and 
along rail routes. Methods would be used which had already been worked out and put 
into practice during the war, including the surveillance and medical inspection of all 
those on the move, compulsory washing of their bodies and disinfection of their clothes 
and other belongings, as well as vaccination and quarantine if necessary. This would all 
be carried out before they were allowed to mix with the local population. Such extensive 
intervention, said the author, was the sole guarantee of the epidemiological well-being of 
the motherland.680 
  
The extension and systemisation of sanitary procedures aimed at the itinerant population 
had actually already begun in 1944. At the start of September of that year the People’s 
Commissariat of Health of the RSFSR ordered that People’s Commissars of Health in the 
autonomous republics and the directors of regional and republican city health 
departments laid responsibility for the organisation of medical-sanitary measures in 
relation to the itinerant population on the State Sanitary Inspector at that level.681 The 
inspectors had to work out in a ten day period an all-embracing plan of sanitary measures 
to be implemented at the locations from where people were leaving, those where they 
were arriving and settling and in transit, to be confirmed in resolutions by regional and 
city soviets and those of the autonomous republics.  
  
The Health Commissariat set out the measures which to be incorporated into the plans. 
These included the careful medical examination and compulsory ‘sanitary processing’ of 
families in the places from which they were leaving and a second sanitary treatment of 
the whole itinerant population and their baggage in baths and disinfection chambers 
before they boarded special trains (eshelony). Evacuation posts near train stations, wharfs 
and population centres, were equipped with premises where the population on their 
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journey home could be housed temporarily, be fed and where they would be registered. 
They also were required to contain isolation wards, medical and quarantine premises and 
bathhouses with disinfection chambers for the treatment of re-evacuees on their arrival 
and departure. Some kind of ‘sanitary educational work’ was also to be conducted there 
among the departing population.  
  
Each of the trains had to be accompanied by medical personnel who would make checks 
en route, working together with the sanitary-control centres established at smaller train 
stations and localities en route. At these centres those suspected of carrying an infectious 
disease were to be hospitalised, the train wagons to be cleaned and, if deemed necessary, 
the whole trainload of passengers to be ‘processed’ again. At the final destinations, living 
premises had to be prepared before the arrival of the trains and provision made for the 
continuous operation of baths and disinfection chambers. Those arriving were to undergo 
another careful medical inspection and be unloaded a wagon at a time. Before settling in 
new accommodation a further sanitary treatment was obligatory, including the 
disinfection of people’s belongings. Incomers were to be kept under medical observation 
in their new premises for twenty five days, the time period for the incubation of 
typhus.682 
  
The population arriving in Leningrad, therefore, may well have already been through 
several obligatory inspections and disinfection treatments during their journey to the city 
at evacuation centres and sanitary control points along transport routes or in sanitary 
checkpoints around other cities. At the main railway junction of the city of Sverdlov in 
April 1944 up to 2,000 re-evacuees each spent about three hours being treated at the 
sanitary checkpoint on their arrival. Most were then stranded at the regional evacuation 
centre on the train station premises with other people in transit, for up to 13 days in 
unhealthy, filthy and overcrowded conditions while they waited for available transport.683 
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In addition, resolutions passed by the Leningrad City Soviet between 1944 and 1948 
coupled the measures advocated by the Commissariat for Health to clean up and contain 
the population on the move with the internal passport system governing settlement in the 
city. The local police were forbidden to give residence permits to anyone in these years 
until they had presented a certificate, a so-called ‘sanitary passport’, attesting that they 
had passed through sanitary observation or treatment upon their arrival to Leningrad, 
regardless of whether or not they had already undergone sanitary processing in their 
places of departure or on the journey.684 The staff of the Leningrad sanitary inspectorate 
began to organise the regular quarantine and sanitary processing of the incoming 
population.685 The annual reports of the Leningrad GSI from 1945 to 1948 contained 
detailed sections on its activities under headings such as ‘Sanitary control over the 
itinerant population’. These laid out how the inspectorate had ensured that those arriving 
underwent compulsory observation and treatment of their bodies, clothes and belongings 
at sanitary checkpoints or in polyclinics before they were settled in the city.686  
  
According to the inspectorate reports, re-evacuees and enlisted workers and trade school 
students, brought to the city in large organised trainloads particularly in 1945 and 1946, 
were kept in isolated premises on their arrival, until specially reserved places were made 
available for their treatment in the city’s sanitary checkpoints. Most of the trainloads 
were processed on the day of arrival but particularly large groups were kept in isolation 
over two or three days. Subordinate inspectorates in the city districts were charged with 
control over the quarantine and accommodation of these groups after their treatment. 
People arriving individually, rather than in organised groups, were required to undergo 
sanitary inspection in observation centres at polyclinics in Leningrad and those suspected 
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of carrying lice infestations or typhus were sent to sanitary checkpoints in the city for 
treatment.687 Only once they had undergone thorough inspection and treatment could 
incomers be integrated into the civic environment and community.  
  
In reality, for most of the four immediate postwar years, occurrences of typhus did not 
reach the levels feared. In the case of Leningrad, for example, cases of typhus per 10,000 
of the population fell from a peak of 43 in the severe blockade year of 1942 to roughly 9 
in 1946.688 Confirmed monthly cases of typhus did begin to increase rapidly in July 1947 
in the midst of famine conditions but levels began to drop again by December and 
reached ones similar to those of 1946 by February 1948.689 Incidents of other diseases 
such as dysentery were actually a much greater problem in terms of frequency, with over 
80 cases of dysentery per 10,000 of the population recorded in both 1946 and 1947.690 
Fatality rates from typhus infections, moreover, even during 1947 remained low.691 The 
authorities remained particularly anxious about the threat of a typhus epidemic, however, 
throughout this period. 
  
Filtzer argues that it was because of the “controls over human railway traffic” put in 
place from the early days of the war that epidemics in fact rarely occurred in the Soviet 
Union during and after the German invasion.692 Considering these controls in the light of 
Paul Weindling’s work on the development of ‘sanitary policing’ in Eastern Europe, 
however, suggests a rather different interpretation. According to Weindling, it was 
exaggerated fears about the spread of typhus that translated into practices of sanitary 
policing directed at unwanted inhabitants of a locale and itinerant populations. Fears of 
an epidemic spreading like wildfire legitimated international administrative responses of 
isolation, containment and cleansing that operated as elements of state systems designed 
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to control population movements, such as border points and passports.693 Delousing, 
disinfection and quarantine became routine in Europe during and after the First World 
War, such that “by the time of the Second World War migrants and deportees had 
become conditioned to expect the ordeal of delousing at border crossing, ports, railway 
junctions, and on entry to camps”.694 The work of other scholars corroborates the notion 
that sanitary controls and medical surveillance over migrants in Europe and the United 
States, which were introduced by some governments even before compulsory travel 
identity documents, have not functioned simply as anti-epidemic measures. Alison 
Bashford has referred to them as early practices designed to stake out borders on the 
ground and Amy Fairchild as means of initiating newcomers to ‘societal expectations’, in 
particular about industrial culture.695 
  
A. N. Marzeev referred to these widespread and “age-old” international practices in his 
article in the journal of the Soviet Ministry of Health as a justification for the conclusion 
that mass population movements played an incomparable role in the spread of the most 
dangerous infections.696  
  
Whether or not the sanitary controls targeted at populations on the move did contribute to 
the generally low rates of occurrence of typhus, what is interesting is that the regime 
chose to expend so many resources on isolating, treating and quarantining the itinerant 
population instead of adequately addressing the unsanitary living conditions that 
prevailed in many cities during and after the war and that posed a variety of health risks 
to the urban population.  
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The next section of the chapter will discuss how official measures to improve living 
conditions in the urban environment remained inadequate and erratic into the 1950s. 
People arriving in the city had to contend, just like those already living there, with a 
squalid urban environment lacking comprehensive sewerage systems and well-organised 
rubbish collection. They also had to contend with further rhetoric and measures that 
treated the displaced population entering Leningrad not only as an extra burden on 
infrastructure but as an inherent threat not just to the city’s health but also its ‘cultured’ 
appearance. The section explores how the sanitary practices and discourses directed not 
at the dirtiness of the urban environment but at that other ‘matter out of place’ - people 
arriving into the city and itinerant groups living at its margins - were closely intertwined 
with official practices to ‘protect’ the city from other kinds of ‘disorder’, to assert control 
over behaviour on the streets and to ‘cleanse’ the city of criminals.  
  
5.3 Cleansing the cityscape 
  
The re-evacuees, demobilised soldiers, enlisted workers, factory school students and 
people arriving on their own initiative into Leningrad in the immediate post-blockade 
years found themselves in an environment severely blighted by a breakdown in 
sanitation. The author of a letter posted from Leningrad to Tashkent, which came to the 
attention of the Military Censor in spring 1946, contrasted conditions he encountered in 
the city with those of pre-war years and depicted the post-war streetscape in the following 
way:  
  
The snow was cleaned up badly in winter – there is soot, dirt and construction 
debris everywhere and it even floats along Nevskii – with an uproar, dirty, 
stinking streams shoot out from under gates, in the houses the gutters don’t work 
and all the water flows onto the pavement, onto passers-by. The public is grey, 
dirty, nervous.697 
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Leningrad had possessed possibly the most developed sanitary infrastructure of any city 
in the Soviet Union before the war, however the severe conditions of the blockade had 
taken their toll. In the winter of 1941-2, for example, the water supply system had 
suffered significant damage and from 1945 it was necessary to construct it almost 
completely anew.698 The sewerage system had been incomplete even before the war, with 
sewage emptied into the river Neva and the city’s canals. After the war, the sewerage 
system in the city’s old districts had to be reconstructed, new networks built and wooden 
pipes replaced with concrete ones.699 
  
Transport available for clearing rubbish and cleaning the streets in the city fell 
dramatically during the war and did not recover quickly. In the first quarter of 1945, for 
example, only 41% of homes and 59% of dirty yards were cleaned of rubbish.700 The 
debris which was removed from damaged buildings in the course of reconstruction, 
moreover, was often collected at the expense of everyday household waste.701 
Spontaneous rubbish dumps sprang up in many yards at the back of the city’s houses and 
in urban wastelands created by the bombings and the break-up of buildings for 
firewood.702 In the first few months of 1945 the Sanitary Inspectorate recorded up to 100 
unauthorised dumps in the rubble of destroyed housing.703 Scrap-iron, construction 
debris, household waste and sewage, along with tram tickets, cigarette ends and scraps of 
paper littered the streets, waterways and backyards of Leningrad.704  
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Letters written to the editor of Leningradskaia Pravda once the blockade was lifted 
described the struggle with maintaining cleanliness at home when sewage was not 
removed, and there was no water to clean dirt from stairwells and yards.705 In addition, 
laundries in houses often did not function due to a lack of fuel and still only 25 public 
laundries existed in the city at the end of 1947, compared to over 160 before the war.706 
There were also fewer public baths and in order to wash at a bania or to give clothes in to 
be laundered, residents had to queue for several hours, in some cases half a day. Once 
inside the public baths, hot water and soap were provided intermittently and customers 
had to wait up to two months for the return of clean clothes from the laundries.707 The 
problems with fuel supply also meant that many people had to sleep in their clothes in 
order to keep warm.  
  
Officials of the Leningrad city Soviet noted in 1944 the presence of lice infestations in 
the city’s dirty, overcrowded hostels, where inhabitants had to sleep in their clothes, on 
hay or unclean linen.708 The following year the Anti-epidemic Commission of a district 
Soviet in central Leningrad recorded that unsanitary conditions in 11 of the district’s 
hostels had created an environment for the spread of infectious diseases, a number of the 
hostels were significantly lice-ridden and cases of typhus had recently broken out as a 
result in the hostel of the cadet school.709 A city Soviet resolution of February 1946 called 
for the necessity of improvements in cleaning Leningrad’s districts of rubbish and 
sewage, greater order in the work of public baths and laundries and overcoming the 
unsanitary conditions in houses, as measures to combat the spread of diseases.710  
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Several resolutions were carried out by the city Soviet in the course of 1945, as a result of 
material sent by the Sanitary Inspectorate, to reinforce the cleansing of the city.711 In 
August, for example, one such resolution resulted in 10 new trucks and extra drivers and 
petrol being provided for this purpose.712 The report concluded that despite these 
measures, however, at the end of 1945, as before, there remained a significant 
accumulation of sewage and rubbish in the city.713  
  
The main measure employed for addressing problems created by deficiencies in the urban 
sanitary infrastructure was the mobilisation of urban populations in mass biannual clean-
up campaigns.714 In well-publicised campaigns each March and April in Leningrad from 
1942 onwards, thousands of people and hundreds of vehicles were mobilised in the 
‘Sunday clean-ups’(voskresniki) of the city streets. As measures to improve conditions in 
the city, these clean-ups were inadequate. While they tended to result initially in 
significant drops in the number of unauthorised rubbish dumps and filthy yards, the 
reports of the Leningrad Sanitary Inspectorate for the immediate post-war years 
demonstrate how after the initial success of spring campaigns the problems would 
reappear. Streets, courtyards and cesspits again become fouled and waste carted to 
makeshift dumps, and this necessitated the often less successful autumn campaigns. By 
the end of every year dumps had reappeared and the proportion of yards whose territory 
was deemed dirty by the inspectors had increased once more.715  
  
The Sanitary Inspectorate’s report for 1946 noted, for example, that by the end of the first 
quarter of the year the proportion of dirty yards had reached 78% and the number of 
spontaneous dumps was 67.716 Resolutions by the city Soviet of March and April 1946 
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launched a spring cleaning campaign, involving 39,000 people, which reduced the 
proportion of dirty yards recorded to 5.5% and the number of unauthorised rubbish 
dumps to 22. The quantity of the latter continued to fall for the rest of the year, reaching 
15 but the percentage of filthy yards began to rise again, though only to 6.2% and 9.2% in 
the third and fourth quarters respectively.  
  
Piles of refuse continued to be a feature of streets and courtyards all across Leningrad 
throughout 1947 and 1948, however.717 By the end of 1947 there were still only 60 
vehicles available for sanitary transport, as opposed to 180 before the war, and these were 
in such bad condition that a third of them needed to be written off. Regular organised 
rubbish collection still occurred in only three districts of the city in 1948.718 According to 
the city Soviet, in the central Dzerzhinskii district in May 1947 almost a quarter of 532 
courtyards checked were littered with scrap-iron, construction debris and household 
waste and in over 30 houses the yards had been turned completely into rubbish dumps. It 
was not only the yards, moreover, but also a whole number of streets in the district which 
remained in a filthy state.719  
  
At the end of 1947 thousands of flats, furthermore, were still without water and a 
significant number of basements remained flooded with sewage.720 In addition, access to 
soap became even more difficult for the population when it was no longer given out by 
ration cards from the end of 1947.721 The arrival of hundreds of thousands of people into 
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the city annually in the first few post-siege years of course placed further strain on the 
strapped urban infrastructure. Immigrants to the city, in particular enlisted workers, 
students mobilised to trade schools and re-evacuees who had lost their pre-war housing, 
were often accommodated in premises completely unfit for habitation.  
  
A publicised ‘raid’ by employees of Leningradskaia Pravda in 1944 found new workers 
in the city living in dreadful conditions. In one hostel for new workers, for example, the 
lack of working toilets meant that for people living on the fourth or fifth floors it was 
necessary to use the neighbours’ toilet on the third floor, find one in another hostel or go 
into the yard where “it is possible to literally get stuck in the sewage”.722 Workers of a 
number of re-evacuated factories were settled in the factory workshops, in basements, in 
the ruins of buildings and, in the case of the Kirov factory, under the stands of the 
factory’s stadium.723 The sanitary situation was so poor in these temporary ‘hostels’, 
nicknamed ‘concentration camps’ by inhabitants, that the GSI insisted in 1946 that part of 
them be closed down and those living in them resettled.724   
  
The measures and rhetoric adopted by official bodies, however, treated the displaced 
population entering Leningrad not only as an extra burden on infrastructure but as an 
inherent threat to the city’s cleanliness, its orderly appearance, and its culture and purity 
more generally. The local authorities often framed the need to address the problem of the 
unsanitary cityscape in terms of the desirable aesthetics of the postwar urban 
environment, in particular the city centre, rather than the threat of disease. A letter to the 
editor that was printed in Leningradskaia Pravda in 1944, for example, described the 
disagreeable experience of life on the central Stremiannaia street: 
  
The July heat has begun. In all the houses the windows are open. But we, 
residents of house number nineteen on Stremiannaia ulitsa, are deprived of this 
possibility. For more than two weeks at our very windows…..there has been a 
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tram platform (littered) with filth and garbage. Flies swarm over this dump. A 
horrible stench spreads all around. We struggle for cleanliness and order in our 
beloved city. But here, in the very centre, dirt and unsanitary conditions are 
multiplying.725 
  
In resolutions about improving the appearance and infrastructure of Leningrad, the city 
Soviet discussed the removal of plywood from windows of houses on central streets, the 
repair and painting of railings and the washing of shop windows, together with the 
necessity of clearing rubbish from the city’s wastelands and dealing with dirt and 
disorder at markets.726 Items appeared in the local press about the need for improved 
cleanliness, order and ‘culturedness’, above all on display in the historic centre of the 
city. An article in Leningradskaia Pravda in September 1944, titled ‘On the culture of the 
city’, linked care for the cleanliness of the streets with the restoration of the beauty of the 
city’s buildings, which also entailed getting rid of dirty and ungrammatical posters 
displayed on houses and shops, in particular those with old slogans left over from the 
blockade.727  
  
In other issues of the newspaper the authorities made clear that the unpleasantness and 
untidiness of the urban environment, its streets, workplaces and domestic arenas, should 
be addressed by the demonstration of more civilised, cultured and hygienic behaviour by 
the population. A speech made by Georgii Malenkov in 1945 insisting that a “Soviet 
factory should be a breeding ground of cleanliness and order” was reiterated in 
Leningradskaia Pravda with the additional admonition that “enterprises and institutions 
must be hearths of culture”.728 The responsibility of residents for the health and 
appearance of domestic environment appeared, for example, in an article of 1944 under 
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the heading ‘Kazhdyi dvor v gorode dolzhen soderzhat’sia v poriadke’, in February 
1944.729  
  
Newcomers, who had yet to be fully integrated into urban culture, were depicted as 
particularly vulnerable to the corrupting influence of visible signs of untidiness, dirt and 
disorder in the city. Accounts in the press also discussed this type of disorder as an 
indicator of the uncultured behaviour of people who had yet to acquire the habits 
appropriate to the city.730  
  
A newspaper article of September 1944, for example, titled ‘Concern about the living 
arrangement and labour use of new workers’, admonished factory authorities about the 
dirty conditions in hostels and the breakdown of the water and sewage systems. The 
article framed its accusations not just in terms of the welfare of the new inhabitants, but 
also in terms of the need properly to educate workers who had been sent “from all ends of 
our motherland”.731 Care had to be shown towards the environment of these new workers 
so that they knew ‘their place’ in the workshop.732 The association of a dirty and untidy 
environment with the demonstration of appropriate habits and culture to newcomers can 
also be seen in an article of October 1945. This article purported to describe a textile 
factory, ‘through the eyes of a newcomer’, as: 
  
 … such a picture: in the centre of the factory yard, where the display case of the 
factory’s indicators stands, several bushes have been planted. On top of their 
branches has been thrown linen, some sort of rags. In the factory administration 
itself there are dirty staircases, corridors which have not been washed for a long 
time. In the office and in workshops an ungrammatically written slogan stands 
out vividly.733  
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The article later notes the workshops’ dustiness and a scrap heap found in one of them as 
further elements of what did not fit with the desired cleanliness, order and ‘cultured 
external appearance’. The article praises the newly arrived students from factory schools 
for not yet succumbing to the influence of the dirty surroundings and constantly washing 
the dust from their machines. At the same time it admonishes the factory’s directors to 
ensure that newcomers, not accustomed to industrial work and vulnerable to the influence 
of messy surroundings, are taught how to be neat and orderly from the very first day of 
their arrival. It expounds that now people are arriving at the factory who have not worked 
in the industry before:  
  
it is necessary to ensure that they do not see scattered everywhere – on the floor, 
on windowsills, on staircases – spools, reels, wisps of cotton, skeins of threads. 
It is necessary immediately to teach them not to hang out or strew their personal 
things over windows, higgledy-piggledy (gde popalo).734  
  
In September 1947 Leningradskaia Pravda, published a letter to the editor from a local 
resident, expressing concern about the lack of cleanliness and order on the city’s streets. 
The author of the letter, I. Pikin, protested that: 
  
After the war the composition of the population of Leningrad was significantly 
renewed. Many of the new arrivals have still not managed to acquire the skills 
which are demanded of inhabitants of a big city, have not cultivated in 
themselves a sense of discipline. They violate traffic regulations and throw 
cigarette ends, scraps of paper and wrappers from ‘Eskimo’ ice creams onto the 
pavement…..A scrap of paper dropped on the street  - that is a sign of a lack of 
culture (nekul’turnosti) and lack of respect for the city in which you live.735 
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In this complaint, Pikin wove together everyday encounters with piles of rubbish in the 
post-war urban environment, the fact of the mass replacement of the population in a 
narrative which associated newcomers to the city with the degradation of the spatial, 
normative and sanitary order.  
  
In other articles and letters the lack of sanitary order in urban spaces that betokened the 
potentially unruly and uncultured disposition of in-migrants shaded into other types of 
disorderly, offensive and even criminal behaviour. In March 1945 a letter was published 
from two servicemen and a war invalid complaining about the dirty appearance of the 
‘Kolizei’ cinema and the indecent behaviour of a group of adolescents who “swore and 
pestered visitors”.736 A letter printed later in the year associated the filthy conditions in a 
city marketplace with other social problems, such as crowding and bad behaviour. The 
author of this letter linked issues such as congestion at the market entrance, the dirt filling 
the market square and the ceaseless swearing and fighting of drunken hooligans, who 
gathered in a corner where vodka was sold, as examples of reigning disorder.737 
  
As we have seen, an article by the NKVD chief Shiktorov of July 1946 related the 
untidiness of its streets, yards and buildings to the violation of traffic regulations by new 
arrivals from the countryside and to more serious disorders and including drunken fights 
among inhabitants.738 In an earlier article of October 1945 article he had averred that, 
since the lifting of the siege, crime and social disorder had been on the rise as: 
  
The population size of the city has increased by 2.5-3 times. In August and 
September alone 200,000 people arrived in Leningrad. In the course of this year 
all the children who were in evacuation have returned. Those who have arrived 
have swiftly been taken into work and conscientiously labour for the 
reconstruction and further development of our industry, economy and culture. 
but among the large mass of those returning to Leningrad a certain number of 
unstable and criminal elements have seeped through. Particular individuals, not 
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occupied in socially useful labour, evade work under all sorts of pretexts. They 
prefer to engage in speculation, fraud and [the pursuit] of easy gains.739  
  
He gave some examples of the criminal activity of those who had ‘seeped’ through. The 
case of a man, for example, who met a woman “unknown to him” on the trolleybus and 
gave her his address and other personal information, only to return from work at a later 
date to find his flat broken into and his valuables stolen. The woman when arrested 
turned out to be a ‘tourer’ (gastrolersha), a thief without permanent residence in 
Leningrad and in possession of a pile of fictitious documents in several different 
surnames.740 In another case a woman with close ties to the criminal world permitted 
“shady people, who are not registered anywhere” to sleep at her apartment, where they 
engaged in “drunken orgies” and divided up stolen goods between them.741 What most 
outraged Leningraders, however, wrote the police chief, were the activities of the 
hooligans who were violating normal life, fighting and causing uproar on the city streets, 
in parks and in other public places. This included the felony committed by a drunken 
teenager who did not have any ‘fixed employment’ and had shot and wounded four 
people at a cinema on Nevskii prospekt, as well as people crossing the street in the wrong 
place, jumping onto the buffers of overcrowded trams and out of buses that were still in 
motion.742  
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The ‘lumping together’ of social ‘disorders’ such as litter on the streets and the improper 
use of transport with more serious public crimes suggests that the attention paid to the 
presence of deviant behaviour by migrants in the city was as a function of the assertion of 
power over the people and behaviour belonging on display in the city as much as, or 
more than, a response to a genuinely growing danger.  
  
Joan Neuberger, has discussed how the merging of public rowdiness, offensive pranks 
and horrendous crimes in published discussion about hooliganism transcends the specific 
crimes to focus on larger social, political and cultural issues.743 Attention to hooligan and 
disorderly behaviour in the popular press of late imperial Petersburg, she writes, was a 
product of attempts to demonstrate control over the culture of the street at a time of social 
transformation.744 In the local party newspaper of Leningrad in the post-blockade years, 
marketplaces and cinemas in the city centre, as well as trains and stations and the ‘streets’ 
more generally, recurred as sites of concern with respect to dirt, disorder and crime.745 
Members of Soviet social organisations (obshchestvennost’), Shiktorov affirmed in 
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October 1945, were participating in patrols around the city streets with the police to 
combat crime and hooliganism, helping to man posts at cinemas and also markets.746  
  
David Shearer has written in relation to the upheavals of the 1930s of how high Stalinist 
officials hated market places and railroad stations as sites of spontaneous, private trade, 
of the intermingling of the population, and of potential contamination by the presence of 
unchecked migrants.747 They feared the reality, moreover, was undermining Soviet 
propaganda heralding bustling markets and trains as part of the grand achievement of 
socialist modernity, of rapid movement forward and the state as provider.748 In the short 
story Finally at Home the heroes who were successfully integrating into postwar life at 
the factory and in the home were contrasted to:  
  
the usual crowd of ‘market loafers’, people without occupations and without an 
address, roaming from city to city, from one police department to another and 
who once more had appeared at train stations, markets, jetties, at the lit-up 
entrances to cinemas, in bars and cafes. There is that type of people in all cities, 
and you are always astounded at where they have all come from.749 
  
At the end of the war, cinemas were particularly emphasised by the authorities as part of 
their efforts to define who had a place in core sites of the city and the conduct expected 
there. On the 9th July 1945 the Leningrad city Soviet passed a resolution declaring the 
need to combat ‘hooliganism’ among ‘déclassé elements’ visiting cinemas and in the 
previous year it had laid out the behaviour expected of children at cinemas and other 
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‘spectacles’.750 Cinemas were also among the symbols of socialist modernity. In addition, 
they were places where other achievements were to be on display. The targeting of 
cinemas in the wake of the war for manifestations of disorderly behaviour was perhaps 
related to the culmination of the transformation of the ‘model Soviet citizen’ into a 
passive spectator.751  
  
To what extent, though, was rising crime as a whole actually menacing the city in the 
years? An article printed in 2002 in the journal of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the 
Russian Federation that was based largely on pronouncements made by Shiktorov in the 
NKVD journal Post Revoliutsii at the end of the war, has described the post-siege city in 
the following way:  
  
Postwar Leningrad was gloomy and dangerous. Ruins of buildings, destroyed in 
strikes by bombs and shells; empty embrasures of pill-boxes and military 
emplacements not yet taken down; broken-up roadways. The shine of the 
military decorations of demobilised soldiers and officers – and hundreds of 
horribly crippled frontoviki, becoming drunkards from hopelessness. Ration 
cards, spontaneously appearing flea markets, speculators, packs of homeless 
children, “hot” (palenaia) vodka, some prototype of today’s game of “thimble” 
(naperstok), “roulette”...And an outburst of hooligans and criminals unseen since 
the legendary times of Len’ka Pateleev…The city was terrorised by…gangs, in 
whose wake stretched a bloody trail of armed raids on flats, shops, warehouses. 
Large-scale dens of thieves flourished. Distinct zones appeared in the city, where 
the police were forbidden to tread…during the warm months of the year, 
criminals (blatnye) lived in burial vaults in the cemeteries and when, in the 
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daytime, sounds of shots carried over from cemetery territory, passers-by were 
not particularly worried, guessing that this was the “blatata” amusing 
themselves by knocking off the noses and wings of marble angels with 
bullets”.752            
  
Some scholarly accounts have given a similar, if slightly less colourful, impression. 
Aleksandr Vakser, for example, describes the increase in criminal activity across the city 
in the reconstruction years in the following terms:  
  
Criminals – alone or in gangs, acted in all districts of the city. Robberies of 
depots of foodstuffs and manufactured goods, of shops (and) flats, armed attacks 
on the streets, in yards (and) entranceways, followed one after the other.753 
  
V. A. Ivanov of the St Petersburg University of Economics and Finance has written in his 
treatment of the operations of the local security organs in 1946 that postwar Leningrad 
became a “different city”, one imprinted with “moral devastation”.754 Do the figures on 
the number of crimes committed in these years support these assertions? Figures on crime 
rates are highly problematic. Elena Zubkova, for example, points out that statistical 
accounts of crime in the Soviet Union in the postwar years were incomplete and 
contradictory and included different categories of crime depending on the source.755 Data 
on registered crimes in the city can be used as a rough indicator, however, of the extent to 
which actions defined as criminal by the authorities increased in the immediate postwar 
period. 
  
A review of the work of the Leningrad police in 1944, sent to the Chairman of the City 
Soviet by the Chief of the City and Regional NKVD at the start of 1945, reported growth 
in crime in the city taking place from the second quarter of 1944.756 In the course of 1944 
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a total of 12,374 crimes were registered by police organs and the city’s NKVD 
administration, as opposed to 10,573 in 1943, according to the research of V. A. 
Ivanov.757 In the special monthly summary on crime in the city of Leningrad produced by 
the local NKVD for the City Soviet for December 1944, the number of registered crimes 
was reported as 1226.758 The summaries for the first 6 months of 1945 documented 
similar levels of registered crime in the city of just under 1000 to about 1350 cases per 
month.759 The number of felonies registered increased in the final quarter of 1945 and in 
January of 1946 the number recorded was 1917, over double that of the same month in 
1945.760  Levels of recorded crime remained at about the same level until the final quarter 
of 1946 when they went up once more.761 Monthly NKVD summaries for March and 
April 1947 give totals for registered crime in the city comparable to those of early 1946, 
with 1769 cases reported for March and 1841 for April.762 Reports for subsequent months 
indicate a progressive fall in the numbers to under 1000 in June and to 502 in November 
1947.763  
  
The fall in the level of crime from the spring of 1947 can be partly ascribed to changes in 
the categories of crime considered in the summaries. After April the monthly reports to 
the city Soviet did not include the total number of registered crimes and instead recorded 
the sum of ‘general criminal phenomena’, which included crimes such as theft, murder, 
robbery and hooliganism, but not economic offences like embezzlement, swindling, 
speculation and bribery. Nevertheless the figures do seem to point to a brief jump in the 
numbers of crimes reported that began in 1944, tailed off and resumed again in the course 
of 1946, and then subsided significantly in the middle of 1947.  
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The data accord with the pattern in postwar crime figures for the Soviet Union as a whole 
that has been elaborated in the the work of both Jeffrey Burds and Elena Zubkova. They 
have demonstrated that in the Soviet Union as a whole there were slightly higher levels of 
crimes registered and people sentenced in 1946 and 1947 than in the war years.764 This 
low level increase, however, transpired within the context of an overall decrease in crime 
from 1940 to 1954. Data indicate, for example, that recorded crime in these two years 
was substantially higher than in 1948 but “was on the whole significantly lower then the 
prewar rate”.765 
  
The majority of criminal offences registered in the years following the end of the 
blockade, according to the available statistics, were not public or aggressive crimes but 
petty and domestic thefts, particularly of items such as linen and food from people’s flats. 
The local NKVD review of the work of the Leningrad police during 1944 observed that 
the growth in the number of crimes registered during that year occurred primarily in the 
category of thefts.766 This crime of theft constituted, on average, 60-70% of all registered 
criminal offences throughout the postwar decade, including the period 1945-1947.767  
  
There are a number of possible ways to account for the growth that did occur in reported 
crime at the end of the blockade. Firstly, as we have seen, many of the people who were 
returning to the city at this time arrived to find that their belongings had been stolen or 
destroyed during the siege. Even the author of the 2002 article from the journal of the 
Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs stated that the growth in crime from early 1944 could 
be explained primarily on account of citizens returning to the city, discovering that their 
property had been stolen and submitting statements to the police organs about these 
thefts, which had actually been committed in 1941-1943 but not been registered by 
anyone at the time. During the war and blockade, weakened city dwellers and 
overwhelmed officials may have also been unable or unwilling to record other criminal 
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incidents as they occurred during the war and blockade. The crime rates of the siege years 
are probably a distorted benchmark against which to assess postwar trends.  
  
The high figures for 1946 and early 1947 in comparison with immediately proceeding 
years may also be connected with the postwar famine. The famine, as we have seen, 
impacted on the population of Leningrad, although conditions did not come close to the 
hunger and starvation of the blockade years in the city or to those prevailing in rural areas 
after the war. Nevertheless the poverty in which many people were living may have 
prompted them to respond in the same way as Rodion Nakhapetov, who has written of 
the post-war famine conditions as so difficult that he was taught at five years old to go 
out and steal in order to feed his grandmother.768  
  
The number of thefts registered as criminal offences could also be connected to the 
changes in the laws on theft adopted in 1940 and then again in 1946 and 1947. The law of 
1940 set a new minimum punishment for petty theft from factories at one year.769 The 
subsequent laws of 1946 and 1947 increased penalties for the theft of state property, in 
some cases to as high as 15 years imprisonment.770 The increased severity of laws on 
theft may have translated into an increase in incidents deemed to constitute criminal cases 
of theft, although Solomon maintains that the 1940 law on theft from factories was often 
not enforced in practice and the issuing of the June 1947 theft law coincides with a fall in 
the level of reported crime in the city of Leningrad.771 The 1940 law that penalised petty 
theft at factories had also reinforced the edict that made labour fractions such as truancy 
and quitting a criminal offence and set a minimum of one year imprisonment for 
hooliganism. These may also have been enforced more stringently in the famine and 
reconstruction years than during the war.772  
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Whatever the cause of the brief rise in crime rates after the war in the context of an 
overall downward trend, it is possible to conclude that the regime translated exaggerated 
fears about the growth in criminality into representations of incomers that acted as 
“theatres for dialogues” on social, cultural and moral concerns.773 They also linked these 
fears into judicial and extra-judicial practices to monitor, fix or remove ‘suspect’ itinerant 
populations. 
  
The article by NKVD chief Shiktorov from October 1945 was published in connection 
with a city Soviet resolution to ‘combat social disorder’ which also made a connection 
between the character of incomers and growth in crime and violations of order.774 The 
resolution and accompanying article made clear that an important measure to counter 
rises in criminal and disorderly activities should be the education of new arrivals, 
especially young people, in the ‘disciplined’ habits required of people using the streets of 
the city. The main instrument in the fight against social disorder, however, was the 
strengthening of the passport regime to remove those who did not belong in the civic 
community from the space of the city altogether. Unfortunately, Shiktorov noted in his 
newspaper piece, in many enterprises and houses at the moment employees were 
neglecting their duties to check up on new arrivals and were even helping ‘shady people’ 
find work or somewhere to live. The passport system must be reinforced, he underlined, 
to facilitate the “organised cleansing of our city from thieves, hooligans, parasites and 
other people who do not have a place in Leningrad”.775  
  
Passport sweeps that targeted people moving into the city without official sanction not 
just for their breach of the passport regulations but for harbouring in their midst an 
incorrigible “criminal element” were extensively used in prewar years and continued 
during the war and immediate postwar period, along with the ‘filtration’ of people 
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arriving on trains.776 The head of the local NKVD noted in his reports to the city Soviet 
not only the numbers of people discovered every month living in Leningrad or arriving 
there without valid passports or residence permits, but also the numbers of ‘labour 
deserters’ and people categorised as ‘criminal’ among their number.777 Police reports 
from the first few post-siege years also highlighted the proportion of people bracketed 
together under the classification ‘without fixed occupations or places of residence or 
déclassé elements’ who were among the total number of people convicted of criminal 
activities.778 These amorphous categories incorporated a variety of people judged to be 
without stable ties or legal means of existence within Leningrad, including people 
entering the city without all the correct documents, as well as tramps, beggars and 
deserters from the army and from industrial enterprises and runaways from trade 
schools.779 In this way, not only was displacement without official authorisation itself 
criminalised, therefore, but large numbers of criminals were defined in official records as 
people who were no longer ‘fixed’ spatially or socially.  
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Following the 1945 resolution on combating growing crime and social disorder in the city 
that called for increased vigilance by employees at factories and housing blocks 
responsible for scrutinising the documents of newcomers, the police authorities 
periodically stepped up their own activities to bolster the passport system as a crime-
prevention measure.  
  
The scattered data available point to the fact that in February 1946 and throughout 1947 
many more people in breach of the passport regime were summarily exiled from the city 
than had been in December 1944 and the first half of 1945. While in the earlier period 
several hundred people living in Leningrad in transgression of the residency system had 
been sent immediately out of the city by the police each month, in February 1946 and for 
most of 1947 the number was several thousand.780 In April 1947, for example, 4076 
people caught up in passport sweeps were ejected straight away from Leningrad, 
compared to 205 in the same month of 1945.781 The MVD report on criminal activity in 
the city in November 1947 contained data showing that officers had patrolled 14,306 
locations, including houses, bars, buffets and markets, to find people who had illegally 
entered the city, almost double the number of places visited every month between 
December 1944 and June 1945.782 Almost 2,000 of the people discovered without valid 
documentation were exiled immediately in this month, even though incidents of criminal 
activity had become much fewer and far between. According to comments by Shiktorov 
in the November 1947 report, recorded crime in that month was under half what it had 
been in the same month of the preceding year.783  
  
In addition, when the rates of occurrence of typhus in Leningrad began to increase in 
mid-1947, the response of the authorities was to tie in anti-epidemic procedures with the 
policing of the passport regime. Decrees issued by the city’s Extraordinary Anti-
Epidemic Committee in August 1947 called upon the local police to strengthen the 
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passport regime as an anti-epidemic procedure.784 The peak period for recorded arrivals 
of people into the post-siege city, often in trainloads organised by organs responsible for 
the distribution of the labour force, was over by this point. The police, nevertheless, were 
required to take steps to improve the timely registration of new arrivals to the city and 
provisions for their sanitary treatment prior to settling in any accommodation.785 The 
August decrees stipulated, furthermore, that practices to prevent the spread of typhus 
should also be linked to the punitive and exclusionary facets of the enforcement of the 
passport system. The struggle to combat the growth of disease in the city was to be 
closely bound to the ‘struggle’ more generally to combat, if necessary by removing or 
even bringing criminal charges, people leading a “vagrant form of life”.786    
  
It should be noted that the displaced population had not been merely a passive object of 
state intervention and discipline. Official measures aimed at the bodies of the itinerant 
population could be avoided or challenged and people adopted a variety of responses to 
the imposed sanitary conditioning. Accounts of arrival in Leningrad which deal with 
sanitary treatment have proved hard to find. However evidence regarding sanitary 
processing during the evacuation from the city suggest a range of reactions. One evacuee 
from Leningrad describes the experience thus: “the bath for the evacuated was an event 
which cannot be scorned. It allowed one to be cleansed not only from dirt but from black 
thoughts”.787 An interviewee in the blockade project, however, recalled how the journey 
into evacuation was particularly unpleasant because of the periodic sanitary stops, when 
the train suddenly halted and passengers were ordered to split up into men and women to 
undergo “all these things”.788 Another interview respondent remembered how it was 
possible to refuse to undergo the sanitary treatment. On arrival in evacuation her mother, 
she recalled, would not have anything to do with the disinfection, baths and head shaving, 
and they were left with their hair to deal with any lice themselves.789 People who came to 
Leningrad on their own initiative, regardless of the strict legal restrictions on settlement 
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in the city, by evading the residency controls were also able to avoid the accompanying 
sanitary measures.  
  
Those who circumvented the passport system and arrived in Leningrad without residence 
permits, however, were among those targeted in the anti-epidemic measures implemented 
by the Extraordinary Anti-Epidemic Commission in August 1947. The measures were 
aimed above all at unaccompanied children and people without fixed employment or 
registration at a place of residence, as categories posing the main danger to the health of 
the city’s existing population.790 At the city’s marketplaces, police stationed at special 
sanitary posts, sometimes accompanied by medical personnel of mobile anti-epidemic 
brigades, detained beggars, waifs and other people deemed by these officials to be 
“slovenly” or “dangerous for the spread of typhus” and sent them for treatment at sanitary 
checkpoints on a daily basis.791 
  
Other sanitary measures which were emphasised at this time focussed on the territory of 
the city’s train stations. This involved work to repair the infrastructure and improve the 
appearance of stations, including the provision of station toilets connected to the 
sewerage system and competitions for the station in the best sanitary condition.792 In 
addition to improving the cleanliness of the environment of stations, these measures 
charged the Ministry for State Security (MGB) guard on the Leningrad railway with 
systematically checking and ‘cleansing’ stations and train depots of unaccompanied 
children, homeless people, beggars, people without documents or train tickets and anyone 
breaking the station rules and causing disorder.793 These groups had to be detained, 
removed from the station premises and subsequently sent for sanitary processing and 
disinfection. On the trains themselves, medical workers were deployed daily to make 
checks of passengers travelling towards Leningrad and conductors were exhorted to lead 
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the anti-epidemic struggle against those without tickets, waifs, ‘touring’ elements 
(gastroliruiushchego) and ‘baggers’ (meshochniki).794  
  
At the end of 1947 the police were sending several thousand people each week for 
sanitary treatment who had been rounded up in these patrols as ‘homeless’, ‘in violation 
of the passport regime’, ‘disorderly’, or ‘dangerous’,. Following the sanitary screening 
and disinfection of these groups, the authorities ‘sorted’ them according to the level of 
harm they posed to the city. In December 1947 and the first few months of 1948 tens of 
people were sent after sanitary ‘processing’ to criminal courts every week where they 
were sentenced for passport violations, the police exiled several hundred more 
individuals, and several hundred received fines.795  
  
The measures were maintained and bolstered in the first quarter of 1948, even as 
occurrences of typhus were dropping. Interestingly, the Extraordinary Anti-Epidemic 
Commission made note of only one recorded case of the illness being spread by a 
homeless person in December 1947. The ‘homeless’ person singled out as the source of 
infection was N. Tarasova, a woman who had been given work and accommodation by a 
vegetable processing plant in the city but who was an ‘illegal’ settler, without a passport 
or resident permit and, it was noted, was also wanted by the police for theft.796  
  
The practical and symbolic linkage of responses to a feared typhus epidemic with a battle 
with other types of ‘contaminating’ behaviour borne by itinerant groups resonates with 
Weindling’s comments about European ‘demonology’ of refugees from countries to the 
east in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Typhus control and eradication 
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measures, he writes, constituted a medical discourse on the “barbaric threats” to 
European civilisation and the integrity of European nations from the margins.797  
  
Tomas Balkelis has written in a similar vein about the quarantine facilities established by 
the German military authorities in Lithuania at the end of the First World War.798 The 
purpose of these facilities was to filter out from the ranks of refugees from Soviet Russia 
those believed to pose a political threat to the regime, above all Bolshevik spies, as well 
as to prevent the potential danger of epidemic disease. At one of the quarantine centres, 
refugees were forced through something like a sauna, cleaned and scrubbed, after which 
they were subject to political screening by a Commission of Refugee Control. This 
screening entailed the verification of identity documents and checks on personal 
belongings for signs of civil and political loyalty. Once they had been washed and 
screened, the refugees were permitted to travel onwards but had their movements 
restricted to certain districts. At the same time, negative articles in the press vilified 
refugees as the bringers of epidemic diseases such as cholera and typhus, the source of 
the “dangerous misfortune of our nation”.799 
  
At the end of the Second World War the victorious powers conducted epidemic 
prevention procedures on millions of refugees and people on the move as part of an 
imposition of control and surveillance across the territory of Europe.800 Allied policy was 
to “collect and incarcerate” people labelled displaced persons (DPs) in special camps, 
where they were registered and classified in advance of their ‘re-placement’ through 
repatriation.801 A priority of the camps was the medical inspection of the DPs and their 
‘delousing’ as well as the prevention of crime and acts of retribution.802 According to 
Weindling, from April 1945 the occupying authorities also “imposed a strict cordon 
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sanitaire along the Rhine” and DDT dusting to combat lice and other parasites was 
stringently applied at all allied crossing points.803  
  
The linking of sanitary controls with policing and the passport regime as part of both the 
integration and exclusion of people from the urban community also, though, drew on 
specific prewar Soviet practices. Weindling points out that in Germany the modernist 
European state ethos, which incorporated the regulation of the cleanliness of social space 
and containment of the flow of populations, became intertwined in Germany with a Nazi 
ideology of racial purification.804 The Soviet Union, as the work of Amir Weiner has 
shown, was engaged in its own quest for purity.  
  
In the Soviet state, according to Weiner, the modernist European ethos of social 
engineering combined with a Bolshevik Marxist eschatology in a revolutionary campaign 
to transform society into a beautiful, pure and harmonious body.805 This campaign 
entailed the excision of those who did not belong in the cleansing operations of the 
purges, alongside practices to transform individuals and society into an ideal image. In 
this ‘purification’ process, groups and individuals perceived to be hostile to the 
harmonious social body were continuously referred to in biological-hygienic terms, as 
vermin, pollution or filth.806 The entire society was mobilised in both the punitive and 
welfare facets of the road to purity and harmony, through denunciations and also in 
ordinary daily practices of hygienic and ‘moral’ behaviour. Weiner writes that, “each and 
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every member of the Soviet polity was expected to be an active agent in the purification 
of himself and his surroundings”.807  
  
As the Bolshevik regime confronted the major disorders resulting from their policies of 
the late 1920s and early 1930s, above all the upheavals of the collectivisation and 
industrialisation campaigns, fears about the contamination of the body social increasingly 
began to focus on the population arriving into urban areas. Attempts were made to 
transform the newly arrived population into the loyal and cultured urban workers desired 
by the regime. A major facet of the campaign to inculcate cultured-ness (‘kul’turnost’’) 
was the attempt to impose norms of hygiene in the new workers’ barracks, which were 
seen as repositories of filth and deviance, offensive smells and coarse speech. The 
civilising of the barrack space was intended to be instrumental in changing people’s 
habits of cleanliness and, in turn, their attitudes and manners, producing, in this way, 
public order.808 Neat and clean curtains, lampshades and tablecloths in the barracks were 
intended both to transform the uncultured people and to function as symbols 
demonstrating their ability to live in accordance with the norms of kul’turnost’.809 This 
was, Volkov claims, reminiscent of Foucault’s ideas about the creation of disciplinary 
space, in which “each individual has its own place”.810  
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The mass of people entering into the urban areas, new workplaces and barracks had to be 
inspected for signs of dirt and disease and cleaned before being ‘placed’ in them. In the 
Ukrainian industrial region of the Donbass before the Second World War, the Soviet 
authorities had developed medical-provisioning centres for migrant workers from the 
Tsarist era into a network of large sanitary-observation centres. These centres conducted 
sanitary inspections, treatments and sometimes quarantine of newly arrived and seasonal 
workers before they could be assigned to urban accommodation.811 Earlier, ‘sanitary 
control centres’ had also been set up towards the end of the civil war in Petrograd to 
disinfect passengers coming into the city who, it was feared, were the source of an 
outbreak of typhus. Their belongings were also disinfected and each was given a towel 
and soap before they could enter the Bolshevik-controlled civic territory.812   
  
In the 1930s, the language of ‘hygiene’ and ‘danger’ also informed the implementation of 
the passport system as police began to use the passport system to ‘quarantine’ and 
‘cleanse’ urban areas from marginals believed to be the cause of crime and disorder.813 
David Shearer, for example, has discusses how, by the mid-1930s, both the civil and 
political police were using passport sweeps in cities as a primary way to bring in tens of 
thousands of people who fit the profile of the ‘socially harmful’. Increasingly, this meant 
not just ‘class aliens’ but social ‘marginals’ more broadly, conflating criminals and 
associates of criminals with itinerants, the unemployed, beggars, prostitutes, persons 
caught repeatedly without proper residence permits or returning to places where they 
were forbidden to live, and children over twelve caught in a criminal act. Some of those 
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picked up would be charged with crimes such as speculation or convicted of passport 
violations and others expelled from the city.814 During ‘mass operations’ conducted in 
1937 and 1938, in addition, special police boards continually sentenced ‘harmfuls’ to five 
years of exile or camp sentences.815 
  
Shearer underscores that the police conceived passport sweeps as a means of ‘cleansing’ 
urban streets from ‘social trash’ and points to several instances when documents 
produced by police officials associated the sweeps with measures for public hygiene.816 
In 1932, for example, as the passport system was being introduced, a police report 
referred to the presence of socially marginal people as “filth or dirt (zagriaznenie) on the 
face of our cities”.817 On the very next page the report urged local police to lead the fight 
for public hygiene by literally clearing rubbish from the streets.  
  
Postwar anti-epidemic measures, therefore, built on methods used in the past in attempts 
to ensure that those permitted to settle in towns were appropriately clean and not carrying 
infection before they could come into contact with the urban environment, and that they 
demonstrated appropriate ‘cultured’ behaviour. They also intertwined with practices 
continued from the prewar period which entailed rounding-up, detaining, processing and 
sometimes excising people who did not belong in the cityscape. The expression of 
concerns about the effect of the incoming population after the end of the blockade on the 
sanitary, normative and cultural order of the city, however, also had distinctive local and 
postwar dimensions and served the construction of visions of people’s place in the 
national and civic ‘family’ once the war and siege were over.  
  
 
 
                                                  
814
 Shearer, ‘Elements near and Alien’, pp.847, 851 and 875. 
815
 Hagenloh, ‘Socially Harmful Elements’, p.301. 
816
 Shearer, ‘Elements near and Alien’, p.850. 
817
 Ibid: Shearer also mentions in this part of the article that police and health officials in a circular of 1933 
jointly ascribed the spread of epidemic diseases such as typhus to ‘mobile’ groups in the population, in 
particular nomads, wanderers, orphans. 
 228
5.4 Repopulating a purified space  
  
The rhetoric and practices constructing displaced populations in post-siege Leningrad as 
potential ‘contaminants’ must be understood not just in terms of the imbrication of 
measures to combat crime and disease with the integration or excision of incoming 
populations. They also formed part of efforts by the Soviet state to impose a particular 
normative, social and cultural order upon postwar urban landscapes and the Soviet 
‘homeland’.818  
  
Roger Argenbright has noted in his study of the wartime evacuation in the Soviet Union, 
based on arguments by the geographer David Sack, that attempts to govern “‘in/out-of-
place’ relationships” are linked to the ability to control spatial interactions and also to 
impose specific meanings on a place.819 The Stalinist state in the postwar period was 
engaged in reconstituting a Soviet homeland that had been purified spatially and 
demographically.820 The Stalinist regime which, in the words of Boris Groys, pursued 
complete “dominion over signs” and total victory in the “symbolic occupation of space”, 
acted quickly to demonstrate its control over Soviet territory and the ascription of 
meanings to Soviet landscapes at the end of the war.821 Gatrell and Baron, for example, 
have written of the Stalinist state’s reconstitution of the Soviet ‘home’ after the war in 
practical and symbolic ways, for example in the staging of a car rally in 1947 that staked 
out and reclaimed territories formerly occupied by the Nazis and extended to the newly 
incorporated Baltic republics before passing through Leningrad and returning to the 
centre of power in Moscow. Earlier mass cross-country runs in liberated territories had 
similarly celebrated the vitality of the Soviet motherland and the reoccupation of Soviet 
space that had been purified and cleansed from the Nazis.822  
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On the level of the Leningrad cityscape, the Soviet government made efforts to impose its 
authority over the way in which the emptied city spaces filled with objects and 
significance, as well as people, through the management of the reconstruction process. 
While the repair of the city’s destroyed housing and sanitary infrastructure progressed 
slowly after the war, the restoration of façades, monuments and parks in the city centre 
had begun before the war even ended.823 Articles appeared regularly in the local press 
celebrating the number of façades that had been repaired and painted and the number of 
trees that had been planted.824 
  
The rapid return of the city to the ‘neoclassical grandeur’ of its prewar appearance, 
Kirschenbaum points out, suited the Stalinist preference for classical forms that embodied 
the power of the harmonious, rational, hierarchical and centralised state.825 Repairs to the 
exteriors of the city’s high profile buildings, public monuments and open spaces also 
signified the rapid overcoming of the disarray of the war and a return to “order”.826 
Society was resuming its prewar march but, having been through the experience of the 
war, was even closer to a harmonious, pure and civilised communist polity.827 The 
ongoing drive of the regime to mould a healthier, more cultured and “more aesthetic 
society” had, according to Amir Weiner, became even more urgent after the victorious 
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outcome of the war.828 The appearance of the city, just as the Soviet system itself, was 
not to be fundamentally altered by the experience of war, but as the author of one article 
put it, made “even more beautiful…even more splendid and even more monumental”.829 
This also accorded with the desires of local planners and also some among the population 
to manifest the renewal of the city following its sufferings in the reconstruction of its 
monuments and facades.830  
  
Both the central and local authorities were engaged at the end of the war in the 
delineation of the social and geographic place of several new categories of people created 
by the war in this purified Soviet ‘home’ and a renewed normative order. Several of these 
population groups were among those who featured prominently in the authorities’ 
rhetoric of social disorder at the end of the war. They included the war veterans, above all 
those who were now classed as invalids, and also teenage labour reserve students, who 
had begun to appear in the postwar Soviet landscape.  
  
There have been two memorable portrayals of postwar criminals filmed in the Soviet 
Union and Russian Federation in the last thirty or so years: the elusive ‘Black cat gang’ 
of adolescent robbers that terrorises postwar Moscow in the 1979 television series ‘The 
Meeting Place Cannot Be Changed’ (Mesto Vstrechi Izmenit’ Nel’zia) and the travelling 
thief and con-man who identifies himself as a war veteran in Pavel Chukhrai’s 1997 film 
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‘The Thief’ (Vor). These fictional criminals reflect contemporary descriptions of various 
felons who gained notoriety in the Soviet press of the immediate postwar years. 
  
In April 1946 Leningradskaia Pravda printed a lengthy article about the arrival in the city 
and subsequent behaviour of two “swindlers”.831 These petty con-men were posing as 
demobilised soldiers, possessed forms attesting to a host of decorations and awards for 
bravery received during the war and wore proof of their heroic feats in the shape of the 
rows of ribbons on their soldier’s blouses. Impressed by the list of medals and the 
presence of a hero in their midst, employees at the city Soviet’s trade department found a 
place for one of these characters, Aleksandr Mukhin, as the head of one of its district 
branches. The other, Igor’ Galchenkov, presented attestations about his heroism and his 
talent for drawing to the Academy of Arts, where he was taken on as a student in the 
painting faculty. Both received rooms in the city immediately, without having to be 
placed on a waiting list. One, the article continued, even managed to obtain a large war 
invalid’s pension.  
  
Once they had been assigned their workplaces, according to the article, Mukhin spent his 
time helping himself to beer and other goods from the stalls in his charge while 
Galchenkov systematically removed paintings, lithographs and even sheets and 
pillowcases from the academy. Both engaged in petty theft from the people they 
encountered. The instructors at the academy of arts gradually began to investigate their 
student more carefully, the article stated, while Mukhin, despite the lack of any 
documents confirming any of the details listed in his form, “held on firmly to his 
place”.832 It was left to the city’s criminal investigation organs to establish without any 
real difficulty that they were both ‘rogues’ and impostors, self-styled heroes whose past 
‘deeds’ consisted not of heroics but of hooliganism and rough and ready forgery. One had 
to be surprised, the article concluded, at the willingness of state employees to succumb to 
the hypnosis of glory. Heroes of the war, crowned with government laurels, had earned 
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the esteem of the people. The greater the respect, however, the higher a title, the more 
careful one must be about casual, unknown pretenders to glory.  
  
Sheila Fitzpatrick has written of the flourishing of this kind of “entitlement imposture” 
after the war.833 Identity documents and records had been lost or destroyed during the 
war, while at the same time new forms of status and attendant privileges had been forged. 
As before the war, members of a mobile population could attempt to refashion 
themselves with each move.834 Secondary accounts of postwar tricksters, including that 
by Fitzpatrick, usually refer to the case of Borukhovich Vaisman, a thief who turned to 
swindling in 1946 after he lost both legs and a hand to frostbite during an unsuccessful 
escape attempt from a labour camp.835 Vaisman, like the Leningrad con-men, obtained an 
attestation about his status as a Hero of the Soviet Union and decorated his jacket with 
orders and medals and represented himself as a wounded war hero. His targets were 
rather more highly placed, however, and he managed to obtain all sorts of goods, services 
and gifts, from top Soviet administrators. He received tens of thousands of rubles, many 
items of clothing and even some high quality artificial limbs.  
  
The tone of the intelligence reports on Vaisman, Fitzpatrick notes, is not strongly 
judgemental and show something of an appreciation of the trickster’s skills.836 This was 
also characteristic of prewar newspaper reports on swindlers as well as the novels by Ilf 
and Petrov featuring the conman Ostap Bender. The Leningradskaia Pravda article on 
the two postwar impostors similarly reserve more judgement for the softheaded officials 
who fell for the scams than for the pair themselves. This was perhaps because these 
‘rogues’, although committing petty offences, were also performing impeccable postwar 
Soviet identities, confirming the hierarchical order in which decorated veterans returning 
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to work and study were particularly privileged.837 The discussion of their behaviour 
served as a theatre for reiterating this order, while also calling for greater vigilance on the 
part of those responsible for upholding it. 
  
Local police reports from Leningrad in the post-siege years expressed graver concern 
about other crimes committed by war invalids at the time, despite their fairly small share 
as a category of all those who had been convicted of offences.838 In a memo of March 
1945 to the chairman of the city Soviet, for example, the NKVD chief wrote of his 
disquiet about war invalids engaged in crime, specifically about invalids who were 
travelling to other cities at this time under false pretences and were exploiting their 
privileged freedom of movement to speculate in deficit goods. One roving war invalid, 
the head of police noted, had received permits to travel from the Leningrad Soviet on 
false pretexts on four occasions between May 1944 and January 1945.839 Another had 
been issued a permit to make the journey to the town of Iaroslavl’ to attend his wife’s 
funeral but instead was found to be illegally transporting and reselling large amounts of 
foodstuffs.840   
  
The newspaper account of increased crime and social disorder also emphasised the 
unacceptability of disruptions to social order on the streets by war invalids. Mark Edele 
has discussed a “subculture” of beggars, vagrants and small-time con-men in the postwar 
and famine years who lived at train stations, travelled from town to town, begged, stole 
                                                  
837
 Alexopoulos, ‘Portrait of a Con Artist’, p.790 on self-fashioning by a Soviet con-man that embraced 
many of the features of the Stalinist order, while also being subversive of it. 
838
 Police reports and correspondence from the initial post-blockade years made particular note of the 
proportion of war invalids among the total number of people convicted for criminal offences. Govorov 
notes that while the participation in criminal activity by war invalids in Leningrad in the first postwar years 
aroused serious concern among the authorities, “at the same time it must be admitted that the number of 
war invalids engaged in criminal activity was very small”, constituting on average 0.4-0.8% of all those 
convicted in 1945-1948: Govorov, Prestupnost’ i bor’ba s nei v poslevoennoi Leningrade, p.68; the 
scattered data to which I had access give a slightly higher proportion but still less than 5%; in January 
1945, for example, 3.3% of the 789 people convicted were invalids, and in the same month of 1946, of the 
1538 people given criminal sentences, 4% were classified as servicemen or invalids: TsGASPb, f.7384, 
op.36, d.148, ll.19-27 and ibid, d.181, ll.1-7. 
839
 The previous chapter discussed how war invalids and other former servicemen were exempted from the 
obligation in force at this time to obtain permission from the police prior to purchasing tickets for train 
travel, however they still required some official documentation confirming the purpose of a journey made 
for personal reasons.  
840
 TsGASPb, f.7384, op.36, d.148, ll.44-5. 
 234
and engaged in small-scale trade, a culture of which war invalids were a major part.841 
One woman interviewed as part of the blockade project recalled that what struck her 
about the postwar city was the “abundance of cripples” and the “abundance of beggars”, 
of people who had returned from the front and were now asking for alms and getting 
drunk on the streets of the city.842 The negative portrait of a war invalid ‘impostor’ in the 
story Finally at Home, published towards the end of 1947, shows him not as a convincing 
Soviet employee but as one of the ‘market loafers’. He had lost his legs to frostbite 
during a drinking bout but after the war had travelled to a different town, “crowned” 
himself a war invalid and spent his time “in the far corner of the market”, where the 
ramshackle wooden kiosks began, drinking with suspect acquaintances like the purveyor 
of homemade tobacco or the fortune teller.843  
 
The invalids who drank together out on the city streets often may not have been in breach 
of any article of the criminal code, but the newspaper piece by the city procurator, Falin, 
published in January 1945 suggests that their mere presence in public places was 
construed and represented by the authorities as a violation of the desired postwar 
‘order’.844 A number of disruptions to social order, Falin noted, had been committed by 
war invalids. This was particularly unacceptable because:  
  
Soviet power surrounds its war invalids with care, granting them a number of 
privileges. The whole Soviet people relates to them with care and love. They 
have deserved this. They have shed their blood, lost their health in battles for the 
motherland. For this reason the struggle with those who bring this title into 
disrepute should be all the more severe.845  
  
                                                  
841
 Edele, “A “Generation of Victors?””, p.389. 
842
 Interview with V. I. V., ATsUI, Interview No. BL-1-025, p.10. 
843
 Gauzner, ‘Vot my i doma…’, pp.26-27. 
844
 On how official control over theanings and uses of public space were challenged by inhabitants 
conducting the everyday tasks of going to work or buying shopping as well as by social groups claiming 
and transforming locations through their recreational activities see Gerasimova and Chuikina, ‘Ot 
kapitalisticheskogo Peterburga’, p.45.  
845
 Falin, ‘Usilit’ bor’bu’, p.3. 
 235
The care of Leningraders for their war invalids and the families of servicemen, he added, 
should serve as a moral example to all. Many invalids, however, who had “not found 
their new place in life” still required help to find work and learn a new profession.846 The 
war, he concluded, had shown that the Soviet order was unshakeable, now was the time 
to sort out any defects. War invalids who were not at work or being cared for in Soviet 
institutions undermined what Beate Fieseler has termed “the performance of a state 
devoted to welfare”, the demonstration of inclusive, paternalistic care for wounded 
members of the Soviet family.847 They also destabilised the regime’s attempt to deny its 
war scars and project an image of a victorious society moving on to the tasks of 
reconstruction and settling in a grey, de-heroised, middle-class domesticity.848 The 
gathering of war invalids, and other veterans, to talk and drink in cafes, snack bars and 
open air ‘taverns’ could be seen, furthermore, as a display of belonging to a separate 
community within the wider Soviet one and of the attribution of space with unsanctioned 
meanings and uses.849 
 
There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that at some point in the late 1940s the Leningrad 
authorities responded by excising these invalids from the cityscape altogether. The local 
historian Aleksandr Panchenko, for example, has spoken of how there were many 
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invalids in the city after the war, of how it was common when walking along it streets to 
meet people without legs, on noisy carts, who made ends meet by trading something or 
sharpening knives. Then, suddenly, in one day, he claims, “they were no more: they had 
been sent to [the island of] Valaam”.850 I have not been able to locate any documents 
referring to a decision to move invalids forcibly to this small island on lake Ladoga, 
however many certainly ended up in a shelter on the island. An interviewee recalls 
visiting her grandmother there in the late 1940s and being terrified by the corridor full of 
people without their limbs.851 The war invalids of Valaam have also formed the subject of 
the novella Patience by Iurii Nagibin and of paintings by the artist Viktor Antonov.852 
  
There are many documents attesting to the extra-judicial practices employed by the local 
police to pick up unsupervised and homeless young people from public places in the city, 
a common practice in prewar years that after the war was closely connected to attempts 
by officials to control the placement and behaviour of students of the expanding labour 
reserve system.853  
  
As in the case of war invalids, police reports from the time made note of the proportion of 
adolescents who had been convicted for criminal offences and detailed the felonies 
committed by young people assigned to the city’s trade and factory schools in 
particular.854 Police officials highlighted in their records, for example, incidents of theft 
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and drunken assaults by bands of teenagers who had been mobilised into these 
institutions.855 These included the activities of a group of students from a Leningrad 
labour reserve school calling themselves the ‘Black Cat gang’.856  
  
According to Aleksandr Tarasov, the proliferation of gangs identifying themselves by the 
sign of the ‘Black cat’ was a postwar phenomenon in cities across the Soviet Union. The 
reality was often, however, much “more modest” than the scenes from the series The 
Meeting Place Must Not Be Changed.857 The activities of the Leningrad gang, for 
example, consisted of the classmates swearing loyalty to each other, giving themselves a 
tattoo and then committing a few petty thefts from apartments, usually belonging to 
neighbours of members of the group.858 Only three of the group when caught were 
sentenced to periods of imprisonment of one to three years. The students appear less like 
violent ‘bandits’ than impoverished teenagers who, alienated from the myth of the war, 
formed an alternative community identifying with rumours about the culture of the 
criminal underground.859 
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Most of the trade school students who were dealt with by the police in these years were 
not actually prosecuted in the courts. Newspaper articles by Falin and Shiktorov that 
drew attention to misdemeanours by youths, in particular those arriving at the trade 
schools, noted low-level ‘social disorders’ such as trading in cigarettes, vodka and tickets 
at markets and cinemas, or simply “getting up to mischief” on the streets and bothering 
passers-by.860 While under a hundred labour reserve students and other adolescents were 
actually convicted of crimes each month in 1945 and the first two months of 1946, over 
5000 were picked up from the streets for transgressions such as street trade, jumping on 
and off trams and other undefined ‘violations of order’. The police subsequently returned 
most of them to their parents or placed them in factory and trade schools.861  
  
The focus in the rhetoric and practice of the authorities on the criminal and disorderly 
behaviour of adolescents in general, and those from the labour schools in particular, can 
also be understood in the context of the enforcement of a spatial and normative postwar 
order and the efforts of the regime to ‘remake the streets’ as well as the population 
according to these norms. Labour reserve students, after all, were semi-indentured 
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workers whose unauthorised absence from the workbench was itself illegal.862 They were 
also represented in the Soviet media as a symbol of the reconstruction effort and 
regeneration of the workforce. Numerous articles in the Leningrad edition of the 
newspaper Pravda from 1944 to 1947 emphasised the contribution of young people in 
general and trainees from labour reserve schools in particular to the city’s economy and 
housing.863 One such article depicted how hundreds of boys and girls who had recently 
arrived at a Leningrad factory school got up at 6.30 in the morning to begin work as 
builders, describing them as “the generation who has to reconstruct our Leningrad”.864 In 
addition, newspaper accounts portrayed them, like war invalids, as emblematic of the 
state’s inclusive ‘care’ for its people. The whole country, articles in Leningradskaia 
Pravda proclaimed, was generously providing for them and surrounding them with 
attention.865  
  
The uncontrolled movements about the streets of these adolescents, who were often 
poorly clothed and under nourished, disrupted the image of a society structured according 
to concepts such as ‘employment’, ‘care’, ‘middle class cultured-ness’ and ‘renewal’. In 
October 1944 the city Soviet has issued a resolution according to which students of trade 
and factory schools were not allowed out in the city without notification of authorised 
leave.866 This resolution must be upheld by, Shiktorov reminded the directors of trade and 
factory schools in his article a year later, in order to prevent the “aimless wandering of 
teenagers about the city”.867  
  
The city Soviet’s department of cultural and enlightenment work made detailed proposals 
as to the manner in which the newly arriving young students and workers should conduct 
themselves around the city, the way in which they should use and also interpret the public 
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spaces of the centre. The central library, for example, proposed activities with young 
workers mobilised to the city, “to acquaint new Leningraders with “the city of Russian 
glory” Petersburg-Petrograd-Leningrad, with the history of our miraculous city, with its 
glorious revolutionary past, with its monuments of art and culture”.868 This was to be 
achieved through exhibitions, public readings, directed excursions and a quiz based on 
these. The suggested excursions included details of the route each one should take and 
the selection of material which should be read to accompany the visit and inform an 
understanding of the historical walks.869 The library also recommended a poster to be put 
up in workers’ hostels and trade schools on the ‘city of Russian glory’, with illustrations 
of the city’s monuments and excerpts from poems written by Ol’ga Berggol’ts and Vera 
Inber during the blockade.870 The local authorities sought to control in this way both the 
assimilation of civic symbols by new city-dwellers and, conversely, their own 
assimilation into the cityscape. 
  
On a local level, therefore, the attention paid by officials to the relationship of particular 
incomers to the appearance of the postwar cityscape was bound up with the construction 
of belonging to a particularistic civic community and environment. The ambivalent 
attitude of the Leningrad city government to those arriving after the war had been 
demonstrated in the previous chapter. On the one hand, Leningrad officials needed to 
promote the speedy integration of hundreds of thousands of people into the post-war 
urban environment. On the other, they had participated in creating a powerful local 
wartime myth of the city and its inhabitants during the blockade as a special, unique 
moral and cultured community, purified in the course of withstanding unprecedented 
suffering and barbarism. The confrontation with this ambiguity generated a discourse 
which was often centred around issues of cleanliness and morality. Articles appeared in 
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the press in which people’s relationship to the cleanliness, tidiness, culture and ‘order’ of 
the city’s spaces was closely tied to their inclusion in the community of Leningraders.871 
  
Shiktorov averred in one of his articles, for example, that the community of Leningraders, 
always marked by high levels of culture, had been cemented by their preservation of 
order in the city during the blockade. Tens of thousands of this population had displayed 
mass heroism, he wrote, in defending their beloved city, guarding its buildings and 
protecting the lives and property of other inhabitants.872 In the city, in particular, 
therefore, manifestations of disorderly behaviour were unacceptable.  
  
Lisa Kirschenbaum has demonstrated the way in which official local media accounts of 
the blockade during the war and for several years afterwards infused and shaped the 
experiences and memories of ‘Leningraders’ with mythic narratives that encouraged them 
to understand themselves as heroic defenders of a moral and civilised community. A 
recurring element of this shared narrative of local officials and inhabitants of the 
blockade city was the spring cleaning of the city in 1942. The narrative that 
‘Leningraders in spring 1942 voluntarily went out to clean their native city despite the 
cold and hunger, as a result of which heroic effort no epidemics appeared in the city’ was 
continually repeated in the media at the time and after and recurs in interviews with 
blockade survivors decades later.  
  
A front page article in Leningradskaia Pravda of March 1944, for example, reiterated the 
message that Leningraders risked enemy fire to clean yards, streets and squares out of a 
love for their native city that was stronger than cold, tiredness and hunger, thus 
demonstrating their culture and heroism.873 That the 1942 spring cleaning became one of 
the standard symbols of the resilience of the city’s population during the blockade is 
demonstrated by interviews conducted during the recent oral history project on the 
blockade. Almost identical phrases about the spring cleaning occur in over twenty of their 
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73 transcribed interviews with blockade survivors. The following statement of one 
blokadnik can be seen as representative: “in March 1942 Leningraders achieved a real 
feat. They saved the city from epidemics….you could barely hold the spade in your 
hands…This is love for the city”.874  
  
Re-evacuees could write themselves into the narrative of cultured, moral Leningraders, 
concerned with the cleanliness and order of the city, by means of several narratives. 
These narratives were utilised by respondents in interviews over five decades later. Those 
who were in the city during the most terrible blockade winter of 1941-42 and who did not 
leave until after the spring clean up, of course, mobilised the standard version of the feat 
of morally good Leningraders in their accounts.875 Others emphasised their upbringing as 
Leningraders, which, for them, meant precisely that they did not drop rubbish after the 
war.876 Another interview respondent, who had not taken part in the spring clean up 
before she was evacuated, nevertheless emphasised her connection to these events, and 
thereby to the city’s revival. She described how she had witnessed exhausted people with 
spades cleaning Leningrad’s main street, Nevskii Prospekt, before she left and, moreover, 
how she had heard about the clean ups in evacuation where ‘we lived the life of 
Leningrad’.877  
  
This was not the case with two other groups: adolescents mobilised into trade schools, 
whether they had been evacuated from Leningrad as children or were new to the city, and 
new arrivals in general.878 There were many public representations of these groups, by 
the municipal authorities and native population, which expressed doubts about their 
sanitary discipline and the requirement for them to prove they had been ‘acculturated’ on 
the city’s terms. 
  
An article of February 1944 about a trade school dealt at length with the issue of whether 
the adolescent arrivals to the school were ‘Leningraders’ or not. Interestingly, many of 
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them were originally ‘natives’ of the city. The article noted that most of them had lived in 
the city before the war and ‘only some had left at the start of the war and do not know 
how we lived and others were taken away in spring 1942. They lived together with us 
that winter’.879 Even though these young ‘Leningraders’ had now returned ‘home’, 
however, the article emphasised that they had needed actively to re-integrate into the 
trade school community and ‘family’ by learning, or re-learning, and demonstrating what 
were termed Leningrad traditions of behaviour.  
  
The article described how the new arrivals had striven to integrate with the old to prove 
by their behaviour that ‘we are also Leningraders, we won’t let you down’.880 The most 
basic commandment of the work collective, which the new arrivals had managed to 
grasp, was to ‘do everything ourselves’, in particular the cleaning of the hostel. It was 
emphasised that the youths themselves, both new and old, were now responsible for the 
cleanliness that shone in the hostel, the smell of freshly washed floors and the neatly 
arranged bunks. As a result of their proper conduct, the article concluded that they could 
indeed now properly be considered ‘Leningraders’.881 
  
Adult migrants arriving in Leningrad for the first time were also depicted as in need of 
sanitary instruction in order to belong to a cultured community of Leningraders. The 
letter published in the newspaper from I. Pikin, in which he wrote that a scrap of paper on 
the street was the sign of a lack of culture by new residents of the city, underscored that 
this was particularly salient in Leningrad, a city always renowned not only for the beauty 
of its architecture but also for exemplary order, for high levels of discipline.882 A 
newspaper article of September 1944 titled ‘Concern about the living arrangement and 
labour use of new workers’, admonished factory authorities about the dirty conditions in 
hostels and the breakdown of the water and sewage systems.883 Care had to be shown 
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towards the environment of these new workers so that they knew “their place” in the 
workshop and so they could assimilate “not only the culture of production but also 
traditions of the collective (and) join the glorious family of Leningraders”.884  
  
This discussion of ‘crime’ and ‘disorder’ in the city in the framework of state and 
community building practices aimed at ‘placing’ people in the postwar order and 
environment helps to make sense of the disjunction between the actual numbers of crimes 
and outbreaks of disease registered and the prominence of threats to the health, 
appearance and morality of Soviet society in discourse at the time. Jeffrey Burds and 
Elena Zubkova have attributed this discrepancy to different causes.885 Burds takes issue 
with Zubkova’s assertion that this it reflects increased public fear of falling victim to 
crime in the poverty-ridden postwar years and suggests instead that it is connected with 
the growth in particularly violent crime.  
  
Examining the materials in the light of the ‘itinerant’ perspective has suggested another 
reading altogether, however. In the rhetoric of the law enforcement agents serious crime 
shaded into petty disorders and both become imbricated in a discussion of the 
‘dangerous’ character of people on the move into the city. Particularly threatening groups 
were those with unknown or false identities and those who shirked from work and got up 
to mischief on the streets. In this discourse certain urban spaces had to be protected, 
above all market places and cinemas, as well as public space more generally. It is both 
their safety and their tidy appearance that must be ensured. In short, these representations 
can be understood as part of the elaboration of the social and spatial postwar order by the 
authorities and the disciplining of those who disrupted attempts to fix their ‘place’ within 
it. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion  
 
6.1 The postwar Soviet family 
 
At the end of 1946, a short story by Platonov was published under the title ‘The Family 
Ivanov’ (Sem’ia Ivanova) in the journal Novyi Mir.886  It depicts the broken and 
incomplete ‘return’ of a demobilised soldier, Ivanov, to his family at the end of the war. 
On the journey, while waiting for a train, he meets a woman whom he had known when 
she was working in an army canteen. He senses that she, too, feels “orphaned” without 
the army and they embark on a brief affair during the trip.887 Ivanov accompanies her all 
the way to her home town, from where her mother and father had been driven by the 
Germans never to return, and which now seems an almost “foreign land” to her.888 After 
two days, however, he parts with her to travel onwards to his “native place”.889 When he 
arrives home he discovers a son who has become old beyond his years and a wife who 
herself has been unfaithful. He is left feeling usurped from his roles as father, husband 
and provider in his now unfamiliar home. The story does not end with his reintegration 
into the family but with the veteran standing on a path, with no indication of whether he 
will follow the direction home. 
 
Platonov’s story reflected the actual experience of many whose families had been 
dispersed by the war or who had become alienated from each other by wartime 
experience.890 The authorities could not, however, countenance the implications of a story 
in which domestic life was turned upside down, paternal roles were challenged, 
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‘homelands’ had become foreign places and the future trajectory of the protagonist was 
uncertain. There was a furious official reaction to its publication and Platonov was never 
allowed to publish again. It was attacked on the pages of Literaturnaia Gazeta and in the 
Central Committee decree of 14th August ‘On the journals Zvezda and Leningrad’ and 
was ritually denounced by other Soviet writers in their responses to the decree as a 
“vulgar” and “defamatory” tale that “denigrated” the Soviet family.891  
 
Lynne Viola has discussed how prewar work by Platonov captured the realities of the 
times, above all the contradictions of the Bolshevik drive to control and master society 
through ‘rational’ visions of order, discipline and productivity and its chaotic results. 
Platonov exposed how Bolshevik planning ended up as a façade grafted onto a complex, 
messy society resistant to such ordering.892 His tale of the Ivanov family, and its 
subsequent treatment by the authorities, encapsulate in a similar manner the ongoing 
unsettlements of the postwar period that both engendered and frustrated official efforts to 
impose a certain order, to implement a vision of a purified Soviet family in which 
everyone had a place.  
 
This thesis has attempted to show how the processes of displacement, state power and the 
construction of ‘home’ interacted during the repopulation of Leningrad in the wake of the 
siege. It has done so through the adoption of what Liisa Malkki has termed the “scholarly 
lens” of the itinerant perspective.893 This lens, it has argued, enables us to view this 
period of the city’s history and the history of the Soviet Union in a new way. 
 
6.2 A new lens 
 
We are accustomed, Eric Naiman writes in the introduction to his monograph on early 
Soviet culture from 1997, to viewing the Soviet Union of the 1920s “through the lenses 
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of a few well-worn pairs of glasses.894 It is time, he argues, to feel less nervous about 
trying on new visual aids. The same could be said of the postwar period of Soviet history 
until recently. The common lens through which scholars viewed the years immediately 
following the war was that of ‘high Stalinism’, bringing into focus political and cultural 
repressions and the “lethal logic” of the regime.895 Some researchers maintained the focus 
on high politics but instead of a ‘lethal logic’ saw policy disputes, factions and 
compromise among a wide circle of senior officials.896 Only Vera Dunham trained her 
gaze on Soviet society more widely and through a reading of postwar fiction observed a 
concordat between the regime and some sections of the population, a ‘Big Deal’ between 
the Stalinist state and the values of the middle classes.897  
 
Since Elena Zubkova published her social history of the postwar years in 1997, many 
more scholars have begun to follow suit.898 Most, however, have ‘spied on’ postwar 
Soviet society through a lens of ‘normalcy’, looking for a settling down in everyday life 
and concluding either that this return to normal existence was effected after the war or 
that it was delayed by postwar events.899 Those who turned their attention to Leningrad in 
the aftermath of war and the siege, on the other hand, adopted a uniquely local view that 
refracted all postwar events through the experiences of the blockade.900    
 
This thesis has attempted to incorporate the history of postwar Leningrad into that of the 
Soviet Union as a whole and to examine both through a new ‘visual aid’: that of the 
‘itinerant perspective’. The lens of the itinerant perspective helps us to understand the 
processes of displacement that are involved in constituting communities on a national 
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level and on the scale of the city or the neighbourhood.901 It shows how the movements 
of people and the practices and discourses adopted by governments and other agencies 
aimed at constraining and disciplining their mobility create and define ‘homelands’, their 
boundaries and their outsides.902   
 
Adopting this perspective has revealed both the diverse mobilities and the normalising 
practices to which they gave rise that were an important feature of the reconstruction 
years in Leningrad and in the wider Soviet state. It has allowed us to view these in the 
context of longer term and more widespread processes of displacement and measures to 
‘fix’ populations. Observing that experiences of flux characterised the postwar period for 
many and that these experiences, furthermore, were not an aberration from a sedentary 
normality sheds new light on ‘ordinary Leningraders’ after the war, on the nature of 
Soviet society and on the interactions among the population and between people and the 
authorities.903  
 
The post-blockade city, in this light, can no longer be neatly defined as a ‘city of 
blockade survivors’, coming to terms with their experiences through an identification 
with well-known civic myths and urban spaces, or as a ‘city of migrants’, newly arrived 
from the village to replace a lost population of residents who had been the bearers of a 
unique Leningrad culture. The post-siege population included blockade survivors who 
had arrived in the city as migrants or ‘refugees’ shortly before the siege began or who had 
been displaced from their prewar homes within the city during the course of the war; re-
evacuees who had lived through much of the siege or who felt they had ‘lived the life of 
Leningrad’ in evacuation; a range of newcomers, including demobilised soldiers, 
mobilised workers and trainees and people arriving on their own initiative, often illegally. 
Some people arriving in the city understood their journey as a ‘return home’, while many 
among the population, including newcomers, re-evacuees and blockade survivors, 
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continued to encounter displacement and resettlement inside the city as part of the 
‘struggle for housing’.  
 
The ongoing migrations that shaped the city intersected with the mythologizing of the 
blockade by local officials, cultural figures and siege survivors and with the state building 
practices of the Soviet regime. Visions of a ‘community of Leningraders’ and a ‘postwar 
order’ were formulated, developed and imposed through measures and rhetoric aimed at 
the ‘population on the move’, in which itinerants figured as a potentially transgressive, 
contaminating ‘element’. People travelling to the city at the same time manifested their 
own understanding of who belonged in the city and their own forms of social 
identification and in so doing prompted renewed attempts by the authorities to regulate 
their presence in the urban landscape or to remove them altogether. The picture is not so 
much one of a ‘return to normalcy’ as the interaction of continued unsettlement with a set 
of practices and representations aimed at ‘normalising’ populations who had not found 
their ‘place’ in postwar society and the local or national ‘family’. 
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